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ABSTRACT
LABOR UNIONS AND REGIME TRANSITION IN ARGENTINA

SEPTEMBER 1988
LINDA CHEN, B.A., QUEENS COLLEGE, CITY UNIVERSITY OF
NEW

YORK

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Howard

J.

Wiarda

Current scholarship on regime transition in the

Southern Cone has concentrated on the internal dynamics
or structural contradictions of the authoritarian regime

as being the fundamental

reason leading to its demise.

Undoubtedly, the exit of the military authoritarians in

Argentina from power resulted from their own assessment
that the costs of maintaining power were too high.

However, it would be

a

mistake to solely emphasize the

internal dynamics of the ruling elites without taking
into consideration the role of popular civilian groups
in destabilizing the authoritarian regime.

This thesis argues that during the last military

authoritarian era (1976-1983), the Argentine labor
movement was one of the few civilian groups capable of
opposing the regime.

The Argentine labor movement has

long tradition of political activism dating back to the
vi

i

a

days of Juan Peron.

During the last military

intervention, the military attempted an all-out
assault
on labor to de-Peronize and de-politicize it.

The

military was initially successful at repressing labor
activism through the use of force and legal statutes.
In the first three years of military rule,

movement was divided and weakened

— its

the labor

political power

was effectively circumscribed, despite efforts by labor
to redress the dire situation.

Labor attempts to reconstitute its political pwoer
base came toward the end of the most repressive period
of military rule.

Faced with the threat of

institutional destruction, labor was able to mount

a

campaign against regime policy long before any other
civilian group was able to do so.

By relying on its

ability to mobilize sectors of the population over bread
and butter issues,

its organized bureaucracy,

and its

tradition of political activism, labor was able to
resist the regime, although throughout this period, much

dissension existed within the movement.

The ability to

utilize issues of economic survival as forums for

criticizing regime policies were constant problems for
regime whose raison d'etre rested on law and order, and
the ability to ensure a docile labor force.

They very

inability of the military to contain labor activism was
an important factor in the transition to democracy in

Argentina in 1983.
vii i
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CHAPTER

I

THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN AN AUTHORITARIAN SETTING

The study of Latin American politics has undergone

several transformations since the World War

II

era.

From an emphasis on legal-formalism to contemporary

theories of corporatism and dependency, as

a

field of

analysis Latin American politics has attempted to

manifest itself in the prevailing political reality of
the area.

Theory building concerning the whys and

wherefores of political change has sought to describe
and explain the essential characteristics of Latin

American political life in the hope of greater
1

understanding and predictability for the
analyst. More
often than not, new trends in theory building

have been

precipitated by unforeseen and therefore unexplained
events in Latin America such as

a

rash of military coups

or the emergence of paramilitary groups.

building trends necessarily provoke

a

New theory-

rethinking of old

theories and models of analysis, leading to the

rejection of some and the revision of others.

it is

within this tradition of theory building that an
analysis of Latin American political change will be
si

tuated

Traditional Theories of Political Development
The point of departure for this study is the period

after World War II for this was the beginning of the

development of theories of modernization for Latin

America and the rest of the Third World.

In terms of

political change, the world was seeing the demise of the

British and French empires and the emergence of newly
independent nations in Asia and Africa.
1950s,

Prior to the

it was the accepted wisdom that these nations

would create democratic political systems along the same
lines as the United States and the countries of Western
Europe, and that this democratic development was the

2

standard in weighing the extent of
modernization.

a

country's

Studies— mainly historical and

descriptive in nature

—

were made of executives,

legislatures, and constitutions.

While initially, many of the newly independent
nations instituted some form of democratic government,
the study of formal institutions did not seem to get at
the crux of what these new nations were all about.

one thing,

For

these nations were vastly different from the

nations of Europe and the United States, both culturally
and philosophically.

In the interest of creating value-

free and objective criteria for analyzing differing

political systems, many comparative theorists embraced
the field of behaviorism with its emphasis on systems

and functions.
The Politics of the Developing Areas by Gabriel

Almond and James Coleman, published in 1960, attempted
to introduce new conceptual frameworks emphasizing

action and behavior into the study of developing areas.

Almond and Coleman argued for replacing an analysis of
formal legal institutions with an analysis of the

functions performed by political systems.

More elastic,

fluid categories of analysis needed to be developed to

promote greater comparability across diverse cultures.
For example,

the concept of the state connoted certain

3

legal and institutional models (of European
style),

while the political system included

a

diverse range of

political organizations and activities.

A political

system, according to Almond and Coleman, was

system of

a

interactions which performed the functions of

integration and adaptation by the means of, or threat
of,

the use of force.

It was valid,

therefore, to call

governments of tribal chieftains political systems so as
to facilitate their comparison with other political

systems

Almond and Coleman argued that all political systems
performed certain functions.

Borrowing from David

Easton, they called these functions inputs and outputs.
Input functions were political socialization

and

recruitment, interest articulation, interest

aggregation, and political communication.

functions were rule
adjudication.

-

making,

Output

rule application,

and rule

What separated one system from the other

was the degree of specificity of the structures which

performed these functions.

As

a

general rule, developed

systems were those where specialized structures existed
and where the functions were universally understood.
For example,

in modern systems interest articulation

would be diffuse, particularistic, and affective.
result,

As a

interests were harder to aggregate in developing

4

countries than in modern ones.

Almond and Coleman's desire was to break the
notion
that there was a dichotomy between developed and
developing areas.

All societies had both modern and

—

traditional tendencies

Development then, was

a

they were dual by nature.

process whereby

a

society moved

from traditionaKparticularist, ascriptive,

hierarchical) toward modern (universal, achievementoriented, egalitarian).

Societies could be plotted on

a

time line with progress representing the increasing pace

toward modernity.

Of course, vestiges of tradi tional i ty

existed, but they became subordinate in the political

system rather than dominant as the system moved along
the continuum.^"

Although Almond and Coleman sought to develop

a

neutral analytic framework for studying developing
areas, their structural-functional categories had

embedded in them

a

northern European democratic bias.

The categorization of inputs assumed

a

system where

demands were made from the bottom up; i.e., the people
made demands upon the government which reacted to these

demands in its outputs.

By giving equal weight to

inputs and outputs, Almond and Coleman were assuming

a

system with informed citizens and an open government ala
the democratic model.

Thus, being developed was equated

5

with being democratic which became the
ideal type by
which all other systems were measured.
Implicit was

a

value judgment concerning which systems were
better.
The assumptions of the structural-functional
model

were adapted by subsequent analyses of developing
areas.
Studies were undertaken to measure the degree of

sophistication of bureaucracies, political parties, and

communications networks, among others, in developing
areas.

In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba wrote

Tn e Civic Culture which was an attempt to apply

behaviorist theory to comparative analysis.

They sought

to analyze the relationship between structure, attitude,

and behavior.

The political culture,

that is,

the

attitudes toward government, toward the nation, and
toward oneself and fellow citizens, had an important

influence on the types of structures created and on the

behavior of citizens.

Survey techniques were used and

systematic empirical correlations were attempted.

The

major contributions of this work to understanding the

politics of developing areas were to encourage more
quantitative, statistical and objective studies and to

develop the linkage between political culture (which
could be seen as an elaboration of the political

socialization function) and the structure of government.

6

Critiques of political culture literature and

behaviorist theory in general have argued that there
is
an overemphasis on political culture as causing

structure.

R.

Fagen argued that the government's role

of establishing and inculcating values and beliefs
were

overlooked.

R.

Tucker also viewed the emphasis on

political socialization from below as being biased
toward the western European systems.

3

Here again, the

criticism could be made that The Civic Culture held the

western democratic model as an ideal type rather than

a

neutral yardstick for evaluation.
The 1960s witnessed the decline of democratic regimes
in the nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa,

and

the increasing trend toward violence and dictatorial

regimes.

David Apter, in The Pol i t i cs of Mode rni zat ion

ventured to say that democracy may not work
developing stages of

a

in the

polity so that other means (e.g.,

coercion) for regime consolidation should not be ruled
out.

His work set out to develop the relationships

between three analytical frameworks: normative
(questions of right action and moral choice),

structural-functional (changes in political process),
and behavioral (attitudes).

By analyzing modernization

from these viewpoints, he sought to delineate various

solutions to problems faced by developing nations.

4

C.

Black,

E.

offered

a

in The Dynamics of Modernization.

criticism of modernization as having been

violent process, disrupting total societies.

a

He

cautioned that the loss of traditional ties had not
been
replaced by necessarily better forms, but that the

alienation caused by industrialization and urbanization
had caused misery for millions living in modern

societies.

He stressed the need to explore different

routes to modernization in the hope of avoiding some of
the problems faced by previous modernization epochs.

5

What the studies of the mid-1960s had in common was
the belief that modernization was the same as

democratization.

The transition or the movement toward

modernization might differ from region to region, but
the end-result was always assumed to be the liberal

democratic types of systems found in the United States
and Western Europe.

Studies which dealt with the

problems of modernization were implicitly using

pluralist democracy as their point of reference.

The

frequency of military coups, the divisiveness of
interest groups, political corruption, and other

patterns were labeled "problems" because they were seen
as "lacking" in cohesive institutions and channels of

communication, for certain governmental functions were

deemed to be non-existent.

8

Those

functions, of course,

were those associated with the democratic model
of
gove rnment
In 1968,

Samuel Huntington's Political Order in

Changing Societies provided another facet to the
analysis of modernization theory.

Huntington

differentiated between modernization and political
development.

Modernization involved the social and

economic transformation of the society as

a

whole;

political development dealt specifically with the

specialization and adaptability of governing
institutions

dealing with these social and economic

transformations.

The problem with developing societies

was that mass mobilization (i.e., groups formed with

articulate interests) occurred before government
structures were institutionalized to meet these demands.

Because government structures could not adapt to
increasing demands, the result was instability, leading
to violence and the imposition of authoritarian regimes.

The prior emphasis on system inputs, therefore, had been

misguided; what was needed now was analysis of

institution stability.
One of the effects of Huntington's thesis was the

trend toward the study of elite groups such as the

military, business, university students, and civil
servants, among others.

For example,

9

rather than assume

the existence of military regimes as

a

sign of

underdevelopment, analysts were now viewing
the

prominence of military regimes as

a

necessary outcome of transition.

This was particularly

logical and

true within the field of Latin American politics
as the

1960s saw the capitulation of democratic governments to

military men.

Rather than proving to be "unmode rni zed

,

many of the military regimes of the 1960s displayed

competence at economic planning, foreign policy, and
regime consolidation.
The late 1960s and early 1970s marked
in the field of Latin American politics.

a

turning point

Given that

many of the Latin American nations were not following
the "traditional" path toward modernization and refusing
to accept the idea that Latin America was backward

rather than that

something was wrong with the political

development model, analysts in Latin American studies
began to break away from mainstream thinking of

comparative politics and to attempt new explanations for
Latin American political change.

In observing the

ascendancy of military regimes in many Latin American
countries, theories were advanced to explain their

emergence and to assess their significance to Latin

American political change.
In conceptualizing change

10

in Latin

American politics,

contemporary theories focused on the compatibility
of
non-democratic regimes with economic development.

It

was in explaining the reasons behind this
compatibility
that the debate ensued.

each with

a

Several schools of thought,

distinctive argument but sharing some

similarities and assumptions, attempted to explain the
rise of military regimes. The various schools of thought
can be divided into two categories: corporatist and

authoritarian (with bureaucratic-authoritarianism as the
major sub-type).

One major school of thought which will

not be addressed directly is dependency theory as many
of the salient features of dependency theory will be

incorporated

in the analysis of bureaucratic-

authoritarianism.

Corporat i sm

Although the corporatism/authoritarianism debate in
Latin American politics was

a

decade ago, the theory of

corporatism still exists today.

Corporatism, as defined

by Latin American political theorists, is

a

political

system whereby power is hierarchically organized and
interests were incorporated vertically in
structure.

a

Power would be centralized among

small elite; in 1960s Latin America,

pyramidal
a

it was the

in many nations which was at the apex of power.

11

very

military
Below

the military came other powerful organized
interests

such as the landed oligarchy, the Roman Catholic
Church,
the middle sectors, and labor each sharing some
degree
of power and influence.

Below these groups would be the

newly organized middle class, below them the skilled
workers, and at the bottom of the pyramid would be

peasants and the urban poor.

The key to corporatism is

that it seeks to maintain the power of the traditional

elites while at the same time allowing certain organized

interests into the power structure.
had traditionally not been

a

For example,

labor

power sharer in many Latin

American nations but with the increasing growth in
number of workers and strength at the work place,

traditional elites saw the need to somehow incorporate
labor into the ruling structure.

This incorporation

would take the form of promoting several labor leaders
into the corporatist structure and delegating them

power, but this power would be conditioned by loyalty to
the status quo.

The ruling elites realized the need to

accommodate newly emerging interests in society, but
they were also intent on preserving the hierarchical,

authoritarian system which had favored them for so long.
By using strategies of cooptation and incorporation, the

ruling elites sought to maintain control over the

growing number of demands of
12

a

society undergoing rapid

social and economic transformation.

7

Corporatism then, is clearly non-democratic
and its
hierarchical organization reinforces class
distinctions
among groups in society.
In Latin America,

it was clear

which groups had power and influence and which
did not.
Interest articulation was carried out through set,

established channels with control emanating from the top
of the pyramid.

It is the group rather than the

individual which takes precedence in this social system
and it is the state which determines and controls the

existence and functions of these groups.

That is,

groups were given the right to represent certain

interests by the state and more often than not, the
group's very existence was dependent upon the state's

willingness to grant them benefits and privileges.

Each

group was functionally distinct from the other,
representing

a

prescribed set of interests.

In return,

these groups abdicated their autonomy to the state and

agreed to work within established boundaries in their
demand-making.

The state ideally represented the

"common interest" and the society was an organic whole
in which group interests were tied together.

Problem

solving was carried out through bureaucratic

administrative channels, where they were administered
and handled rather than taken care of substantively.

13

3

The reasons behind why corporatism
rather than

pluralist democracy had been the norm rather
than
pluralist democracy were varied and in
contention.
school of thought argued that corporatism
was

a

One

logical

development given the distinctive heritage of Latin
America.
Theorists such as H. Wiarda, F. Pike,
G.

Dealy, and C. Veliz argued that Latin American

historical development had been rooted in hierarchical,
paternalist, and Catholic social and political

arrangements.

Latin American corporatism was

a

direct

descendant of the Spanish colonial system which was
brought to the New World almost intact by the
conquistadors.

The Spanish Crown theoretically

maintained control over its colonies through the
encomienda system whereby the Crown, claiming control
over the indigenous Indian population, granted certain

individuals the right to use Indians in their mining and

agricultural pursuits.

The relationship the Crown

sought to enforce was one where power was centralized in
Spain with conquistadors subordinate to the Crown and

dependent upon Spain for benefits and privileges.

Q

While the degree of effectiveness of control by the
Crown varied from region to region, the conventions

established by patrimonial Spanish society were adapted
to Spanish America and have perpetuated to this day.

14

The political order was an hierarchical one with
one man
rule.

What prevented this system from being despotic

was the adherence to Catholic principles.

The

conquistador and later in the nineteenth century, the

hacendado had

a

—

responsibility over his underlings

Christianize and to treat them humanely.

to

According to

Catholic doctrine, society was treated as an organic
whole, each person having

a

specific function and

enjoying the rights and privileges thereof.
were subject to higher authority in

Individuals

rank order.

Ideally, the church and its clergy were at the top of
the hierarchy in the temporal life, below them the

hacendados, and below them the masses.

In Catholic

tradition, much emphasis was placed on obedience to

authority, based on the assumption that God ordered
temporal life the way he did for good reason.

This

notion, coupled with resignation to your lot in life,

made Latin America an inherently conservative and slow.

.10

changing region.

Centralized non-democratic authoritarian rule based
on traditional Spanish society has remained an integral

characteristic of Latin American political life.

Rule

by individual hacendados has given way to rule by

military men or by

a

small elite of defined groups.

Even during the republican periods of the late
15

nineteenth and twentieth centuries, politics
coalesced
around certain populist figures.
Present-day
corporatist structures were but reifications of
traditional Spanish Catholic society.

Another interpretation for the reasons behind the

development of corporatism was offered by Alfred Stepan.
Stepan first set out to distinguish between

guiding philosophy and the way

a

a

culture's

society attempted to

order itself in concrete structures and policies.

Like

Wiarda, Stepan argued that the liberal-pluralist

tradition with its pursuit of individual interests as

producing the best good for society was not
the Latin American heritage.

a

part of

Rather, an "organic-

statist" tradition had prevailed which located the

common good with the existence of
community.

strong statist

Organi c-s tat i sm posited that man's nature

could only be fulfilled within
this community,

required.

a

a

a

community.

To attain

strong interventionist state was

The end of state action was to serve the

common good, and the state had the prerogative to take

autonomous action in promoting radical changes in
society.

While public and individual pursuits were

allowed, the state had the legitimate right to bridle
these pursuits as it saw fit.

Each component part of

community had its own proper place and function within
16

a

the organic whole. 11

Where Stepan differed with the "corporatism
as
historical continuity" school was in his assessment
of
the origins of corporatism.

Stepan argued that

corporatism was first and foremost

a

set of

institutional arrangements established to order society
and that organic-statism was often the justification for

imposing such corporatist structures.

Corporatism was

a

means whereby established elite groups dealt with

perceived threats to their power; policies were
therefore consciously adopted. As new groups emerged to
compete for power, groups already in positions of power
felt they were being threatened; when they saw the tide

was irreversible, those in power sought to control the

degree of change which occurred by utilizing the

instruments of the state to corporatize
of newly organized groups.
In this model,

a

select number

1

the state directed the process of

incorporating certain groups into the power structure.
Control was located in the state for it was the only

institution which could claim legitimacy in maintaining
control.

For the elites who felt their power eroding,

the state and its corporat i zing strategies provided

a

means for controlling newly mobilized groups under the
rubric of the "organic-statist" philosophy.

17

By allowing

"non-conflictual" and limited modes of participation,

carefully directed by the state and legitimized
by
elite groups felt they could minimize the erosion

it,

of

their power. 13

Stepan further refined his thesis by differentiating

between various sub-types of corporatism
and exclusionary.

—

inclusionary

In attempting to explain the

diversity of political institutions which existed
throughout Latin America, Stepan delineated the

variables he saw as important in the creation of

corporatist regimes.

Inclusionary corporatism, as the

name implies, entailed policies which sought to

incorporate "salient working-class" groups into the
power structure.

Exclusionary corporatism was policies

which sought the repression and deactivation of salient
working-class groups through coercive means and their
reintegration under conditions which were in accord with
the stated goals of the state.

The conditions under which inclusionary or

exclusionary policies were used varied according to the

politico-socioeconomic conditions prevailing at
time.

a

given

Generally, inclusionary policies were instituted

under conditions of early industrialization and low

political mobilization giving way to the natural demise
of oligarchical forces in the onward march toward

18

mode rni ty

Exclusionary policies which were perhaps more
the
norm in most Latin American countries were

institutionalized under two conditions.

The first was

an environment where political mobilization
was high and

ideologically differentiated.

The elite assumed control

of the state apparatus and, utilizing coercion,

sought

to exclude these highly mobilized groups from the

political arena and to deactivate them.
this deactivation,

Concurrent with

it would seek to redefine these

excluded groups by creating associat ional organizations

designed and controlled by the state.
The second condition occurred where the elites in

power decided that in the interest of furthering

economic development, the state must take

a

central role

and impose repression over certain groups (workers)

whose interests were perceived as hindering further
development.

Exclusionary policies were enacted with

the aim of later reintegration under conditions of

controlled interest representation by the

state."''

4

These conditions, commonly known as bureaucratic-

authoritarianism, will be analyzed in the next section
of this chapter.

Stepan went on to delineate

a

series of variables

which could be used to predict or explain the success or
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failure of corporatist regimes.

These variables were

meant to posit causal relationships between
prevailing

politico-socioeconomic conditions and the types of
policies instituted and the degree of effectiveness of
these policies.

What Stepan was attempting to

demonstrate was that corporatism was
consciously adopted policies

a

set of

on the part of elite

groups seeking to preserve their power in the face of

mounting pressure for change.

This being the crux of

his argument, he rejected the "corporatism as historical

continuity" school of thought as not standing up to

empirical proof.

However, there was little in Stepan's

argument to refute outright the relevance of history and
culture toward an understanding of corporatism.

Where

Wiarda et al, saw history and tradition as primary,
Stepan argued for consciously applied policy choices.
Still, policy choices are not arrived at in

a

vacuum;

they were and are necessarily guided by the cultural and

philosophical ethos of

a

society and it is in this

respect that both interpretations of corporatism have
val idi ty

Authoritarianism
Perhaps the most burgeoning amount of analysis of

Latin American political change has been done concerning
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the many facets of authoritarianism.

From an analyses

of how the era of caudillismo led to
the era of military

regimes to an analyses of international capital
and its
requirements for authoritarian political structures,

authoritarianism has been dissected and debated by all
Latin Americanists.

In this section,

various

interpretations of authoritarianism with specific
attention to bureaucratic-authoritarianism as developed
by Guillermo O'Donnell will be analyzed.
In Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America,

James Malloy set out to explain the rise of

authoritarianism in Latin America during the 1960s and
1970s.

Like the theorists on corporatism, Malloy

rejected the standard wisdom of comparative politics

which posited

a

direct relation between economic

development and the growth of pluralist democracy.

He

argued that the nature of economic development in Latin

America lent itself to the emergence of authoritarian
governing structures and that corporatist structures
characterized state-civil relations.
Malloy viewed authoritarianism as

a

product of two

forces acting in twentieth century Latin American

history -- delayed dependent development and populism.
For most nations of Latin America, economic growth had

been based on the exportation of raw materials to the
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United States and Western Europe and the importation
of
manufactured products to Latin America. As Latin

American nations entered late into the international
capitalist market, their economies became dependent on
international market forces beyond their control.

This

system of classic dependency took expression internally
in the creation of

a

dual society: an urban sphere based

on exports and a traditional agrarian rural sector with

the former exploiting the latter in maintaining

relations with the capitalist center.

This system was

held together through what were commonly called patron-

client relations between various unequal groupings which
cut across class,

race,

and ethnic lines.

Through

strategies of vertical integration, groups were

corporatized into the system." "^
1

As this system of export-oriented growth carried over
into the twentieth century, state structures emerged to

mediate relations among various groups in society but
their autonomy was limited by the interests of elite

groups and the limited resources at their disposal.

The

continuing need to maintain control over the growing
demands of an emergent middle class of professional
white collar public employees required large state
treasuries.

With an economy which was oriented outward,

state structures came to depend more and more on
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external sources of funding.
This state of affairs came to

Depression of 1929.

a

head with the Great

The Depression caused the export-

oriented growth economies of Latin America to come
crashing down.

The havoc this caused led to the

emergence of populism,
economies came

a

with the collapse of national

political crisis over the legitimacy of

the ruling elites.

Middle-class sectors became

disaffected and sought to wrest power from the
traditional ruling elites but in and of themselves they
did not have the resources to overthrow them.

These

middle sectors turned to the lower classes for support
in overthrowing the traditional elites.

Under the guise

of promoting substantive economic and social change,

middle sectors sought to mobilize the lower classes
(which in most cases were the urbanized working classes)
and to present

a

united front in ousting the

oligarchies
Populists saw the central problem of Latin America as

economic underdevelopment conditioned by economic
dependence on
United States.

a

capitalist center dominated by the

What's more, this dependency was

perpetuated and reinforced by groups within society
which were characterized as being "anti-nation."
order to unseat these anti-nation groups,
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a

In

multi-class

movement was necessary.

Populists advocated national

independence and the promotion of social justice
reforms.

They advocated the development of the economy

in all sectors,

and utilizing an implicit "organic-

statist" philosophy, called for the combined efforts
of
all classes in the building of an independent

nationalist state.

Yet,

the middle-class sectors

in their vision of populism,

(the main adherents to this

movement), never gave the lower classes an equal

footing in the struggle to overthrow the established

oligarchies.

Rather, they assumed that the working

classes and peasants would defer to the middle sectors
in carrying out the reforms of the new society.

Middle-

class sectors had an implicit corporatist view of how
social relations were to be organized; it was one which
did not differ radically from the one imposed by the

ruling oligarchies -- only now, the middle classes would

occupy the position the oligarchies had held.
To tie these disparate groups together and to carry

out the program of national development, the state

became the cornerstone of the system.

In breaking the

power of the oligarchies, the state had to locate its

legitimacy in the support of the newly mobilized lower
classes.

To do so,

the state utilized various

strategies in building support: encouraging charismatic
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leadership styles which emphasized nationalism
and
increasing welfare expenditures to meet the

needs of

these groups.

By making the state the primary

distributor of social welfare benefits, populism
created
the conditions for future conflict between
politically

mobilized civil sectors and
resources.

a

state with limited

As long as the economy kept growing (as it

did during World War II and immediately after due to

import-substitution-industrialization), the state would
be able to meet the demands of these newly mobilized

groups and new power contenders would be absorbed into
the system under

a

corporatist framework.

But throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the state never

achieved real economic independence from the external
capitalist market.

Import substitution policies led the

way to more sophisticated forms of dependency and many
Latin American countries found inflation spiralling out
of control.

The populist policies of massive social

expenditures could no longer be sustained but attempts
to cut back were met with popular discontent.

It was

under these conditions that the military came to power
in the 1960s.

The inability of populist state

structures to cope with the needs of economic

development and the needs of politically mobilized
classes necessitated taking over the reins of the former
25

by bridling the power of the latter.
of,

or under the guise of,

in the interest

furthering economic

development, the decision was made to depoliticize the

very groups that populism had mobilized.

The middle-

class sectors abdicated the state to the control of the

military and the military instituted policies of
repression against the population.

Thus,

in the 1960s

and 1970s, authoritarian regimes came to dominate Latin

Ame r i ca
In sum,

Malloy viewed the development of

authoritarianism as an elite response to the economic
crises of the 1960s.

Using in part the Huntingtonian

model, Malloy argued that the need for further economic

development became incompatible with the demands of

politically mobilized population.

a

Where there once was

room for the incorporation of new groups into the

political system, now there existed

a

need to exclude

some of these groups from the political arena.

As these

groups were unwilling to give up the power and influence
they had enjoyed,

repression and violence became common

tools of the political game.

Guillermo O'Donnell pursued this same line of
reasoning by introducing the concept of bureaucratic-

authoritarianism.

Specifically, O'Donnell argued that

differing phases of industrialization led to various
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forms of state domination over
civilian sectors.
The
demise of oligarchical rule which led
to the emergence
of populism was brought about due
to

a

nascent

industrialization based on the production of
consumer
goods.
With the imposition of tariffs and
state

subsidies to promote import-substitution-

industrialization, there evolved

a

domestic industry

concentrated on the production of consumer goods.
During this phase of industrialization, the Latin

American economies were not as integrated into the
international capitalist market and as production was

concentrated inward, there was less need to compete on
the world market.

Economic elites had more flexibility

when it came to dealing with working- class demands.
They viewed the incorporation of working-class groups as

beneficial to economic growth so they enacted policies
which increased social welfare spending and allowed

workers to form unions.

In return,

working class groups

tacitly gave their allegiance to the state which
provided the state with

a

degree of autonomy from

foreign capital.
Once the market for import-substitution-

industrialization goods was exhausted, as occurred
the late 1950s,

the next phase of industrialization

called for the importation of capital equipment.
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in

O'Donnell argued that in order to further
capitalist
industrial development, i.e., to enter into

a

phase of

heavy manufacturing, economic elites had to import
technology, expertise, and capital.

Latin Americans

decided to turn to outside markets, more specifically to
multinational corporations and to
foreign aid.

a

certain extent, to

To finance this new phase of

industrialization, they turned to international banks
for loans.

To attract the necessary capital to further

industrial development as the means toward achieving

economic growth, elites had to adopt "orthodox" economic

policies which necessitated cutting the consumption
demands of the population.

These austerity measures

came into direct conflict with the interests of working-

class groups who saw their economic and political power
base eroding.

Unwilling to accept the dictates of the

economic elites, agitation took place by way of strikes.
Meanwhile, the process of industrialization had

created

a

class of technocrats which carried out the

economic policies of the state.

For the most part,

these technocrats were employees of the state

bureaucracy or the military, and they sought further
industrialization by seeking the aid of foreign capital.
They were intolerant of the demands of the popular
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sector and sought authoritarian solutions
to popular
unrest.
For many, the logical solution to
dealing with
popular unrest was to mobilize the forces
which excelled
at the business of coercion and repression

—

the

military.
The military,

for its part,

came to have the same

views as the economic elites concerning how to
promote

economic growth.

They too viewed the need to attract

foreign capital as necessary for this economic growth,
and what's more,

they linked economic growth to

preserving the national security of the nation.

They

viewed all attempts at disrupting the promotion of
industrial development as
the nation.

a

threat to the security of

When they saw that civilian governments

were incapable of dealing with this threat, the military
came in to enforce law and order.

It was at this

juncture that the bureaucratic-authoritarian state was

imposed
The bureaucratic-authoritarian state in its initial

phase was one which:
1.

consisted of an alliance between the military,

sectors of the economic elites (technocrats), and

foreign capital whose interests coalesced around:
2.

increasing economic growth via policies of advanced

industrialization concentrated on the production of
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manufactured goods and the pursuit of foreign
capital,
and who viewed these interests as being
directly
threatened by:
3.

the demands of working-class sectors whose very

goals undermined the national development of the
country.

To deal with this threat,

the military was

brought into power to manage these groups via policies
of coercion and repression.

To maintain control,

the

military utilized strategies of cooptation to
corporatize certain groups into the system.

First, they

excluded already existing mobilized interest groups from
the political arena and destroyed their bases of

support.

Then,

they selected certain groups or

individuals and allowed them into the system, awarded
them certain rights and privileges, but denied them the
status of representatives of certain interests, and

maintained tight control over them.

This was all done

within an environment of clearly authoritarian
structures.

1^

The maintenance of this type of regime

will now be discussed.

Pol i t i cal Change Unde r Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism

The maintenance of a bureaucratic-authoritarian

regime was replete with tensions and contradictions.

Because this type of regime was imposed through coercion
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and repression of already existing
politically mobilized
groups, the mechanisms for continued
control required a
high degree of sophistication. O'Donnell
in
"Tensions
in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State
and the Question

of Democracy," set out to delineate the
various

pressures that

bureaucratic-authoritarian regime faced

a

in maintaining its existence.

The bureaucratic-authoritarian state came into power

and justified itself by claiming to represent

a

greater

logical developmental i st rationality which would cure
the sick body politic of its ills of economic chaos and

social unrest.

Echoing the philosophy of organic-

statism, proponents of the bureaucratic-authoritarian

state argued that their policies were guided by

a

higher

rationality which in the long run would benefit the
general interest.

Because the bureaucratic-

authoritarian state claimed to be curing
it was also above society

—

a

sick society,

not a part of it

—

but

superior to it and represented all interests of that
.

society
.

18

In locating itself above society and not as a part of
it,

the bureaucratic-authoritarian state required

mechanisms of legitimating its control over society and
more often than not,
and repression.

for justifying its use of coercion

Specifically, it needed to create
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consensus among the various interests of
society if it
was not to remain or to become a totalitarian
state.

For O'Donnell,

there were three "mediations" which any

state needed to generate in order to retain its

legitimacy to rule over civilian sectors.

The first was

the idea of nationhood which was the recognition
of

collective identity of

a

people based on

a

a

shared

history, language, etc., and which made one people

distinct from another

—

a

"we" versus a "they."

The

second mediation involved the idea of citizenship which

involved voting rights and the right to have recourse

against arbitrary acts on the part of state
institutions.

The third mediation involved lo popular

or el pueblo which viewed the state as having

responsibility toward the less favored sectors of the
population.

Lo popular required that the state be above

the factionalism and antagonisms of civil society, and

that it promote the welfare of all citizens of that

society.

Yet,

in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state,

these very mediations were repressed, which led to the

unveiling of this type of state as representing certain
interests over others.

Because the bureaucratic-

authoritarian state's philosophy was one of attracting
foreign capital to promote capitalist industrialization,
it necessarily required the muting of the we-they
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dichotomy so as to promote the
transnationalization of
production. what's more, in promoting
foreign capital,
the bureaucratic-authoritarian state
tended to align

itself with the least nationalistic sector
of the

bourgeoisie which shared the same economic interests
as
the bureaucratic-authoritarian technocrats.

In

repressing the very mediations which promoted the

legitimacy of its rule, the bureaucratic-authoritarian
state had no recourse but to use naked force in

maintaining its power.

1

It was at this point in his analysis that O'Donnell

went on to discuss other structural tensions in the

bureaucratic-authoritarian model, namely the interplay
between various sectors of the bourgeoisie, between the
bourgeoisie and international capital, and between the
bourgeoisie and the military.

He argued how the

particular interests of these groups along with external
conditions created pressures on the system which led to

policies which might in the long run destabilize this
type of state.

It was an analysis of how the favored

elite groups grappled with power.

What was

fundamentally lacking in O'Donnell's thesis was

a

real

analysis of what the working-class sectors were doing
throughout these periods of bureaucratic-authoritarian
rule.

If the bureaucratic-authoritarian state precluded
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any consensual means for maintaining its
power, then it
would stand to reason that the repressed
popular sectors

would seek means to undermine it, especially
given their
previous mobilization in the political system.
if the

elite groups which made up the bureaucratic-

authoritarian "alliance" were insecure in how to best
satisfy their interests, then it was possible for
repressed interests to gain some foothold into the
system.

The part of O'Donnell's theory which remained

underdeveloped was to what degree the state was
successful in repressing previously mobilized groups in
society.

As William Canak observed, O'Donnell assumed

the repression of popular working-class sectors as

fait accompli.

a

He took their defeat at the hands of the

bureaucratic-authoritarians

as a given and proceeded to

analyze how the elites went about imposing their
policies.

20

What required analysis though, was in what

ways and through what means these repressed popular
sectors influenced the policies which were enacted.

The

Argentine Cordobazo of 1969 and the return of Peron to
power in 1973 were two glaring examples of how the

bureaucratic-authoritarians failed to impose their will
over working-class sectors.

It will be argued that the

return to democracy in 1983 in Argentina signalled

another defeat for bureaucratic-authoritarianism.
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On another point, O'Donnell rejected the
notion of

corporatism as being incompatible with bureaucraticauthoritarian needs. 21
of hand.

He perhaps rejects this idea out

in seeking to maintain the bureaucratic-

authoritarian state, resources were not infinite for the

prolongation of physical coercion and repression.

It

was in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state's interest
to find other means for controlling the population.

Corporatism as

a

set of policies linking state and

society would fit well into the bureaucratic-

authoritarian's needs for it would be

a

means of

controlling the degree of "participation" in

a

society.

By giving pay-offs to certain groups within the civilian

sector, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state could

mediate the space between its legitimacy as ruler and
the acquiescence of society.

Bureaucratic-

authoritarianism and corporatism were not incompatible
in this respect and perhaps the former could lead to the

latter in its attempts at stability.

Transi t ions

f

rom Authoritarian Rule

The preceding discussion on various ways of

conceptualizing authoritarianism and change within
authoritarian regimes has led to the current

preoccupation with the transition from military
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authoritarian rule to of all things, democratic
civilian
rule.
While the recent transitions to democratic
rule

all require analysis and interpretation,

the majority of

published work thus far was written before the
transitions were complete or during their early stages.
Because of this, much of the current literature on

transition to democratic rule remains tentative and
preliminary.
Perhaps the most important work to come out to date,
are the studies commissioned by the Woodrow Wilson

Center for International Affairs under the direction of

O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead.

In a collection of

essays by various authors, the themes of transition and

democratization are explored in Southern Europe and
Latin America and compared cross-nationally.

Tentative

conclusions are also drawn up attempting to give some
theoretical perspective for studying transitions but no

theory has really been offered as yet.

This is mainly

because when the papers were written (1980-81), most of
the transitions were either in their infant stages or

had not yet occurred.
Still, the volumes offer insights into the specific

characteristics of regime change.

In Adam Przeworski's

chapter on "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition
to Democracy," he looks at the political space within
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which regime transition should be viewed.

On one level,

focus could be placed on macro-oriented
forces, i.e.,
the objective conditions prevailing at
the

time of the

transition which caused the transition to occur.

m

this case, emphasis would be on economic, social,
and

external factors such as economic growth, class
shifts,

increased educational levels, and war as causal to
transition.

it would be a study of how the inevitable

march of history determined the process of change.

On

another level, focus could be placed on micro-oriented
factors,

i.e.,

actions,

interests, and perceptions.

the interplay of political actors,

their

In this case,

emphasis would be on individuals, decision making,

problem solving, and choice making.

These studies

assume that the key to understanding politics lies with
an analysis of key players in any given situation.

Przeworski argues that while macro-oriented factors
are important to an understanding of regime change, all

they really tell us are the constraints under which
regime changes take place.

They do not determine the

outcome of such situations, but they delimit the

possibilities inherent in any given historical
situation.

What does determine the nature of

liberalization will be the struggles within the ruling
blocs, among group interests, and the strategic postures
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taken by all key groups.

In short,

it

is

the micro-

oriented factors which determine the outcome
of regime
transitions.
This is a conclusion which is pretty much
adhered to by most analysts of regime transition
in
South America.
Having established where the focus of attention
should lie, Przeworski goes on to comment on what micro-

oriented factors are causal to regime changes.

problem he tackles is that of legitimacy.
on regime stability,

One

Most studies

particularly authoritarian regime

stability, argue that legitimacy, i.e., the acceptance
by those who are ruled that those who rule have
to do so,

right

is necessary for any regime to remain in powe

in the long run.

misplaced.

a

Przeworski argues that this concern

i

This is especially so of authoritarian

regimes, which by their very definition

are regimes

which are in power through the use of force.
than assessing whether

Rather

regime has legitimacy or not,

a

Przeworski argues that of greater importance is whether
or not there exist viable alternatives to the regime in

power.

That is to say,

a

regime can remain in power

even if it is clearly inept, by the fact that the key

players cannot agree on what

a

viable alternative would

be to the regime at hand.

This leads to

a

larger point in that Przeworski and
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all the others writing in this
volume view that the
impetus for liberalization comes from
those within the

ruling blocs rather than from mass
upheavals.
are,

of course,

a

There

few notable exceptions, but the vast

majority of transitions will come about due
to schisms
within ruling bloc groups, so attention on
regime

transition needs to be focused there. 24

Alfred Stepan, in his analysis "Paths toward
Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative

Considerations," attempts to categorize the various
routes which transition from authoritarian rule can
take.

He delineates about eight typologies,

but for the

purposes of this thesis, only those paths which he
labels "redemocratization from within authoritarian
regimes" will be considered.

Under this category,

Stepan lists three distinct possibilities for the
impetus for redemocratization:
1)

from the military as government;

2)

from the military as institution, acting against the

military as government;
3)

from the civilianized political leadership.
In the

"military as government" scenario, initiation

of liberalization comes from the military in power.

This is usually done only when it is perceived to be in
the interests of the military as
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a

corporate

institution to leave power, coupled with

a

societal demand to do so.

the military

In this case,

strong

will seek to remove itself from power and return
to the

barracks.

In the case where the

"military as

institution acts against the military as government,"
the overriding concern would be to protect the military
as institution.

Paradoxically,

in this case,

the

military comes to believe that their survival depends
on a return to democratic rule.

In the "civi

1

iani zed

political leadership" approach, impetus for

democratization would come from newly installed civilian
leaders but with veto power in the hands of the
military, which would remain

a

threatening force.

Here,

the negotiation of pacts would probably be the path

taken toward greater democratization.
In all three cases,

the military plays the role of

ultimate arbiter over the course and extent of regime
transition.

What becomes the critical factor for the

military is to safeguard its survival as an institution.
Social pressures are important in these scenarios and in
some cases are of critical importance, but they usually
do not determine the outcome of the transition.
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Alain Rouquie, in "Demilitarization and the

Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Politics in
Latin America," provides some clues as to how Latin
40

American military regimes are
different from the
totalitarian regimes of the past in
Europe.

He posits

that the dominant ideology of
Latin America has alway s
_
been liberal and democratic.
Military regimes
really the exception rather than
the rule and in thi s
lies their precarious existence.
Latin American
military regimes have always paid lip
service to
'

democracy because, inherently,

a

democratic

constitutional order is the only legitimate
order in
26
society's eyes.

Another important point Rouquie makes

that

is

contemporary Latin American military regimes have
for
the most part no organized political project
with

which

to carry out their rule.

The existence of

"threat" to

a

society may enable them to come to power, but it
does
not offer them a long-term project in which society
is

transformed in one way or another.

Rather,

these

authoritarian regimes always invoke the promise of
future democratic rule to justify why they must stay in
power now.

The notion of legitimacy, therefore,

is

important to Rouquie's analysis. 27
In O'Donnell's and Schmitter's conclusion,

they

attempt to draw together many of the points discussed by
their contributors.

They begin by offering some

definitions followed by

a

description of some of the key
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^
variables necessary for

a

"successful" transition.

posit parameters of what constitutes

a

They

transition to be

the beginning of the dissolution
of one regime ending
with the installation of another regime.
An indication
that a transition has begun is when the
authoritarian

rulers begin to modify their own rules "in
the direction
of providing more secure guarantees for
the rights of

individuals and groups." 28

This is called

"liberalization" and occurs when there are important

divisions within the ruling bloc itself.

No transition

to date has begun without schisms within the ruling
bloc

—

hardliners versus softliners in general. 29
Once

transition has started, there exist no

a

guarantees that the initiators will remain in control of
the process.

Other important, non-predictable variables

can come into play in

a

transition and each of these can

help to determine the outcome of the transition.
example,

a

dramatic event such as

war or some key

a

person's untimely death could push

a

transition in

different directions than those intended.
of resurrecting civil society

civilian groups

—

—

For

i.e.,

The process

remobilizing key

will be critical to the nature of the

transition as will the problem of dealing with the past
abuses of the outgoing regimes.

Within this realm of uncertainty though, O'Donnell
42

and Schmitter offer some prescriptions as
to how
regime transition can lead to

instauration.

First,

a

a

successful democratic

the perception that a military

regime has resoundingly failed will enable the

transition to get off to

a

good start toward democracy.

Where the record of an outgoing regime is not so clear
(as in the case of Brazil),

be more shaky.

the road to democracy will

Pacts which are not characteristic of

recent regime transitions are also important to

transition.

O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that pacts

negotiated between the outgoing military and incoming
civilian governments are less stable, given the

military's penchant for retaining control.

Rather,

pacts between civilian groups will make the successful

instauration of democracy more likely.

In their minds,

when key civilian groups come to some agreement as to
the rules of the game, by negotiating a pact,

the road

to democratic instauration will be more certain."^

Along with this, the first elections of

a

newly

liberalized regime must not allow any one side to win
resounding majority.

Both left-center and right-center

parties must win enough votes to allow each side

significant say in the new regime.
people

a

a

a

This will promote in

greater faith in the system, since it will be

clear that the results are not predetermined.
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Finally, the entire transition has certain
rules and

agreements to which all contending parties must
adhere for
democracy to be feasible. The two most important
rules,

based on recent transitions, are the protection
of the
property rights of the bourgeoisie and the continued
institutional survival of the military.

No transition to

democratic rule to date has taken place without such prior
understandings.

Two tacit agreements which have also been

significant involve the players in the game of transition.
One is the agreement that all players will seek benefits and

space to compete in the transition but without seeking the

elimination of their opponents.

A second agreement or

understanding is that the players in the game do not

necessarily have to have democratic values when they start
the game.

In the process,

they will come to acquire these

democratic values.
Transi t ions from Authoritarian Rule offers many

provocative avenues for further research on transitions and
redemocratization, especially now that most of the nations of
South America have returned to some form of civilian rule.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the current era
of redemocratization should not be interpreted as

a

vindication of the earlier theories concerning modernization
which posited that all nations would eventually move toward
pluralist democratic rule.

It
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is

clear from these volumes

.

that the road to redemocratization is quite
different from a
"stages of economic growth" approach, and it
is also far from

certain whether the current wave of democratic
regimes will
endure over time.
The tentative nature of the concluding
volume speaks to this uncertainty.
While the focus of these volumes have been on transition
rather than democratic instaurat ion

,

it would have been

helpful if the authors had come up with an initial definition
of what constituted democracy.

For Latin America,

existence of democratic forms such as elections,

a

the mere

congress,

and a constitution have been poor indicators of whether

a

nation was democratic or to what degree

it was democratic.

What Latin American scholars need to do

is

democracy is in the Latin American context.
done,

to define what

Until that is

the danger remains of judging Latin American politics

through the prism of U.S. and Western European democratic
norms

Another omission from the Transitions series and other
current articles is the role of civilian groups in the

transition process.

As with the literature on bureaucratic-

authoritarianism, the current literature on transitions
remains state-centric with only passing reference to the role
key social groups can play in

a

transition.

If we accept the

premise that the initial impetus for transition comes from

within the ruling bloc: what
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is

it

that causes differences to

become schisms?

what would constitute

a

"ruling bloc", what

groups are involved, and under what conditions
do the
"softliners" come to dominance? Who influences

their

decisions and the actions they take?

Could the resistance of

certain civil groups to the authoritarian regime
provide and
provoke schisms within the ruling bloc thereby opening
the

way to

a

transition?

For any analysis of transition to be

complete, more attention needs to be focused on the role of

civilian groups in this process.

Labor and Regime Transi t ion
The analysis of authoritarianism in Latin America has

traditionally concentrated on the actions of ruling elite
groups.

This is due to the fact that the very definition of

authoritarianism assumes centralized control by the regime
over civilian sectors.

However,

in light of the

regime

transitions of the mid-1980s, it behooves political
scientists to come to an understanding of how and why the

experiment with military authoritarianism failed so miserably
in so many countries.

The current literature on regime

transition begins to explore the characteristics of these
recent transitions.

However,

in the

literature on both

authoritarianism and regime transition, little light has as
yet been shed on the role key civilian groups played in

undermining authoritarianism and their impact on regime
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.

transition.

To address this gap in the literature,

this

thesis attempts to analyze the role of labor
in Argentina
from 1976 to 1983.
In general,

labor could be viewed as enjoying

status in many Latin American nations.

special

a

During the 1940s,

under programs of import-substitution-industrialization,
labor was incorporated into the political system as
player.

In Argentina and Brazil,

a

key

the labor movements were

taken into the political fold and transformed into state-

dominated, hierarchically and vertically structured interest
groups
In Argentina,

under Juan Per6n, labor enjoyed status and

power, unparalleled in any other Latin American nation. 33

After the demise of Per6n, labor became the special object of
repression.

The newly emergent political coalitions of the

late 1950s and 1960s sought to undermine labor's role in the

political game by stripping it of its economic and

institutional power.

The exclusionary corporatist strategies

discussed by O'Donnell and Stepan were targeted specifically
at labor.

Labor's response to these strategies could

therefore shed light on how effective bureaucratic-

authoritarian policies were.
Most analysts of the recent military authoritarian

experiment in Argentina have argued that the regimes of 197683 also sought to depoliticize labor.
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Through

a

combination

of laws,

repression, and the

playing off of one facti on
.

against another, the military attempted to
destroy the
institutional existence of the labor movement. 34
How

successful the military was at this project and
more

importantly what the labor response was will be
explored,
analysis of the dynamics of military-labor relations will
create

a

better understanding of the many facets of

authoritarianism as well as give guidance to the efforts
democratic restructuring.
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CHAPTER II

ARGENTINA AND THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

The history of Argentina in the twentieth century

provides an example of how traditional modernization
theories have been inappropriate in explaining the

politics and economics of Latin American nations, while
those theories designed to specifically address Latin

America have provided models for understanding that
area.

At first glance, Argentina appears to possess all

the prerequisites of

a

modern industrial society.

has vast natural resources as yet untapped.

It

Its

population is predominantly white (and proud of it) and
literate.

Its major cities are centers of culture with

an huge middle class.

Its urban infrastructure looks

much like that of U.S. and European cities, and its

population is one of the best fed in the world.
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Yet for

most of the twentieth century Argentina
has had
nondemocratic forms of government and an
economy which
has suffered severe fluctuations in its
fortunes.

Industrialization and urbanization did not bring
about
democracy but helped to engender one of the most

brutal

regimes in modern history.

The predominantly white and

literate urban middle class did not possess the
"values"
so necessary to a "civic culture," and the
population's

intake of beef made Argentina one of the leading

countries where cholesterol and heart disease are
endemic.

Also,

the stages of economic growth did not

"take-off," but rather Argentina experienced more than
its share of high inflation and economic turmoil.

On the other hand,

theories of corporatism, populism,

and bureaucratic-authoritarianism have proven better

guides than traditional modernization theories in

interpreting the Argentine case.

position as

a

Starting from its

dependent agricultural export producing

nation at the turn of the century, Argentina's twentieth

century growth has been sharply influenced
international economic system.

by tne

The Depression of 1929

pushed Argentina to begin import-substitution-

industrialization which led to the emergence of populism
and new social forces in society.

The resulting

"exhaustion" of this form of industrialization led to
the imposition of military rule.
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The decision on the

part of the military and other groups
to "deepen"

industrialization led to further repression and
the
greater entrenchment of military rule.
Throughout,

corporatist strategies were utilized in maintaining
state-civil relations.
This is not to say that Argentina's modern

development was solely the result of inevitable economic
determinants.

On the contrary, almost every step along

the way, Argentines made fateful decisions which led
to
the events which transpired.

The international economic

system and the nation's dependency set the parameters by

which Argentines acted.

The nation's particular history

and diverse settlers go toward explaining why they made
the choices they have.

Therefore, in order to

understand contemporary events in Argentina, one needs
to begin with the past.

The Making of

a

Nation

Argentina declared itself independent from Spain in
1810.

The move was undertaken by

a

Buenos Aires-based

coalition of merchants and landowners seeking to expand
their trading markets.

The economy was based on

agricultural exports, and this system continued to

predominate throughout the nineteenth century.
The basis of Argentina's agricultural economy was

cattle.

Argentina possessed
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a

vast area of extremely

fertile lands called the pampas,
particularly suited to
cattle raising.
Early settlers had only to buy up
land

and some cows and bulls, to see their
fortunes multiply.

Wealth was based on exporting beef to foreign
markets,
primarily to Europe. There was little need
for labor

and capital expenditures.

What little infrastructure

was developed, was created solely for the
purpose of

facilitating the transport of beef to the Buenos
Aires
port and for collecting the profits from these sales.

Little attention was paid in the nineteenth century to
the needs of the internal market, as Buenos Aires

landowners became increasingly wealthy from the sale of
i

their beef.

Independence from Spain led to disputes concerning
how the nation ought to be governed.

One group, made up

of the Buenos Aires merchants, wanted the

nationalization of Buenos Aires.

These "uni tarists

,

"

as

they were called, sought to protect their wealth from
the other provinces by keeping Buenos Aires province

separate autonomous region.
the interior provinces,

a

Another group, representing

sought

a

federalist structure in

which each province would maintain political and
economic autonomy from each other.

The interior

provinces had been fairly self-sufficient, and their
economies were geared toward internal consumption.

They

feared the dominance of Buenos Aires in forcing them to
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open up their markets to goods from
Buenos Aires. A
third group, also calling themselves
federalists, we re
Buenos Aires cattle breeders who sought
provincial
autonomy but with Buenos Aires being the
dominant

province.

Their economic interests called for

protecting their profits from the provinces,
while
forcing the provinces to buy goods from Buenos

Aires.

2

The struggle over how Buenos Aires would be
governed

ended up pitting the provinces against Buenos Aires.
1829,

in

the cattle breeding federalists triumphed in the

name of Juan Manuel de Rosas who is credited with

unifying the provinces that now make up Argentina.

In

1852, Rosas, who ruled as an old-fashioned caudillo

dictator, was overthrown by formerly supportive cattle

breeders and an emergent liberal bourgeois group of
intellectuals.

Disputes over the dominance of Buenos

Aires in the nation's affairs did not stop.

Only in

1880 was a constitution drawn up which separated the

city of Buenos Aires from the province.

The city of

Buenos Aires was redesignated the federal capital.
Nevertheless, Buenos Aires today remains the dominant
center of the nation.

All political and economic

decisions are made here, and their effects resonate back
to the provinces.

Divisions between Buenos Aires and

the rest of the nation persist as each province seeks to

force Buenos Aires to attend to its needs.
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With the unification of
Argentina under the dominance
of Buenos Aires established
in 1880, the nation
experienced a period of growth
unparalleled in its
history.
its economy continued to
be based on
agricultural exports but this now
included ranching,
sheep herding, and cultivation
of
grains,

flax,

and

seeds.

Refrigerated railroad cars, dock
facilities, and
banks were all expanded to accommodate
these export
activities, and the political system
(based on

a

constitution and liberal democratic rule)
ensured that
tariffs and import duties did not hamper
the flow of
trade

4
.

The diversification of agricultural export
production

led to important transformations in Argentine
society.

While the traditional landowning cattle raising and

breeding elites amassed greater amounts of land and grew
wealthier and continued to dominate the state, there
emerged by the 1880s

a

white- collar workers.

class of urban middle-class

These were the people who owned

no land (or very little of it) but who worked in the

service industries which handled the financial aspects
of the agricultural export trade.

Also numbered among

them were small shopkeepers in the urban centers.

From

this class of people pressure would come to liberalize
the political system dominated by the landed cattle

interests

.

58

—

By far the most
important transformation
in fche
ninetSenth
ntUry
e migration 0£ southern
European immigrants
the „u
y ants to m«
shores of Argentina.
The
Creole landed elites
saw the
cne need to
f« increase
the

«^

"

^^
.

nation
attested

o£

the nation so in
the

to promote European
mlgratlon(

northern Europe and

^

E ngl an d,

^
^ ^
^^^

with
However, the vest m aj
ority of immigrants
came frQm
southern Europe, mainly
Italy
an(J

Spain>

tenant farmers or laborers
in the cities. 6
The massive wave of
southern European immigration
whioh began in 1880 coincided
with an agricultural
export boom and rising land
prices.
The established
elites had parceled out most
of the desirable pampas
farmland by the mid-nineteenth
century and were
unwilling to sell their land
to newcomers.
Instead,
they leased land out to tenant
farmers who would oversee
the planting a nd harvesting
of crops for export.
This
system sustained itself until the
end of the nineteenth
century when the mechanization of
farming
led to the

collapse of the tenant farmer system,
and many were
driven into the cities in search of
7
work.

Other immigrants came to Argentina in
search of

temporary work because of bad economic
situations at the
time in their home countries.
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This worked out well as

the seasons in the Southern
Cone were the reverse of

those in Southern Europe so
workers could cross back and
forth for the harvest seasons.
These workers garnered
the nickname of ^oj^nd^inas
(swallows) because of their
movement back and forth across
the oceans and also
because they were predominantly
brown-skinned.
The

mechanization of agriculture forced
many of these
immigrants to return to their homelands
permanently, but
some stayed and went to seek work
8
in the
cities.

Estimates show that between 1890 and
1914,
immigrants landed on Argentine shores

million

4

and 2.4 million

took up permanent residence.

The initial waves of

immigrants were absorbed by the agricultural
needs of
the countryside, but many settled in the
cities.

After

the economic crisis of 1890-1895, with
the collapse of

the land tenure system,

the flow of migrants was from

the rural areas to the urban centers.

The majority of

immigrants were unskilled so they took up labor as
railroad workers, dock workers, and meat packers.

A

small minority of immigrants had entrepreneurial skills,
but they applied them to commercial and speculative

activities rather than in promoting industrialization.
By the turn of the century, Argentina was

with

a

a

9

nation

large urban center but little industrial base,

and the landowning elites wanted it to stay that way.

They were committed to an economy based on agricultural
60

goods exports, and they used
their control over the
state to obstruct attempts
at encouraging industrial
development.
The little industrialization
some did
favor was that which
complemented the business
of

agricultural export.

it should be noted that

the

development of what urban
infrastructure existed was
financed by British capital.
The refrigerated railroad
car,

docks, and banks were all run
by British funds and
the landed elites funneled
their wealth into private

accounts overseas and ostentatious
consumerism.
Little
thought was given to the development
of an internal
market and much less concern was shown
toward the growth
of the urban middle and working
classes. 10
The political hegemony enjoyed by the
landed elites

was challenged by the middle and working
classes as

early as the 1880s.

Urban middle-class, white-collar

workers (mainly clerks and state bureaucrats), small
shopkeepers, and several small independent farmers
joined the Radical Union (later to be the Radical Civic
Union) in an attempt to lobby for greater political

rights and freedoms.

This group sought neither economic

transformations nor economic redistribution per se, but
it wanted a voice in the allegedly democratic political

system.

Members of the group, among them Leandro Alem,

Bartolome Mitre, Carlos Pellegrini, and Hipolito
Yrigoyen, sought to force the landed elites to give up
61

the practice of
fraud in elections.

attempts were tried but
failed.
working classes, anarchist

Several coup

On the part of the

and socialist groups
sought

to influence the
political system but to
little avail as
well.
yet those groups (of
which more will be said
in

chapter

3,

would pl ay

a

decisive role in the ruling

elite's decision to
liberalize their political
system in
11

1912.

The agitation of the
middle class in

caUing

^

political reform was not
rejected by all segments of
the
landed elites.
Many saw the need for
some reform in the
interest of preventing a
deluge of demands from flooding
in.
in 1910, Rogue Saenz
Pena, a reform-minded
landowner, came to power, and
in 1912, a new electoral
reform law was implemented
which established universal
male suffrage and a secret
ballot.
This signalled the
end of the landed elites'
dominance over politics, but
it was their view that, given
the political situation,
some concessions were necessary.
At that time, many in
the landed elites feared the
spread of anarchist and
particularly communist influence among
the working
classes.

To deter that influence from growing,

it was

thought better to incorporate the Radical
Civic Union
into the political ranks so as to appear
more liberal
but also to obtain the Radicals' support
in fighting

what were deemed to be subversive elements among
the
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working classes. 12
The passage of the Saenz
Pena Law resulted in the
election of Radical Hipolito
Yrigoyen in 1916 to the

presidency, but the conservative
landed elites
maintained control over the congress.
Yrigoyen, while
espousing democratic principles
and freedoms, actually
acted like a strong-arm caudillo
within his party and in
government.
He attempted little change
of the economic
system and only encouraged domestic
industrialization

because the war efforts of Europe and
the United States
precluded import trade. He did nationalize
the oil

industry by creating the state run YPF
(Yacimientos

Petroliferos Fiscales) in 1922. 13
Because Yrigoyen's and the Radicals' platform
was so
narrowly defined, they had little success in attracting

members from the upper and working classes.

The upper

class was suspicious of any hint at social reform and

used the congress to obstruct Yrigoyen's modest
proposals.

The working classes saw little benefit from

Yrigoyen's policies and continued to agitate for change
via strikes and work stoppages.

labor strikes led to
forces.

a

In 1919,

a

series of

bloody put-down by government

The Radical Civic Union lost any support labor

had given it, and before Yrigoyen left office, he

greatly increased state spending and enlarged the
government bureaucracy.

14
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in 1922,

Marcelo

T.

de Alvear,

elected to the presidency.

another Radical was

During his administration,

the Argentine economy
prospered through cereal and meat
exports and the last great wave
of immigration took
place.
However, dissension soon arose
within the Party

over Alvear's attempts to curb
the public spending which
had marked the last years of
Yrigoyen's first

administration.

The majority group repudiated
Alvear

and allied behind Yrigoyen.

The smaller more

conservative-oriented group organized itself
into the
UCR-antipersonalist wing in direct opposition
to

Yrigoyen.

Yrigoyen, for his part, attempted to promote

populist image among middle-class sectors, and
in 1928
he won re-election to the presidency. 15
a

However, Yrigoyen's second administration would
be

eclipsed by

a

military coup.

The conservative landed

elites had become discouraged with the Radical

democratic experiment, especially with Yrigoyen's brand
of populism.

They sought

a

change and began to agitate

the military to undertake

a

military coup.

The

Depression of 1929 gave them the perfect reason to
foment

a

coup as they could blame Yrigoyen for the

worsened economic situation.

In 1930,
1

deposed and sent into exile.

Yrigoyen was

C

The year 1930 heralded in nearly fifty years of

military domination of Argentina's politics.
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The

Argentine military by then was

a

highly professionalized

and European-trained group
of men.

Created by the

landed elites, the military was
supposed to be loyal to
civilian authorities and to eschew
the dirty game of
politics.
However, throughout the early
twentieth
century both landed elites and
Radicals sought military
complicity in their political ends,
so that by 1930,

the

military, particularly the army,
had grown accustomed to
playing a role in the affairs of
17
state.

General Jose

F.

Uriburu of the army came to power in

1930 and pursued policies of repression.

He sought to

dismantle the constitution and to impose
fascism on Argentina.

a

form of

His extremist views led him to be

replaced by General Agustin

P.

Justo,

a

more moderate

legalist who called for constitutional democracy,

although controlled from above.

These two men

represented two contending extremes within the military

during the 1930s.

One faction, the legalists favored

constitutional government; the other favored

authoritarian corporatist control.

Both were initially

tied to landed elite interests but by 1940 many had

become disaffected from this sector. 18
The Depression of 1929 and Justo's policies led to

profound changes in the nation's economy.
Industrialization, which had been opposed by the landed
elites,

finally began to take on significance in the
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.

form of
import-substitution-industrialization.

Bereft
of markets from which
to import manufactured
goods,

urban middle-class entrepreneurs
began production of
light consumer durables. 19
The landed elites attempted
to control the nature of
this industrialization.
They only supported it in the
hope that import-substitution-industrialization
would be
temporary and in time the internal
market would correct
itself and agricultural export
products would resume at

high profit levels.

The military supported import-

substitution-industrialization as it began to
envision
itself as a more modernized sophisticated

establishment 20
Much of the initial impetus for
import-substitution-

industrialization came from foreign entrepreneurs
who
still maintained ties to their native countries.

Many

had not even taken up Argentine citizenship,
and

therefore, they represented

a

distinct non-national

class separate from the traditional elites of Argentina.
So too, many of the economic policies promoted by
Justo

sought to encourage foreign investment and to deepen the

already dominant role of British capital.

The Roca-

Runciman Treaty passed during Justo's regime, gave the
British

monopoly over the beef trade.

a

21

Justo was succeeded by Roberto Ortiz.
for only

a

Ortiz ruled

short time due to poor health and Ramon
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^

Castillo succeeded him
to power
World
^
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army me „ SOU9ht
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stepped up pressure to
Keep Argentina fro™
Joining this
alliance,
within the army, .
group o£ mid . level
officers conspired to
infant a fascist regime in
Argentina. when elections
were called in 1943, this
9rou P under the name of
Group o£ United Qff
and a pro-United states
moderate group would lead an
army revolt against
Castillo.
In the aftermath of the
coup, these two factions
fought over what direction
the
new regime would take and
which side to take in World
War 11.22 The G0U nationalists
managed to

^

come to

power, and an army colonel
by the name of Juan Per6n
stepped into the limelight.

The Perftnist Revolution
By 1940,

the military, which had traditionally
sided

with the landed elites in political
matters, was no
longer as supportive of maintaining
the status quo.

Rather, many had come to see the need
for greater

industrialization and for greater control over the
economy, which was still dominated by foreign
interests.

Nationalistic feelings ran high within the army by
1942
as it felt undue pressure from the United
States and

Brazil to declare war against Germany.
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In a

climate of

rising tensions, with Radical
support, the army
overthrew Castillo and imposed
a military regime. 23
After a period of political
wrangling between the
moderates and GOU nationalists
for control of the
government, General Edelmiro
Farrell was installed in
power in 1944.
Juan Peron, who had been
active in
pursuing the nationalist cause
became his minister of
war.
As minister of war, PerOn
was responsible
for
controlling promotions and the
distribution of military
supplies, in this highly influential
position,
he

appealed to the army and navy as an
advocate for
military independence.
1944, he spearheaded the
creation of an air force. His support
among many in the
military grew. 2 ^

m

While Peron was building up military support,
he was
also concerned about winning popular support
for the

army's efforts.

In 1943,

under

a

government

reshuffling, he took over the National Labor Department
in Buenos Aires and turned it into the Secretariat
for

Labor and Social Welfare.

Attempts to win the support

of the political parties were to no avail, and in

a

short time, Peron turned his attention to the working

classes.

He realized the untapped popular base labor

could provide in his vision for reshaping Argentina and

began

a

concerted effort to win labor's support. 25

From his position as head of the National Labor
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Department, he began to settle
disputes in labor's
favor.
He doled out wage increases
and benefits to
workers in efforts to court
union leaders' support.

He

reversed longstanding anti-labor
legislation and passed
new legislation favorable to
labor.

leaders,

To the labor

such cooperation and support
from

official was

a

a

government

radical change from years of
unfulfilled

demands and repression.

Many readily allied behind

him. 26

Throughout his rise to power (he was named
vice
president in June 1944), Per6n extolled
the virtues of
nationalism and the need for an independent
Argentina.
He argued for the need to unite
against communism (a

threat from within the labor unions) and
against
imperialism.

He was particularly effective in

exploiting the fears of the army against an alleged
scheme by Brazil,

instigated by the United States, to

invade Argentina in light of the latter's refusal to

openly break with the Axis powers.

It was

this

particular stance which allowed Peron to carry out labor
reforms without setting off alarms within the military.

Many in the army viewed his gestures toward labor as

defusing

a

potential rebellion by the masses. 27

One other group Peron managed to gain the support of
was the Catholic Church.

In 1943,

compulsory religious education
69

in

the GOU had advocated
the schools.

When

Perim was running for the
presidency in 1945, he
reaffirmed the
to impose compulsory
religious
education, to the satisfaction
of the Catholic church
hierarchy. 28

cogent

Per6n's rise to power,
however, was not without
opposition.
The first group to be
alarmed at his
policies were the landed elites
and the Argentine Union
of industrialists, a group
of export-linked
manufacturers.
Both these groups viewed with
alarm the
benefits Peron doled out to the
working class.
Factions
within the military, particularly
in the navy were
worried at Per6n's growing acquisition
of power and
began to voice dissent against the
Farrell regime.
A
group called the Fuerzas Vivas, which
had
come into

existence in 1940 and consisted of free
trade advocates
from landed interests, exporters,
importers, and foreign
interests, openly declared its opposition
to Peron's
social reforms in mid 1945.

Peronist sympathizers

openly repudiated this opposition.
for confrontation.

The stage was set

2^

General Farrell, by mid-1945 realized events were

moving against him and his vice-president.

Bowing to

pressure from within the military and from civilian
groups, he dismissed Per6n and had him imprisoned.

transpired after this has now become the folklore of
Peronist history.

Peronist sympathizers lost little
70

What

time in amassing support
to force Peron's
return fro,
exile.
Labor union leaders
and Peon's mistress,
Eva
Duarte, canvassed
working-class neighborhoods
in Buenos
Aires to rally support
for a demonstration.
On October
17, 1945, to the horror of
the traditional elites,
thousands of workers rallied
to the Government House
(Casa Rosada) demanding
the appearance of Peron.
He was
quickly brought in from Martin
Garcia Island and Farrell
called elections for February
1946.
Peron and his
sympathizers had won the first
round. 30
in late October 1945,

Peron organized the Labor
Party

and managed to win the support
of
the Radical Party,

a

minority faction of

called the UCR-Junta Renovadora.

its

leader, Hortensio Quijano, became
Peron's running mate
in the 1946 elections.
He had also garnered the
support
of many provincial conservative
party bosses due to his

nationalist outlook.

By election time Peron had the

solid support of the working classes,
many in the army,
the Catholic Church, some radicals,
and provincial

conservatives.

Opponents to Per6n rallied behind the

Democratic Union, but this group was too
heterogeneous
to provide real opposition to Peron.

in one of the

few

fraud-free elections of the twentieth century, Peron
won
a

solid 54 percent of the vote.

Peron's vision of

basic goals:

(1)

a

31

new Argentina consisted of three

to strengthen and extend
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industrializationon,

IZ\
(2)

=
a

wealth of the country;

non-aligned position.

(3

certain redistribution
of the
*.

)

•

to stake out a
distinctive

He had to his advantage
a large

state treasury from
which to dispense funds
for his
economic endeavors.
Argentina had

^^^

-crease during

the war years when
Europe's economy was
concentrated on the war effort,
and

Per.n also enjoyed

the initial support of
most of the key groups
in
society, save for the landed
elites. 32

Peron continued to pursue
his pro-labor policies by
promulgating laws covering all
aspects of workers'
lives.
He instituted compensations,
procedures, and
created a union bureaucracy to
oversee all labor-related
matters.
Redistribution of income was
accomplished by
transferring funds from the primary
export sector.
Workers' wages and benefits were
substantially
increased, and for the first time
in Argentine history,
the working classes began to see
a substantive

improvement in their standard of living.

33

Funds from the agricultural exporting
sector were
also transferred to the industrial
sector.
Here Peron
embarked on a program to purge foreign
interests out of

industry.
gas,

He nationalized the railroads,

and urban transport.

The state took control over

matters concerning external trade as well.
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telephone,

Compensation

for these nationalizations came
from state treasury

funds which led to

a

severe depletion of state
funds for

promoting greater industrialization.

Pe r 6n emphasized

light consumer durables production
over capital
intensive manufactured products. With

his goal of

social reform and giving benefits to
groups which had
helped him come to power, he spent monies
on non-

productive activities such as military
expenditures and
housing construction.
Little of his industrial programs
created the basis for self-sustained
34
economic
growth.

in agriculture,

Peron did little to force changes in

land tenure practices.

He wrested some profits from the

landowning elites to benefit other sectors of the
economy, but overall, this group did not suffer
severe
losses, despite their protests to the contrary.

Peron

raised rural wages and passed protective legislation for

agricultural tenants, but no structural changes were
forced upon the landowning elites.

However,

this group

responded by cutting back on agricultural production. 35
The presidential style of Per6n was clearly

personalist and throughout his rule he fostered the
adulation of his followers.

With his charismatic wife

Evita at his side, the couple became revered by many,

particularly among the working classes.

This image of

benevolent patriarch however, hid from the public eye
some of the less civil policies of Peron.
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He purged

.

.

from positions of influence
those who disagreed with
him
whether labor union leaders or
newspaper publishers.
Per6n overlooked abuses of power
(such as embezzlement
of funds) committed by those
who supported him and his
wife. Unquestioning loyalty to
the Per6ns was necessary
to anyone who sought government
patronage
or

influence

3^

The authoritarian bent of Peron
has been

characterized at times as being fascist.

Certainly, the

efforts at centralized control spoke
to Peron's desire
for personal power at all costs, but
at the
same time,

his authoritarianism was moderated by
of populism.

a

certain degree

There was repression, censorship, and

outright strong-arm mafioso brutality, but
network never really developed.

a

terror

The degree of control

over society was not all pervasive as in
totalitarian
regimes, nor as organized.

argues, Peronism was

a

Rather, as David Rock,

peculiar blend of

authoritarianism, chock full of internal

contradictions
The Per6nist experiment at reshaping Argentina began
to fall apart in 1950.

Peron's economic policies for

income redistribution and industrialization were all

based on state treasury funds and expropriating profits
from the agrarian export sector.

By 1950,

state

treasury funds had run out owing to expenditures to the
74

massive state sector and to
compensation for
nationalizations.
j„ the agricultural

sector,

drought and

a

seve;re

drop in international prices
for

agricultural goods led to

a

fall in production and lower

profits.

Per6n had assumed he could rely
on this sector
to pay for his reforms, but
he was mistaken
and

Argentina fell on hard times.

37

The economic crisis of the early
1950s enabled

Peron's opponents to build up
opposition to his rule.
While Peron managed to win election
under the

Justicialista Party to

a

second term in 1951, efforts

were already underway to depose him.

The landed elites

and middle classes had never been supporters
of Peron so
they eagerly awaited his demise.
Factions within the

army were upset at his personalist strong-arm
tactics
and liked even less what they saw to be the undue

interference of his wife, Evita, in military affairs.
Even the labor unions, while still the most loyal to
Per6n, began to call strikes in protest of the economic

situation.

Lastly, Peron had managed to alienate the

Catholic Church with his recognition of certain cults
and spiritualist groups.

3 a

The beginning of the end for Peron came after the

death of Evita in 1952.

Gone was the woman who brought

Peron to the masses, and with her death, Peron became

increasingly isolated.

He
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responded to the situation by

imposing greater repression
against his critics and even
had labor strikes squashed.
He sought relief from the
economic situation by courting
foreign investors,

especially the United States, but
this did little to
effect the situation. Army factions

felt he had to go.

The Catholic Church was scandalized
by his passage of
divorce law and declared outright
opposition
to him.

1955,

a

By

civil unrest had become endemic with
pro-Pe r6ni s ts

and anti-Per6nists fighting each other
in the streets,
often at the instigation of Peron.
On September 19th,
1955,

amidst army revolts in Cordoba and Bahia Blanca,

and with Buenos Aires under blockade by the
navy, Per6n

resigned and fled into exile.

experiment was over.

3

The first Per6nist

q

The legacy Peron left Argentina in 1955 was expanded

group interests vying for political power.

Added to the

landed elites, the army, and the urban middle-class

Radicals was

a

Peronist Party whose backbone was the

labor unions and working classes.

To the state he left

an huge bureaucracy with responsibilities to

nationalized industries and social welfare policies.
the economy, he left

a

shaky industrial base.

depleted state treasury and

a

He neither destroyed the power

of the traditional ruling elites nor did the Peronist

government gain enough strength to check the former's
power.

Rather,

in the next eighteen years,
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attempts

To

would be made to defeat
Per6nism
bm
fail at high social
cost.

'

all of which
311
k- u
would

The Lib^atins
P^voluUon
The military which
came to power in 1955
sought to
create law and order
once again in civil
society

Dominated by the army
branch of the military,
General Eduardo Lonardi

f

irst

and then General Pedro
Aramburu

took power.

with the backing to the
landed elites, the
army undertook the
denervation of Argentine society
It intervened the CGT
(General Confederation of
Labor)
and purged all union
leaders who were loyal to
Perc-n.
Strikes by workers were
brutally squashed as well. 40
Aramburu also saw to the
purging of Persist symbols
from society.
He embarked on a campaign
to expose the
excesses and corruption of the
Per6ns by displaying the
material goods amassed by Juan
and Eva
Peron.

He was

also responsible for kidnapping
Evita's body and having
it sent to Milan, Italy,
so as to deny the Peronist
movement of a "sacred" symbol. 41
In the economic sphere,
Aramburu reversed the

Peronist policy of transferring funds
to the industrial
sector and once again, favored the
agricultural export
sectors.

He encouraged the export sectors
and entered

Argentina into the International Monetary
Fund.
encouraged foreign investment, thereby worsening
77

He also

.

Argentina's international debt.

The economy was not to

recover to pre-1940 levels of
prosperity. 42
The efforts at de-Peronization did
not succeed in

cleansing Argentine society of Per6nism.

The labor

union movement reacted by becoming more
fiercely proPeron.
Factions within the army were dubious of

Aramburu's efforts to create
from exile Per6n

a

Peron-free Argentina, and

offered words of support to those

still in allegiance to him.

Aramburu saw the need to

leave power and called elections for February
43
1958.

From its inception, the "Liberating Revolution"
was only
to be a temporary measure to correct chaos and

corruption before civilians could take over again.
After three years of attempting to "liberate" the nation
from Peronism, the army had lost its revolution.
too,

So

it showed little success in dealing with the

economy

The Radicals Return
The elections of 1958 did not include the Per6nists
as the army continued to proscribe the group's

existence.

Nor was the army to relinquish all control

over the civilian regime which would come to power.

The

army saw to it that in 1958, the Radical Party came back
to power.

By 1958,

the Radicals had split into two factions.
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One faction,

led by Arturo Frondizi
called itself the
UCR-mtransigents and advocated accommodation
with the
Perc-nists.
The other faction, led by
Ricardo Balbin,

called itself the UCR-Pueblo and
urged complete
dissociation from Peronism.
order

m

presidency, Frondizi entered into
Per6n:

to win the

a

secret pact with

in return for working-class
support Frondizi

promised to re-legalize Per6nism.

This strategy worked

in defeating Balbin for the
presidency but the political

costs were more than Frondizi could
handle. 44

Frondizi's pact with Per6n led to great
mistrust on
the part of the conservative elites
and the
army,

and

his administration was subject to several
coup attempts.
His campaign promises to Peron were initially
fulfilled
but rather than coopting Peronist labor support,
the

Peronists demanded more concessions which Frondizi
could
not deliver.

Frondizi's economic program of

"devlopmentalism" could not support the kinds of social

welfare benefits which Peron had been able to dole out.
At the end of 1958, Frondizi embarked on an economic

project designed to promote price stabilization and to
end a balance of payments deficit.

To carry this out,

Frondizi sought foreign assistance by way of

a

$328

million loan from the International Monetary Fund.

In

order to obtain the loan, Frondizi was forced to adopt

policies which hurt his attempts at coopting working
79

class support.

^

The lnitial result Qf his

fall in real wages of
26%.

^

The response to Frondizi's
program was a series of
strikes by labor, which
were violently crushed.
The
army, alarmed at the
recent revolution in Cuba
viewed
labor agitation as part of
the international leftist
conspiracy.
it pressured Frondizi
to take a hard line
against labor discontent.
By late 1961, early 1962,
the economic situation,
which had shown some signs of
improvement, was again in
crisis.
The army was alarmed at
Frondizi's foreign
policy forays which many interpreted
as attempts to buy

popular support.

in 1961,

Frondizi sought to mediate

the confrontation between Cuba
and the United States.
That same year, he welcomed Che
Guevara back to his

nation of birth.

with several gube rnatior ial elections

slated for 1961, Frondizi was seeking
votes.

However,

the army was becoming increasingly
impatient with him.

The elections of 1961 were victories for
the Radicals

and Frondizi decided to make good on

a

campaign promise

by allowing the Per6nists to run their candidates
in the
1962 gubernatorial elections.

Frondizi hoped that

a

Radical victory would give him some independence from an

increasingly overbearing army.
the Per6nists won

a

He lost his gamble as

majority of the governorships.

The

army pressured Frondizi to annul the electoral results;
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he refused and the
army deposed him in
a coup.
The period Mediately
following the coup witnessed
a
power struggle within
the army over what
form of
government to install.
One faction., called the
Azules

(Blues), wanted

a

return to legal constitutional
rule

and favored some
accommodation to Per 6n
The other
faction, called the
Colorados (Reds), was militantly
anti-Peronist and wanted
extended military rule.
.

Throughout 1962, conflicts
and clashes, at times
violent, took place, but
eventually the Azules got the
upper hand and called
45
elections
for July 1963.

in this election,

the Peronists were still
banned

from participating and
UCR-Pueblo candidate Arturo illia
was elected with 25% of the
popular vote.
The army,

as

with Frondizi did not completely
retreat from the scene
and continued to exercise its
veto option.

Uli a

represented the conservative wing
of the Radicals and
was only able to maintain the
support of the party's
traditional wing. The landed elites had
since formed a
coalition with the UIA and called for
less state

intervention in the economy.

They viewed Illia's

policies of expanding the government bureaucracy
and
state spending as inflationary. 46
His fiercest critics though, came from the
CGT and
the labor unions.

Having been denied the right to run

their candidates in the July elections,
81

few in the

working classes saw lll
ia as

a

leg iti m ate ruler.

when
Illia attempted to divide
the labor movement, the
response was a series of
strikes and sit-ins which
disrupted the country. From
exile, Peron encouraged
efforts to destabilize lllia
and even attempted a return
to the country but was
stopped in Rio de Janeiro and
sent back to Spain. 47
in September 1965,

lllia called congressional

elections with every intention of
seeing the democratic
process through, which meant allowing
the Peronists to
field candidates.
Hoping for a Radical victory, again
the gamble was lost when the
Peronists won.
Labor

stepped up its military support for

within the army began working toward
28,

1966,

coup.

a
a

Factions

coup.

lllia was removed, with hardly

a

On June

protest from

any group in Argentine society.
The administrations of Frondizi and Illia,
while

nominally democratic, were basically army-orchestrated
attempts to have civilians deal with Per6nism.

Neither

Frondizi nor Illia were totally free to exercise power
as they pleased,

but rather, the army expected the

Radicals to rule without Per6nist support,

when they

were unable to do so and began to negotiate with some
factions of the Peronists, the army came in.

The army

knew it had forced an impossible task upon the Radicals,
but the other two alternatives seemed unpalatable in
82

they could have allowed
Peron to return to
Argentina and negotiated some
kind of pact with him
to most in the army
at that time, this was an
1958:

unacceptable strategy

-

power themselves, which

0
a

r

-

they could have come to

faction of the army advocated

and which ultimately, was
the solution adopted in 1966.

Bureaucr atic-Authoritarianism
The Argentina of 1966 had
undergone several

transformations since 1955 when the
army ousted Per6n.
The landed elites were still
a significant
force in

politics and were the principal
supporters of dePer6nization.
in those ten years they had
recovered
much of their wealth
which they

-

country

—

sent out of the

and many had entered the realms of
finance,

commerce, and eventually, industry.

The national

industrial bourgeoisie had grown in number,
but its
fortunes were languishing due to the inability
to deepen
indust rial i zat ion.
This group was rivaled by the entrance of foreign

multinational corporations, primarily from the United
States.

Under the Radicals, foreign investment had

increased dramatically and was now
in the economy.

factions.

a

significant player

The middle class was divided into

Many who had seen democracy crushed by the

military in the past ten years went
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in

search of an

alternative to Radicalism
and joined up with
the
Peronists.
The Radicals,

ha vin g £ail ed at
, over ning.

fell into disarray and
conflict among themselves.

Radical policies o£ favoring
foreign capital over
domestic industry also
alienated many from the
middle
class.
The working classes,
after ten years of
repression, were as powerful
as ever.
Successive
policies of de-Peroni.ation
had only led to greater
identification with Percnism.
so too, in the !960s
there had emerged labor
leaders who were less
dependent
on Per6n and internal
rivalries plagued the labor
movement between Feron
Perftn'cs loyalists
and those who sought
an independent way. 48

Together with this heterogeneous
group of contending
social forces was the army which
had become
disillusioned at civilian inability
to defeat Per6nism
and to attain economic stability.
The army of 1966 had
come to adopt the notion of
"national security" in its

interpretation of what was wrong with
Argentina.
National security broadened the
traditional view of
"enemy" to include the enemy from
within.
Threats such
as communist infiltration and counte
r i nsu rgency were

very real, and the military had the
responsibility to
weed them out and destroy them.
"Warfare" was no longer
limited to fighting an external enemy but expanded
to
include the eradication of internal opponents.
84

To many,

1

Per6nism and the working
classes harbored subversive
elements which needed to be
destroyed.
what the
civilians could not do, the
49
army would.

Another aspect of national
security called for
maintaining the traditional
values of Argentine society.
Liberation Theology, a radical
reexamination of Catholic
doctrine, was spreading its
gospel in parts of Latin
America and the Argentine military
was worried it would
gain a foothold in Argentina.
Therefore, when the
military came to power, their public
discourse was
imbued with Christian symbols.
The messianic element of
military rule from 1966 to 1982 was
a direct response to
reformist trends within the Catholic
Church at that
4.

t

lme 50
•

.

Economically, the military was committed
to an

industrial program for developing Argentina.
goal of making Argentina

a

with its

modern world power, the

military favored the deepening of industrialization.
Import-substitution-industrialization had been
exhausted.

Under General Carlos Ongania, the military

sought an alliance with foreign capital to provide the

needed impetus for expanding industrialization.

This

alliance was the first experiment at bureaucratic-

authoritarianism.

5

In order to implement his program of attracting

foreign capital, Ongania had to take care of the,
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broadly defined, opposition.
Labor
Principal target as it
posed

,

of cour

^_^

the most serious threat
to

attracting foreign capital,
and the repression
unleashed
was unprecedented in
Argentine history up to that
time.

Persist labor leaders were
jailed and
labor unions intervened.

was

the principal

The severity of the
repression

direct consequence of the
high levels of political
mobilization on the part of
labor.
Because labor was
accustomed to playing an influential
role in the
a

nation's politics as an
opposition force, greater force
was necessary to silence its
52
opposition.

Labor was not the only group
attacked.

University

professors and students, intellectuals,
the political
parties, and anyone who appeared
to question Ongania's
policies were purged and silenced.
To Ongania and the
military, Argentine society had
become
corrupt and

immoral.

No less than an all-out internal
war was

necessary to cleanse Argentine society of
its sins. 53
Having initially crushed opposition to his
rule,

Ongania moved full speed ahead to implement his
economic
program.

He cut workers' wages

and benefits, devalued

the currency, and rationalized various sectors
of the

state bureaucracy to create

investment.

a

favorable climate for

The initial results were good as foreign

investment increased dramatically by 1967.

However,

the

social dislocations were severe and would prove fatal to
86

^
Ongania's plan.

Labor of course suffered the
brunt of
his policies as massive
unemployment and a drastic
reduction in workers- overall
well-being occurred.
The
national bourgeoisie and owners
of small and medium
businesses also suffered as
foreign competition led many
to bankruptcy.
The traditional elites
and the military
were the only domestic groups
to view these developments
favorably.

Ongania's plan could continue to
work so long as he
was successful at keeping a lid
on social
protest.

Between 1966 and 1969,

it appeared that

Ongania was in

control of the situation, but this
illusion was
dispelled in May 1969 in the city of
Cordoba.
There, an
auto worker strike, a student protest,
and middle-class

support led to massive demonstrations
against the
regime.

while military forces successfully repressed

the strike,

other protests occurred in other cities and

Ongania's days were numbered.
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Ongania attempted to hold on to power despite the

growing number of voices within his own ranks advising
him to resign.

Those in the army who had never really

wanted the military as governors found the opportunity
to force their hand.

In 1970,

military coup.
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Ongania was deposed in

a

The Resurrection of
Peron
The army generals who
ousted Ongania in 1970
realized
the futility of four
years of dealing with social
discontent by force. As a
result, under General
Alejandro Lanusse, the military
government decided it
had to allow some democratization
to take place.

Lanusse embarked on

campaign to popularize his image
in the hope of garnering
support from the middle class
and the political parties.
He called it the "Grand
National Agreement," but managed
to only attract the
support of a few minor parties.
Social discontent grew
by leaps and bounds.
Along with all the other groups
which make up the Argentine political
spectrum, there
emerged in the early 1970s leftist
guerrilla groups
which would make efforts at political
reconciliation
a

impossible without Peron. 56
Urban guerrilla groups had come into being
mostly

during the early 1960s, but they became
significant
players in politics in 1970.

Ongania's regime,

a

In the last days of

group calling itself the Montoneros

kidnapped General Aramburu and executed him.
sent shock waves throughout the nation.

The event

This was to be

followed by other kidnappings, assassinations, bombings,
and bank robberies.
as the ERP

Other urban guerrilla groups,

such

(People's Revolutionary Army) and the FAP

(Per6nist Armed Forces), had been active in the late
88

1960s and were respon S i
ble for the assassinations
of
several labor union bosses. 57

These urban guerrilla
groups predominantly
consisted
of middle- and
upper-middle-class youths
disillusioned
with the Argentine political
stalemate.
Most, though
not all, were inspired by
the l ikes of Che Guevara,
Fidel Castro, and the other
giants of Marxist
revolution.
Having been raised in the
period of
outright and de facto military
rule, these groups,

particularly the Montoneros were
scandalized at the
degree of repression and social
injustice meted out by
the authorities.
So too, these groups
felt the root

cause of Argentina's problems was
in foreign capital
exploitation, and they blamed certain
collaborators for
this situation.
They accused union leaders of
selling
out to the establishment and
pushed for popular

revolution.

When few in the working classes
responded,

they took to the streets themselves. 58
Juan Per6n watched these developments
with great

interest from his exile in Spain.

He let it be known

that he supported the ideology of these guerrilla

groups, and so, he won many of these leftist groups'

support, especially the Montoneros.

Peron's interest,

of course, was in using these groups to his political

advantage.
disarray.

By 1970,

the political landscape was in

Efforts to defeat Per6nism had failed; the
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military was disorganized;
guerrilla warfare appeared
endemic.
what better time

for Per.n to promote
himself

as the only one who could
reconcile the contending

factions of Argentine society? 59
The military by 1973 was
exhausted from failing to

contain urban terrorism and
arrest a declining economy.
Many advocated (although
reservations existed among
others) allowing Perfin to return
to Argentina.
The
middle classes had also grown tired
of social and
economic upheavals.
The Radicals and the military
had
failed, and many defected to Perftnism.
The working
classes had seen their hopes and needs
ignored time and
time again during the past eighteen
years.
The

possibility of

a

Peronist resurrection was tantalizing.

The labor union elite was

a

bit more guarded:

they were

used to acting without Per6n and were unsure
as to what
his return would do to their influence and
power.

The

urban guerrilla groups saw Peron's return as aiding
in
their cause for social revolution.

After some last

minute skirmishing by the army, Per6n returned and he
conquered.

He was inaugurated on October 12,

seventy-seven years of age.
wife,

1973,

at

At his side was his third

Isabel. 60

Immediately upon taking office, Peron set about
repressing the militant youth movement he had encouraged
for so long.

Repression was unleashed on the guerrilla
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groups and the ideals
aeais of f-hoc^
these „groups were
shattered
However, others refused to
accept what was happening
and
went underground.
Pro, there, they regrouped
and would
launch a new wave of political
violence.
with labor,
Per6n attempted to revive
some of the social welfare
policies of forty years earlier,
but the economy was in
deep recession.
instead, he hammered out a
tripartite
agreement between labor, business,
and government to
freeze prices and wages until
the inflationary spiral
halted.
Social unrest did not abate but
escalated.
Urban
terrorist groups intensified their
activities.
Labor,
seeing no improvement in its plight,
called strikes.
The army was grumbling and the
middle class felt

squeezed.

And then Per6n died.

less than

On July 1,

year in power, Peron was dead,

a

followed was

a

period of chaos and terror,

1974,

after

what

with Isabel

now in power, the political situation
deteriorated
rapidly.

Policy making was irrational, the economy

continued in disarray, and urban terrorism increased.
Most groups in society mobilized to call for
coup.

more,

On March 24,

1976,

a

military

the wish was granted,

and once

the military took over. 61

Caudillos

,

Radicals, Populists, and the Military

The history of Argentine politics up to 1976

illustrates

a

path of development distinct from that of
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from Spain
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through t0 the beginning
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pQwer
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^

the landed elites
under the facade of
liberal democratic
forms

The emergence of the
Radicals at the turn of
the
century was a result of
the growing urbanization
of the
nation.
The backbone of this
group was middle-class
white collar workers engaged
in the business and
financial aspects of
agro-exporting and small
shopkeepers.
Economically, these groups
sought tc
maintain the status quo of
furthering agricultural

export production, but they
wanted political rights and
privileges.
The Roque Saenz-Pena electoral
reform law
enabled this sector of society
to achieve political
power and control over the state
apparatus.
in much of the

traditional political development

literature, the middle class is
considered to be
democratizing force in society. On the

a

surface, the

Radicals would appear to have fulfilled
this function in
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Argentine society, promoting
honest elections and
representative government.
However,

a

critical

difference between the
Argentine middle class and
the
North American middle
class was the former's
continued
ties to the agricultural
exporting sector

rather than to

the industrial sector.

The Argentina middle
class was

but an extension of the
agricultural export economy.
This helps to explain why
both the Argentine middle
class and landed elites
proved intransigent
to the

growing demands of an emergent
working class.
This also
helps to explain why both landed
elites and middle-class
groups courted the military at
various times to gain

political ends.
This is not to say that the landed
elites and the
middle class share the same concerns,
for the landed
elites were very suspicious of the
Radical's expansion
of the state bureaucracy and
attempts at political
reform.

After

a

period of Radical rule, the landed

elites agitated the army to take over
and the year 1930
initiated fifty years of military dominance
over

Argentine politics.
Initially, the military espoused very limited goals
in coming to power:

call elections.

had

a

to clean up chaos and corruption and

It neither

sought long-term rule nor

grand vision for Argentina.

However,

significant

groups within the military were preoccupied with
93
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politics and sought to
promote their interests
in the
Political sphere.
Despite statements to the
contrary,
the Argentine military
from 193Q Qn
g significant
activist role in the nation's
politics, even when

^

the

president in the Casa Hosada
was

a civilian.
The nature
of this political
intervention would be determined
by

economic and social factors.
The 1930s and 1940s were
periods of industrial
growth for Argentina under
policies of import-

substitution- industrialization.

The economic

transformation and the consequent
social changes led to
a period of populism
under Juan
Per6n.

An army officer,

Peron rose to power by enfranchising
the working classes
and creating a new political
force in Argentine
politics.
His leadership style was clearly
personalist
and his opening up of the political
system to the labor
unions did not mean greater democracy
for Argentina.
However, his social welfare policies
created substantive

improvements for an hitherto repressed sector
of
society
It was the mobilization of the working
classes as a

political force which Peron's successors sought to undo.
After Peron was deposed in
a

a

coup,

the army spearheaded

campaign to crush the power of the labor movement and

the working classes.

When it failed, the military

resurrected the Radicals and let them have
94

a

go at it.

The ignominious failure
of the

denervation

of

society led to the
imposition of a military regime,
different from all of its
predecessors.
The Ongania regime of
1966 was markedly different
from previous attempts at
military rule.
Disillusioned

with civilian incompetence
and committed to repressing
Per6nism, the Ongania regime
sought to transform
Argentina into an industrial
world power by fostering
industrialization through foreign
investment.
Committed
to a vision of political
and economic greatness, Ongania
attempted to manage the economy
as well as to promote
social peace.
Herein lies another aspect of
Argentine
political development different from
traditional
modernization theory. The impetus for
industrialization
came from the military which was
overseeing
a

technological bureaucracy in carrying out
its economic
program.
in Brazil the program was working,
but in

Argentina it led to failure.

Nevertheless, in the 1960s

when Argentina had become highly urbanized and
industrialized, its politics were highly repressive and

non-democratic.

Industrialization was not creating

liberal democracy as modernization theorists had

believed.

Rather the opposite was occurring throughout

the continent.

The failure of the first bureaucratic-authoritarian

experiment and the subsequent return of Peron to power
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illustrated how social forces
in society had a
significant impact on the
policies followed by those in
the Casa Rosada.
The Cordobazo of 1969 served
notice
that social groups would
not sit idly by as they saw
their standard of living
eroding.

This was

a

lesson

though,

that few in the Argentine
military would learn
until some years later. Before
that would happen,
Argentina had to enter one of the
darkest periods of its

history
In sum, Argentine political
history up to 1976

followed

a

path distinctive from that followed
by North

America and Western Europe.

Even though to most

observers, Argentina resembled

a

sophisticated and

modern nation, this appearance belied its
roots as a
dependent Latin nation. As such, social and
economic
forces had differing impacts on the nation's
politics.
One such social force which has had

a

significant effect

on the course of contemporary Argentina is the
labor

union movement.

Its evolution will be discussed next.
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CHAPTER III

ARGENTINE LABOR
1890-1976

From their early beginnings
as loose collections of
immigrant self-help societies,
Argentine labor unions
have played active roles in the
nation's politics.
Their growth and strength as an
economic and political
force has been met with periodic
repression, cooptation,
and accommodation on the part of
governing authorities
throughout the twentieth century. Under
Juan Peron's
three administrations (1946-52,
1952-55, 1973-74),

members of the labor movement elite exercised
power and
influence in matters beyond those specific to

labor such

as foreign policy.

Under military and Radical party

administrations, labor exercised power as
101

a

voice of

opposition to standing regime
policies.

m

all cases,

the labor movement has been
subject to cooptation from
the casa Rosada and the
labor elite itself has been

characterized by internal divisions.

The complex nature
of regime-labor relations
and of intra-labor relations
will be explored in the context
of Argentine political

development of the past century.

The Birth of the Labor Movement

As will be recalled from chapter

2,

the 1880s in

Argentina were characterized by the
massive immigration
of Southern Europeans to its shores
in
search of work.

From among these immigrants emerged
the first efforts to
create a labor union movement.
Labor activists of this

period brought to the New World such Old
World-conceived
ideas as anarchism, socialism, sindicalism,
and

communism.

These ideas became the bases for collective

identity building among the newly arrived immigrants.
Early attempts at group formation divided along

ethnic lines as newly arrived immigrants were

assimilated into Argentine society by mutual aid
societies.

Out of these societies emerged labor unions

whose interests focused on working conditions and wages.
Strike activity early on became an integral part of the

strategies labor unions utilized to make their demands
heard.

Government actions to repress this growing labor
102

activity was also characteristic
of this period.
Within the labor movement
itself,

1

there raged fierce

debates over how best to
organize the movement.
Anarchists eschewed any type of
organization and favored
direct action over political
participation or
negotiation.
Socialists, on the
other hand, saw

political action as the best means
toward achieving
favorable labor legislation.
Sindicalists
,

represented

who

minority strain within the labor
movement,
sought an apolitical, bread-and-butter
issues-oriented
approach to unionism. 2 These three
dominant ideological
currents, with diverse political
agendas, made attempts
at labor unification difficult.
Nevertheless, attempts
were made at organizing unions into
associations
a

to

promote labor interests.

In 1901,

anarchists and

socialists were able to set aside their
differences,
albeit temporarily, to form the Worker
Federation of

Argentina

(

FOA

)

.

Unity did not last long, and

subsequently the socialists formed their own

organizations starting with the General Union of Workers
in 1903.

3

As industrial development intensified, coupled with

increased rural to urban migration, labor union

membership accelerated in the first decade of the
twentieth century.

Anarchist-oriented unions

predominated at this time within
103

a

political order still

dominated by landed elite
interests.
strategy of using strikes as
a

The anarchist

means of political

protest was greeted with
government repression by force
and by : e gal statutes.

m

1902,

in response to a

massive series of strikes by
labor unions over working
conditions, the government
instituted the Law of

Miidence which gave

it the power to deport
any alien

considered undesirable.

This law was an attempt to

squash the growing militancy of

a

labor movement

dominated by immigrants from Europe.

m

1910,

the Law

of Social Defense gave the
police the right to imprison

anyone suspected of anarchist
affiliations.

Throughout

this decade, government authorities
harassed labor

militants and periodically imposed
states of siege.

4

The repression by the government
and the lack of

organization by the anarchists led to their
eventual
demise in the second decade of the twentieth

century.

The passage of the Saenz-Pena electoral
reform law and
the election of the middle-class Radical party
to power
in 1916 did not lessen the hostility of
government

authorities toward labor militants.

The ideological

bent of anarchists for direct, disruptive action only

served to reinforce the resolve of the Radicals to use
force to destroy rather than accommodate the labor

movement.

Government repression led to terrorism on the

part of many unionists.

Hostilities between labor and
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government culminated in January
1919 with "La Semana
Tragica," a week in which
police authorities clashed
violently with labor demonstrators.
This signalled the
end of anarchist dominance in
the labor movement as the
repression of two decades finally
succeeded in weakening
the power of anarchists in
the labor movement. 5
As anarchism became less viable,
socialism or socialdemocracy became attractive to many
in the labor

movement by the 1920s and 1930s.

The rise of socialist

support coincided with changes in the
character of the
industrial worker and in the nature of
industrialization
itself.
The original appeal of anarchism
was to an

artesanal class whose members were being
absorbed into
the fold of encroaching industrialization.
As

industrialization became the dominant focus of the

Argentine economy by the 1930s under importsubstitution-industrialization, socialists came to
dominate within the labor movement elite.

Part of this

trend can be attributed to the strong presence of

socialist politicians during the Radical ruling period
of 1916-30 which had an impact on labor union activists.

Another aspect of socialist popularity lay in its
emphasis on organization and working within the system
to promote change.

The increasingly complex nature of

industrialization was expressed in

a

greater

identification by labor activists with the goals of
105

promoting better working
conditions and economic
justice, as espoused by the
Socialist party.
The chief
rival to the socialists were
the communists
who

dominated in the manufacturing
and construction trades.
The socialist principle of
negotiating with

6

government authorities did not
result in improved
conditions for the working classes.
Rather, the

military coup of 1930 brought
renewed repression against
the labor movement as well
as other sectors
of the

population.

Military leaders attempting to create
fascist regime modeled after Mussolini's
Italy

disregarded constitutional rules and norms.
economic policies favored

relationship with Great Britain.

industrialization was tolerated as

a

deepening economic

Some
a

means of dealing

with the nation's trade deficit and as

situation.

Their

return to an emphasis on

a

agricultural export production and

employment so as to defuse

a

a

a

source of

potentially volatile social

Despite the accelerated pace of

industrialization by 1935 (promoted mostly by foreign
entrepreneurs), the ruling elites of the period remained

hesitant and suspicious of this trend.

However, they

became powerless to reverse it as the 1940s approached.
The economic changes of the 1930s led to

a

social transformation of the laboring classes.

profound
The

impetus toward industrialization coupled with the
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7

declining employment
opportunities available in
the
rural sector due to the
Depression, created a
migratory
flow of rural laborers
to the cities.
No
longer

of recently arrived
immigrants from Europe,

a

class

the urban

working classes were now
characterized by second and
third generation Argentine
citizens.
As such,

they were

unschooled in the debates of
their predecessors over the
ideologies of socialism, communism,
or sindicalism.

This was in marked contrast
to the labor union leaders
who in the 1930s and early
1940s were highly

ideologically oriented and quite
elitist.
migrants from the interior were

These new

much more narrowly

concerned with their ability to
earn decent wages and to
work under decent conditions. 8
The inability of the
socialist and communist dominated labor
elite to

understand or even to communicate with
this new rank and
file led to

a

political leadership vacuum at the exact

moment when the working classes were at
their strongest
numerically. Needless to say, the growing
numbers of
urban workers did not translate into access
to political
power as the 1930s ruling elites chose to
ignore
this

significant transformation of Argentine society.

would be left up to

a

It

singular individual with

farsighted vision to understand and to capitalize on
this new social development.
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Peronism

-

Take

I

No other period in Argentine
history has had such a
profound effect on labor and on
Argentine society as
that of the regime of Juan
Domingo Peron.
The period
between 1943 and 1955 wrought
truly

revolutionary

changes in the political life
of the nation, opening up
the political game to new
players and changing the
nature of state-civil relations.
Peron brought labor
into the arena of national
decision making and for the
first time in Argentine history, the
needs of workers
were a principal concern of the
national government.
Between 1937 and 1947, some 750,000
migrants from the
countryside moved into greater Buenos Aires
in the hopes
of finding work in the
import-substitution-industries.

With an economy which began earnestly to
industrialize,
workers, as a class, became critical to the
nation's
well-being.

with increasing industrialization came

increased membership into labor unions and an
increased
number of new unions.

In 1936,

individual union

affiliations numbered around 370,000.

In 1941,

that

number had increased to 447,000 and by 1945, the number
stood at 522,000.

The number of unions between 1941 and

1945 nearly tripled from 356 to 969.

9

While the older union leadership competed among

themselves for control over the ideological direction of
the labor movement (the early 1940s saw
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a

split between

the socialists and
communists in the CGT)

,

other les:s
.

experienced labor leaders began
to espouse the cause of
economic nationalism.
Understanding their role in an
expanding industrial economy,
many labor leaders by the
late 1930s began a call
for nationalization of foreignowned public services.
So too, labor's demands changed
in a significant manner.
According to David Rock, labor
demands after 1940 concerned
the issue
of fringe

benefits rather than wages.

Workers' standards of

living were already on the
upswing by the early 1940s
when Per6n began his ascendance
to power. 10
Per6n began to court the labor
movement in mid-1944
by making claims of seeking redistributive justice,"
"humanized capital," and a "harmony
of classes."
Using
his position as the head of the
National Department of
Labor, he translated his rhetoric into
action by

settling

a

series of strikes in the union's favor and
by

dispensing substantive benefits directly to the
workers.
However, Peron's popularity with labor rank and
file

cannot only be attributed to economic payoffs.

The

principal cause for his staying power can be found in
the fact that he elevated the worker to

a

level of

dignity and respect hitherto unheard of in the rhetoric
of Argentine politics. 11

With his mistress and later

wife, Eva Duarte, Peron mobilized

working men and women into
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a

a

generation of

newfound sense of self-

.

esteem, precisely at

time when the nature of
their
work alienated the.
from their identities.
The events
of October 17,
1945, when the streets of
Buenos Aires
a

filled with workers
demandin, Peron's release
from jail,
was a testament to him
as the master populist
politician
Per6n's ability to gain the
support of the labor
elites during his rise to
power between 1944 and 1946
was not as facile as winning

over labor rank and file.

Part of his success in
gaining the upper hand can be
attributed to the factionalism
among the labor elites
and also to their isolation
from those whom they claimed
to represent.
The repression by the military
in the
early 1940s, particularly against
communist union
leaders, also gave Per6n ample
room to maneuver.

Before his electoral victory in
1946, Peron had
already begun to reshape the labor
movement to his
purposes.

In 1945,

he won passage of the Law of

Professional Associations, which established

a

system of

government registration for all officially
recognized
Unions.
Under this law, no union could enter
into

collective bargaining, go on strike, or appeal
to

a

labor court without government recognition
(personeria

gremial -legal personhood).

what's more, the law called

for one single recognized union per industry and
one

national labor confederation.
110

As the General

1

.

Confederation of Labor

(

CGT

)

was the only national

organization of labor at the
time, it became the
dominant labor organization

under the control of

Peron.

12

For its part, many in
the labor elites saw their

autonomy eroding and fought
vigorously against Peron's
centralizing policies. However,
their efforts to
maintain their power and to keep
the labor movement
independent were futile.
Peron had too many resources
at his disposal and he offered
substantive
power and

influence to those leaders who
cooperated with him.
For
the first time in Argentine
history, labor leaders were
consulted for their ideas and handsomely
rewarded when
they did Peron's bidding. Not only
did their
sphere of

influence encompass labor-specific issues
but also
issues of general policy making.
Labor leaders who
refused to align with Peron were isolated
and shut off
from his pro-labor patronage.
Later, many of these

leaders would be forcibly removed from their
leadership

positions

1

Soon after his release from prison, Juan Per6n

organized the Labor party, the vehicle through
spearheaded his campaign for the presidency.

which he
Many union

leaders joined and offered their support, in the belief
that their political time had come, that labor was

finally an emergent political power.
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The principal

supporters of this Labor
party were the younger labor
leaders, who had emerged
in the previous two
years.
Others, from the older
unions, felt an independent
Labor
party would serve labor's
interests in the years to
come.
concert with all the other
groups sympathetic
to Peron (military,
factions of the Radical party,
industrialists, the Catholic
church), their support
elected Per6n to office in
14
February

m

1946.

As president, Per6n continued
to enact policies

favorable to labor.

At the same time, he successfully

consolidated his control over the
labor unions, thereby
eclipsing the old-line of union
activists.

Under the

Secretariat of Labor and Prevision,
Peron created an
extensive bureaucratic network for the
administration of
labor affairs.
He gradually concentrated matters
concerning organized labor within the
General Direction
of Labor and Direct Social Action
DGTASD
This agency
provided a direct link between the unions and
Peron for
dealing with matters such as collective bargaining,
(

)

.

labor law enforcement, union registration and
dues,

employer-union debates, and work accidents.

The CGT was

empowered by the government to intervene in unions to
replace their leadership as

a

means of dealing with any

dissent over government policies.

Peron also abolished

the Labor party and created the Justicialista party

which became known as the Per6nist party. 15
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Through his policies
j-i_j.es

,

labor unions to the

An
Por
Peron
jsouqht
y at tn
to c,,k~
subordinate

the

needs and requirements
of his
9 i,e.
Throughout his tenure in
offioe, no labor
leader came to
prominence nor was the
substance o £ labor
-tters debated. Poli cies
emanated from the DGTASD
and
Peron directly appealed
to the workers for
support
-a Peron was fundamental in
fosteri„ g direct links
fcQ
the people,
with her lower-class
background and
charismatic style, she
epitomized to many the
true
essence of Peron's co ra
mitment to the working
classes.
These populist appeals
were successful in
solidifying
Per6n's control. 17

-

,

"

After

period of improving workers'
rights and
benefits, Per6n's policies
began to emphasize the
direction and management of
labor affairs.
Under his
tutelage, there arose a class
of labor leaders whose
orientation centered on Per6n,
rather
a

than on

theoretical debates over how
best to fight for workers'
interests.
Having ousted the old-line
labor leaders,
Peron brought into power men
who would do his bidding.
These union men usually had
obscure union activist
backgrounds and next to no independent
working-base
support.
As supporters of Peron,
these union men

accrued considerable benefits, not
only in terms of
political influence but better standards

of living as

well.

Also, Per6n drafted labor leaders for
important
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government positions such as
secretary of forei gn
affairs and minister of the
interior.
The growing
bureaucratic establishment for
the administration of
labor affairs also provided
opportunities for upward
mobility on the part of labor
union men. 18
The virtual hegemonic
support Per6n enjoyed among the
working classes did not
translate into passive labor

acquiescence to his economic
policies.
administration, he faced
strikes.

a

Throughout his

number of very severe

On the one hand, many strikes
were instigated

by Peron himself and their
"officially sanctioned"
status was to demonstrate the strength
of Peron to other
power groups in society. On the other
hand, wildcat

strikes took place which were instigated
by workers over
the objections of their union leaders.
In March
1948,

a

strike was called by bank employees directed
by an

Inter-bank commission which was not connected to
the
legally recognized bank union. As was their usual
tactic, the CGT, at the behest of Per6n broke up
the

strike through repression and the dismissal of many

workers.

The CGT also replaced the union head with

leader to their liking.

In February 1949,

a

strike was

a

called by some graphics workers and here again the CGT
intervened.

In December 1950-January 1951,

called by the railroad workers, headed by

Consultative Commission of Emergency.
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a

a

strike was

clandestine

The strike was

declared illegal, was intervened
with the CGT and Per6n
went so far as to conscript
the workers into military
service.
At the time, Argentina
was engaged in
hostilities with Chile over
the Beagle Channel and the
railroad strike threatened
the flow of supplies to the
south.
By conscripting the
railroad workers, PerOn made
their actions a matter of
national
,

security.

To back up

his decree, he sent the army
in to end the strike.

After the strike ended, Peron
conceded to the workers'
demands.
in all these cases, workers
were striking over
real material issues and did
not view their actions as

disloyal to the government.

Rather, they explicitly saw

their adversaries to be their
employers while at the
same time, they affirmed their loyalty
to Per6n. 19

Labor support for Peron, however, began
to wane after
1951 as the economic crises loomed and Peron
began to

respond to criticism with greater authoritarianism.

death of Evita in 1952 was

a

The

critical blow in his

efforts to maintain the support of labor.

Labor strikes

by 1954 were getting alarmingly numerous, and labor

rallies invoked by the Per6nist labor leaders attracted
fewer numbers of supporters.

1952-1955 were multi faceted
of mismanagement,

;

The economic problems of
the result of

a

combination

embezzlement, and the exhaustion of

the import-substitution-industrialization program for

economic growth, and of severe problems in the
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.

agricultural sector brought
Qn by drought
elite resistance to Per6n's
policies.
These problems
were addressed by austerity
measures which began to eat
into the standard o£ living
of workers
groups

(as well as other

20
)

Peron attempted to offset
growing labor discontent by
directing its frustrations at
other groups and by
continuing to dole out benefits
from the Eva Peron
Foundation (a social welfare agency
which dispensed
patronage to Peronist supporters).
As discontent from
other groups in society began
to increase, Peron
mobilized his supporters to seek revenge
against his
enemies.
In 1953, after a bomb exploded
during a
Peronist labor rally, mobs of Per6nists
ransacked and

torched the Jockey Club, exclusive domain
of the landed
elites.
After repeated confrontations with the
Catholic
Church, Per6n also encouraged his supporters
to oppose

church policies and the result again was

a

great deal

of violence and destruction in many churches. 21

By 1955, the situation appeared to be getting out of
hand.

Civil violence seemed rampant and there were

calls from all sides for Peron to resign.

The CGT

elite, a creation of Per6n's, did not openly break with

Peron.

The years of partiality to labor and the

symbolic conditioning had gone far in creating
labor elite.

However,

a

loyal

this loyalty did not provoke
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labor to come to Pe ro „.
s aid ln tfc ,
coup o£
did Perc-n seek an armed
workers' movement fcQ
himself ln power
Rather
.

,

^

^^ ^

^^

the eiohteen years
before his spectacular
return to
Power, he attempted to
manipulate the labor movement
in
his determination to
remain a political force
in

Argentine politics. 22
The first Peronist regime
succeeded in coopting a new
group into the arena of
Argentine politics.
The old
ruling landed elites and
the urban commercial
middle
classes were forced to
accommodate to the priorities
of
the urban working
population.
The political

mobilization of the working classes
was not
democracy for Argentina, but
a

corporatism under

a

a

new era of

classic example of

populist banner.

The labor movement

was incorporated into the
Per6nist state with its power
circumscribed by Peron. Union
leaders, because they
were chosen by Peron, were
obligated to him, and

therefore their function was less
to represent workers
than to gain worker support for
Peronist policies.
Initially, the corpora ti zing efforts
were accompanied by
substantive redi st ributive policies, but
as the latter

became less frequent, the acceptance of
Per6nist

policies reached crisis proportions.
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the Libe_raUn2
Resolution

The military coup
of

1^7^

the beginning Qf &
new stage in the history
of the labor movement.
Pe r 6n
was no longer in the
country, but he attempted
to
control the labor movement
from exile through emissaries
who shuttled back and
forth to Argentina. The
labor
movement was subjected to
repression as the new regime
undertook an all-out assault
on Per6nism.

This

situation served to mold the
nature and strategies of
the labor movement in the
late 1950s and early
1960s.
General Eduardo Lonardi
attempted
to seek an

accommodation with the labor
movement but, his efforts
were eclipsed after three
months by a hard-line military
faction led by General Pedro
Aramburu. Aramburu sought
to de-Peronize and
deinstitutionalize
the labor

movement.

His strategies included purging
union

leadership positions of Persists,
installing a military
intervener as head of the CGT and
outright harassment
of Peronist rank and file.
He hoped that
,

by

"housecleaning" the labor movement of
Peronist
influence, labor would return to its pre-1945

apolitical status. 23
The repression faced by the labor movement
had some

initial consequences for labor's power.

with the

absence of Peron the old divisions of the pre-1945 era
reopened and the old-line socialists and communists who
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had been

finalized

during Peron's regime
re-emerged
as contenders for power
within the labor m0 vement.
They
welcomed the coup of 1955 and
felt that they would be
able to retake control of
the labor movement now
that an
anti-Peronist government was in
power.
This assumption
proved fatal to these old-line
unionists for Aramburu's
regime proved not only anti-Pe
roni st but also anti-labor
in its policies.
with the Peronists in opposition
to

the regime,

it appeared as though the
socialists were

selling out to the military regime.

The latter's

credibility with labor rank and file
was lost.
socialist, communist, and sindicalist

By 1958,

elements within

the labor movement were
marginalized once again. 24

Peronist labor leaders, facing repression
and bereft
of political power scrambled to
retain their leadership
roles even though their benefactor
was no longer around
to protect them.
They well knew that labor
rank and

file held its allegiance to Per6n and
not to them.

Most

also saw the military regime to be
uncompromising in its
desire to rid the labor movement of Peronism.
Given
this situation, many Peronist labor leaders
felt the

best way of remaining

a

force in politics was to prove

their ability to lead the labor rank and file.

To

facilitate this, the Per6nist labor elites used the
return of Perc-n to Argentina as their rallying cry to

unite labor rank and file.
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Peron,

from exile, did not

discourage but encouraged
such efforts. 25
By using the return
of Peron
° n as thp
uthe ultimate
goal of
the labor movement
labor leaders

^

,

^^^^

some status within
the labor movement
survive the reversals
=>„j
eversals and
repression of Aramburu's
te9lme
reP SS ed
or discriminatory
po licy
«as interpreted as a
temporary setback in
labor's longterm stru ggle for the
return of Peron.
The drastic
decline in labor's fortunes
in the years

"

-

Mediately

following Peron-

ouster caused .any to
view the days of
Peron as glory days for
Argentina.
Uniting under a
Perbnist banner seeded to
be the only way of
surviving
the attacks by the
26
military regime.
s

The austerity measures
imposed by Aramburu kindled
labor militancy against
the regime,
over the objections
of Perbn, the number of
strikes and illegal actions

increased between 1956 and
1958.
confrontations,

a

Out of these

new class of labor leaders
emerged

whose success at mobilizing
workers accrued to them real
power and influence. Many of
these new leaders began to
develop their own social base of
support by claiming to
be heirs to Perbn's legacy. 27

Labor Under the Radicals
The elections of 1958 were an
army-orchestrated

attempt to pursue civilian rule without
the
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participation of the Persist
party.

Two rival facfcions
of the Radicals competed
against each other with
Arturo
Frondizi the victor. As will
be recalled from chapter
2, Frondizi won the election by
entering into a pact
with Per6n to gain Peronist
rank and file backing.
the preliminary provincial
elections earlier that year,
Peron had urged supporters to
cast dissenting votes by

m

casting blank ballots.

A full 25% of the votes cast

were blank, attesting to Frondizi
and everyone else the
popular support Peron still enjoyed.
Frondizi, the
master politician that he was, made
a deal with Per6n in
which he promised that if elected,
he would relegalize
the Per6nist party.
Per6n, also a master politician,
thought this would be a good opportunity
to begin

machinations for his eventual return to
Argentina.
However, Peron in Spain had to convince

labor leaders in

Argentina that voting for Frondizi would help
labor in
the long run.
After all, labor had been on the
"front

lines" battling military repression and seeing
its

standard of living declining drastically in the past
three years.

In order to gain their acquiescence,

Per6n

had to get Frondizi to agree to reinsti tuting the Law of

Professional Associations and allowing Peronist labor
leaders to regain control of the CGT.

Frondizi did so

and won the elections from his arch rival Ricardo

Balbin. 28
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Once in power, Frondizi made
good on his promises by
overturning some ant i-Pe r6ni st
legislation, calling for
new union elections, and
enacting a law similar to that
of the Law of Professional
Associations.
However,
Frondizi viewed his pact with
Per6n as a political
convenience for winning the elections
and after a short
period of time, he began to pursue
policies which proved
detrimental to labor's well-being.

Frondizi's economic project, called

"developmentalism," sought to promote advanced

industrialization through capitalization efforts
and the
encouragement of foreign investment. Emphasis
was

placed on capital-intensive production accompanied
by
the freezing of salaries and the contraction
of the

labor force.

Along with austerity measures imposed by

the IMF,

the economic condition of workers continued to

worsen.

Real salaries during Frondizi's administration

declined by 30%. 29
Labor was quick to respond to Frondizi's anti-labor

policies by calling

a

series of strikes during 1958 and

1959; unequaled in militancy up to that time.

Frondizi

reacted by sending in the army to repress them.
in the labor movement,

To many

these actions demonstrated the

intransigence of the Radicals to sympathizing with
labor's needs.

Pact or no pact with Peron,

labor rank

and file began to act against Frondizi's regime.
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From the very beginning,
Fr0 ndizi had sought
to play
several groups in society off
against each other.
He
used labor initially to
demonstrate to the military,
landed elites, and entrepreneurial
class that he could
coopt them.
when labor agitation arose
over
his

policies, Frondizi raised the
specter of social chaos if
the military and other
elites did not align behind him
in repressing this new
wave of labor activism.
He
attempted to prove his staying
power with labor by
alternating the use of the carrot
and the stick.

Concessions to labor would be followed
by repression in
his goal to tame the unions.

satisfy anyone.

In the end he

failed to

30

By late 1961-early 1962,

pressure from all sides.

Frondizi was feeling

The Cuban Revolution of 1959

had heightened the army's concerns
about communist

infiltration and it specifically saw the labor
movement
as susceptible to subversion from
within.

The labor

unions continued in their strike activity, and
the

economy was in dire trouble.
were in the offing.

upcoming elections as
support.

Gubernatorial elections

Frondizi decided to use the
a

means of shoring up his popular

In three provincial gubernatorial elections

held in late 1961, his party had won all three positions
so,

he felt confident he would win the major elections

of 1962.

So sure was Frondizi of his popular support
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that he allowed the
Persist party to field
candidates.
The result was a disaster
for Frondizi.
of fourteen
Provinces, Per6nist candidates
won ten.
This was more
that the army could accept
and in March 1963
Frondizi
was deposed in a coup. 31
The regime of Arturo Illia
was ill-equipped to deal
with labor opposition and
army pressures to take a
hard
line.
Labor, again denied the right
to field candidates
in the army-orchestrated
election which brought Illia to
power, stepped up its opposition.
early 1964, the
CGT declared a "Plan de Lucha"
(Battle plan) in which

m

selective strikes and factory
sit-ins were employed to
express labor discontent with the
government.
These

actions were taken for more than
economic reasons: labor
was intent on showing government
and business that it
could no longer be ignored when it
came to politics.
Despite Ulia's attempts to bypass the
labor leadership
and seek the support of rank and file,
the labor

movement maintained
his regime.

a

stance of opposition throughout

On another front,

labor militancy and

growing political chaos led Juan Peron to believe
the
time was ripe for his return to Argentina.

Months of

negotiations and rumor-monger ing in Argentina heightened
political tensions.

It all

came to naught as the army

made sure Peron would not be allowed to end his exile. 32
The first ten years of post-Pe r6ni st rule created
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profound changes in the
labor

-d UHa

movent.

The Frondisi

regies proved ineffectual

at bridling labor's
power; Peron had clearly
manipulated labor to his own
personal needs but had
failed to make his promised
comeback in 1964. A new
class of labor leaders
emerged
during this period, who
sought to break with Peron.
The
most influential one ot
of this
t-hic „i
^
class
was Augusto Vandor,
head of the powerful
Metalworkers Union. Vandor
interpreted the events of 1955-62
as demonstrating the
need for a change in strategy
on the part of the labor
movement.
Rather than pursuing militant
confrontation,
Vandor sought more pragmatic
strategies such as
negotiation with the powers that
be.
Labor activity
should rely less on mass mobilization
and more on
calculated assessments of the kinds
of pressure to be
applied in each specific situation.
Also, in seeking to
decrease Per6n's influence, Vandor and
his followers
attempted after 1964 to marginalize the
issue of Peron's
return to Argentina and to concentrate
on carving out

some space for labor in the political
arena. 33

Peron saw what was happening, and he countered
the

independent labor leaders by pitting his allies
against
them.

Jose Alonso,

leader of the Textile workers, was

the most significant of the labor leaders to do Peron's

bidding.

The schisms which these two factions of the

labor movement created and nurtured
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throughout the

»«o.

sun

^

have their lmpact on
the iabor move
t
t°<Jay.
what was interesUng
abQut
i9Ms
between the two tactions
was that eaoh claimed
to he the
true heir to Peron-s
legacy.
M hi le Vandor sought
to
distance the labor
movement frQm

^

perfin s
,

and his allies
nevertheless saw the need
to rely on
Percn-s name to maintain
their standing with the
ran*
and file.
Their public stance
was always one of
expressing support for
Perils™, while privately
seeKing
to separate Percnism
from Peron
or more aptly,
Peronism without Per6n.

-

The ability of the labor
movement to disrupt the
regimes of Prondizi and
illia gave it a renewed
sense of
power, for while repression
was certainly used by the
Radicals, it was not near
the same levels as had
been

suffered during the previous
military interlude.
Many
in the labor leadership
believed their marginalization
from politics to be a thing
of the past, and therefore,
the labor movement stepped
up its opposition
to Illia

(along with every other group in
society)

divisions within the ranks became
endemic.

while
in the 1965

congressional elections, Peronists won
and the wheels
began to turn for another coup.
it
came in 1966,

hardly anyone in Argentina raised any
objection.
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and

.

Mbor

and the First

BHreaucratic^uthHi^

Experiment
General Ongania's accession
to power inaugurated
a
new era for Argentine
politics.
Unlike his military
predecessors, Ongania very
quickly dispensed with the
word "provisional" to
describe this regime.
Ongania was
in power to stay, and
he sought to capitalize on
the
public's discontent with the
Radical regimes to
consolidate his power.
Labor, under the guidance of
Vandor, adopted a policy of
tacit conciliation. 35
It was not long before
labor began to feel the brunt
of Ongania's policies, which
sought to freeze wages and
to contract the labor force.
initial protests by those
unions hit the hardest by his
policies were brutally
repressed and these unions faced
military intervention.
However, Ongania also required some
sectors of labor
support in his goal to deepen industrialization.
Toward
this end, he attempted to coopt some
unions under his

control 36
The strategy of dividing and conquering
one's

adversaries is far from unique in the history of
humankind.

what is interesting as regards Argentina is

that all governing elites have viewed labor as perhaps
the most threatening factor to their rule.

Each

successive regime since 1955 sought to bridle the labor
movement, to assert control over it, and each regime was
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successful up t0

-~.

a

point

_

Qngania inherited

which was factionali2ed
over what

pursue vis

a

vis the government.

a

^^^^^ ^

The
int; two main „
divisions

^^
,

were those which were
willing to cooperate
regime and those who
argued f or outright
opposition.
Vandor led the faction
calling itself
the

"Participationists" which
argued for cooperation,
but it
was a cooperation
predicated on the same strategy
he
used under the Radicals.
That is, Vandor thought
he
could use strikes and
confrontations as a stepping-stone
to negotiation.
First carry out a policy
of
confrontation, then retreat
and open up the arena for
negotiations with a government
forced to listen under
the threat of greater
confrontations.
However, while
this strategy worked to a
certain degree with the
Radicals, it failed miserably
in the face of a military
regime disposed to the use of
force.
in March 1967, the
CGT held a 48 hour strike
demanding better wages and
protesting some of the economic
rationalizing schemes of
Minister of the Economy Adalberto
Krieger Vasena.
The
strike was lifted without any
concessions from the
government, but with Vandor expecting
to be able to
negotiate.
Instead of negotiating, the government

suspended collective bargaining agreements
with labor
for two years,

thereby effectively annulling the power

of labor to have

a

voice in determining salaries. 37
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The hard

l

ine taken by 0nganla
as

^

to the formation of
two separate CGTs in
1966.

^
The

Vandor-led Participation!^
called themselves the CGT
of Azopardo.
The unions which „
ere

^

the regime called
themselves the CGT of the
Argentines
or of the Paseo Colon.
This faction was led by
the

printer's union head, Raimundo
Ongaro.
Also in
contention for power was the
faction which remained
loyal to Per6n.

It called itself the
Orthodox wing or

the "62 Unions at Per6n's
sidp
siae.
t»

»

tv,^ ^faction
This
was led

by Jose Alonso. 38

m

Nay 1969,

a

strike called by auto workers
in

Cordoba erupted into

Ongania's policies.

a

popular demonstration against

The Cordobazo, as it was
called,

was the turning point in
Ongania's political fortunes.
The province of Cordoba has
historically been radical
and suspicious of policies
emanating from the federal
capital, usually for good reason
as Argentine public
policy has always been discriminatory
toward the

provinces.

Industrialization occurred later in Cordoba
than in Buenos Aires with the result
that labor was
concentrated in smaller unions with greater
contact

between the rank and file and its leaders.
less tied to Peron and Peronism.

Unions were

Because of this, labor

demands and subsequent strategies were more radical
and
the union leadership more willing to call strikes
and
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confrontations.

The eruptions of May 1969
led to

a

full- scale rebellion by other
sectors of Cordoban
society, including students from
the local university
and elements of the middle classes.
The demonstrations
were met with repression and violence,
and rioting
appeared to rule the day. The failure
to promote law
and order spelled the end for Ongania's
regime. 39
The rebellions in Cordoba spread to
other industrial

cities as well.

Violence appeared endemic as

a

whole

host of forces were unleashed during this
time period,

spurred on by the utter failure of Ongania's
economic

project and the widespread view that things were
getting
worse.
A month after the Cordoba uprisings, leftist

terrorists assassinated Augusto Vandor, leaving
gap in the union leadership.

was assassinated as well.

a

huge

a year later, Jose Alonso

The alleged reasons for these

assassinations were leftist groups' claims that the
labor leadership had sold out to the authorities.

As

leftist terrorism increased, counterattacks came from
the extreme right.

civil war.

By 1972 the country seemed to be at

Labor strikes were increasing; middle-class

youth-dominated terrorist groups were bombing,
kidnapping, and ransoming their way into supporting
their violent habits; and military factions struggled
over what to do.

The nation was at an impasse and the

only solution to many was that Per6n could save the
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day. 40

The eighteen years
between Per6nist regimes

illustrates several points
about labor and politics.
First, since 1955 every
regime, military or radical,
had
had its fortunes tied to
its effectiveness in dealing
with labor.
Their failure as governors
was due to their

failure to contain the activities
of an highly
politicized labor movement. Second,
labor had not
discriminated between nominal
democratic or military
regimes.
When it saw its economic well-being

threatened, it reacted.

Third, every regime had

attempted to divide and conquer labor,
which exacerbated
differences among the labor elites.
Fourth, while clear
differences existed among labor leaders,
labor rank and

file remained staunchly Per6nist.

These patterns would

continue into the 1970s.

Juan Peron

-

Take II

The Argentina Juan Peron returned to in 1973
had

changed much in his eighteen years in exile.

The state

of the economy was in disarray with runaway inflation

and few resources to call upon to aid it.

Armed leftist

and rightist terrorist groups were assaulting the

general population.

Most importantly, the labor

movement which Per6n had centralized and politicized was
now

a

huge conglomeration of groups, used to being in
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the opposition,

sophisticated in political manuevering,

and more than ever, divided
over how to play the
political game. 41
The labor leadership for
the most part was

apprehensive over how Peron would
deal with it,
especially since in the past,
Peron had always sought to
undercut its power and influence.
Nevertheless, with
the assassinations in 1969
and 1970 of Vandor and

Alonso,

respectively, there existed no charismatic
labor
leader to rival Peron.
Soon after the interim

government of Campora was installed,

"Social Pact" was

a

promulgated, which was to be the cornerstone

economic policy.

The social pact was

a

of Peron's

tripartite

agreement between business (represented by the
General
Economic Confederation CGE
labor (represented
[

]

)

by the

,

General Confederation of Labor

[

CGT

]

)

,

and government on

income policy in an attempt to fight inflation.

The

agreement called for freezing prices of all goods and
services at existing levels,

a

one-time 40% across-the-

board increase in family allowances, and an across-theboard increase of 200 pesos per month.

Collective

bargaining conventions would be suspended for two years
as wage negotiations were centralized within the hands

of the government.

An agency would be set up

— the

National Commission on Prices, Incomes, and Standard of
Living (CONAPRIN)

—

composed of representatives of the
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three involved parties, to
oversee that the real
purchasing power of wages would
not fall below the
levels estimated and to
generally monitor business costs
and profits.
These economic measures were
to be in
effect for two years. 42

Once in power, Per6n enacted

a

new Law of

Professional Associations which
centralized power
relations within the labor movement.
Among its
provisions were (1) there would be no

more than one

union representing one branch of
activity;

(2)

these

unions had the right to intervene in
their affiliates
and annul the mandates of elected
delegates, if deemed
necessary; and

(3)

union leadership terms would be

increased from two to four years.

The effects of these

provisions were to centralize power relations
within the
labor movement among the top leadership elite,
and of

course, to facilitate Peron's control over the labor

movement as

a

whole. 43

Despite the labor leadership's capitulation to these

measures (which effectively stripped it of power in the
area of wage bargaining and independent action), peace
did not reign during Per6n's tenure in office.

Throughout his administration, many strikes were held to
protest working conditions, unfair dismissals, contract
disputes, etc.
attack Peron.

These confrontations did not initially
Rather, union infighting was the norm as
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dissident unionists attempted
to challenge established
leaders over control of the
labor movement.
As the
provisions of the social pact
began to unravel, wage
disputes began to grow in number
and so did the number

of strikes.

Per6n attempted to mediate
the situation

with wage increases but the
economic and social
situation continued to worsen.
The situation did not
abate until his death on July
44
1, 1974.

Isabel

p er6n

and Jose Lopez Rega

The death of Peron ushered in

a

period of economic

crisis and social convulsions which
were to culminate in
a military coup.
Neither Isabel Peron nor her assorted
advisors, principally Jose Lopez Rega, were
equipped to

handle the economic crisis which was gripping
the
country.

Instead, the policies followed by the Per6n-

Rega team were irrational and lacked any sound
basis of
judgment, thereby alienating all sectors of society.
The labor leadership was divided over how to deal with
Mrs.

was

Per6n.
a

One faction argued that the labor movement

political arm of the government and therefore

should follow and support Peron unconditionally.
other wing,

The

represented within the group of "62

Organizations" argued that the labor movement was

a

pressure group and therefore its mission was to apply

pressure to any government in power, Per6nist or
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otherwise.

This faction though, did

go to great

lengths to support Per6n, for
it realized that if
they
opposed Peron and aided in destabilizing
her regime, the
results would be disastrous for
labor's political power.
Under the Per6nist regime, labor
enjoyed a modicum of
political influence and power, a
situation which
benefitted many labor leaders personally.

m

confronting Isabel, they attacked those
around her,
primarily her minister of economy.
Nevertheless, as the economic situation
worsened, the
labor leadership could not ignore the
growing demands
from rank and file for action to ameliorate

deteriorating incomes.

A period of government

repression, against independent union action,
during
1974,

while successful at first in containing strike

activity, only made the situation more explosive in
1975.

In March 1975,

the Ministry of Labor convened the

bargaining committees to discuss wages and working
conditions which would be put into effect in June upon
the expiration of the social pact.

Several months of

negotiation followed with increased rank and file labor
agitation and greater obstinance on the part of Mrs.
Peron in negotiating seriously with labor,

when Mrs.

Per6n refused to ratify the agreements reached, the CGT

called

a

forty eight hour work stoppage.

The result of

this confrontation was the capitulation of Mrs. Peron to
135

labor demands and the
reaffirmation of support by the
central labor movement
leadership for her government.
While this particular crisis
was resolved in victory
for the labor movement
leadership, the events
of the

following months were to destroy
this resurgence of
labor movement power.
The economic situation continued
to worsen with heightened
fears on the
part of the rank

and file of more layoffs and
unemployment

-

a situation
which continually forced the labor
leadership to react
to each new crisis.
This along with growing rumors of a
coup and heightened agitation by
other sectors of
society made Argentina a pressure cooker
by February

1976.

As factions in the labor movement
continued to

fight over how to deal with Mrs. Peron,
political

violence on the part of terrorist groups appeared
to
grow rampant, and Mrs. Per6n seemed to be losing

control

over the government.

The situation cried out for

means to decompress the pent-up tensions.
came in the form of

a

a

The solution

military coup on March 24, 1976,

with practically all sectors of society welcoming the
change.

The labor movement leadership which had

attempted to remain loyal to Mrs. Peron was in no
condition to protest the coup: after three years of
Peronist government, it found itself alienated from its
rank and file,

and therefore unable to assert itself

either way over the political crisis.
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All debates

concern,

what the labor movement

^ ^^
^

when the military
intervened in all the central
unions
and many labor leaders
were jailed. 45

Conclusion
The historical development
of the labor movement in
Argentina has been as unique
and complex as that of

Argentine politics itself.

unlike labor movements in

other Latin American countries,
the path of Argentine
labor development has seen
greater integration into the

political arena engendering both
special opportunities
and pitfalls.
The early efforts at union
organizing coincided with
the great waves of Southern
European immigration from
the 1880s to the 1920s.
Early labor unions borrowed
from their European counterparts
in Italy and Spain both
in ideology and organization.

Labor leaders were

predominantly foreign born and sought to
replicate the
same strategies they had used in Europe
for gaining

labor rights in Argentina.

These organizing efforts

were consistently met with repression by the

authorities.

Despite the social and economic

transformations of the time, the ruling elites were not
interested in accommodating this new emergent class.
The landed elites were very much against the trend

toward industrialization and so were hostile to labor.
137

The urban commercial elites
saw labors' demands as

unreasonable, so when they wrested
power from the
traditional landed elites in 1916,
the plight of the
working classes improved little.
Despite the repression suffered by
labor in the first
decades of this century, the rapidly
industrializing
economy ensured that the labor unions
and the labor

movement would continue to grow.

By the 1930s,

the

sociological make-up of labor had transformed
from being
predominantly immigrant to being second and
third

generation migrants from the countryside.

As

a

consequence of this social transformation, many in
the
working classes were not partisan to the older
ideological debates of the past.

Rather,

their goals

centered around wages, working conditions, and employee
benefits

.

This seeming lack of ideological sophistication on
the part of the working classes has been cited as the

principal reason for Peron's ability to coopt them under
his influence.

Much of the literature on this period

argues that his charisma and hand-outs to labor were

largely responsible for his success at winning them
over, especially given their lack of political savoir
faire.

However, Per6n's charisma and pro-labor policies

do not tell the whole story.

It

is an

undisputed fact

that up till the time Peron came into power, no
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political leader or political
party paid much attention
to labor's demands.
instead, outright hostility
against
labor was characteristic in
the pre-1940 period among
Argentina's political and economic
elites.
Peron won
over labor not just because
of fancy
rhetoric, good

looks,

a

pretty wife, or doling out
patronage.

He

enacted policies and programs
which made significant
improvements in the lives of workers.
In his political
discourse, he celebrated the worker,
imbued him with
dignity, and perhaps more importantly,
he reaffirmed
their claim to being true Argentines.
Throughout much
of the twentieth century, the working
classes have been
viewed as marginal members of society
dark-skinned
people who were a little less Argentine
than

—

the fair-

skinned upper and middle classes.

Labor support for

Peron was rational given his actions.
Per6n's personal commitment to improving the lot
of
the poor and working classes is still

dispute.

under much

What can be said is that his pro-labor

policies were important to all three administrations
and his wife Evita strongly identified with the

Argentine lower classes.

However, the Perons exacted

many sacrifices from the labor movement in return for
slice of the economic and political pie.

a

As president,

Peron destroyed the independence of the labor movement
and incorporated the labor leadership under his control.
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in bringing labor £rom
th ,

^

^

over the activities of
the labor movement.

>

^^

Policies
emanated from the top down
and the labor leadership
became messengers of Peron
rather than representatives
of the working classes.
This was classic corporatism
under a populist banner.

Organizationally, all unions were
grouped under one
central labor confederation,
the CGT and only unions
officially recognized by the
government were legitimate
actors in labor affairs.
Peron also ensured that only
loyal union men held positions
of power and
responsibility; any and all who
deviated from his needs
were systematically purged from
union positions.
in
dealing with labor rank and file, he
made it clear that
he was the individual who fulfilled
the demands of
labor.
Direct appeals to the people constantly
reminded
them that Peron and not their union
leaders were

responsible for the benefits they received.
Peron was successful at maintaining labor
support so
long as he continued to enact economic policies
which

enriched this sector of the population.

However, as

economic troubles mounted, his support from labor (as
well as from other groups in society) began to slide.

While his most vocal supporters still came from among
labor during 1953-55, Per6n was unable to prevent the

outbreak of strikes and disruptions from renegade
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unionists.

in the end,

he had succeeded in mobilizing

labor and corporatizing labor
into the political system,
but he failed to exert total
control over its actions.
in the years after the
1955 coup,

the labor movement

sought to resituate itself within
an environment of
anti-Per6nist and anti-labor policies.
The political
power and influence which labor
had enjoyed under Peron
was replaced by physical and
legal forms of attack.
Under the provisional military
government of 1955-58,
pro-labor legislation was abolished and
labor unions
purged of Peronist supporters.
So fierce was the

hostility of the military government that
General

Aramburu had Evita's body confiscated from
Argentina,
thereby making necrophilia an enduring part of
the

Argentine political landscape.
Life under the Radical governments was more bearable
as the repression lessened but only to

a

degree.

Frondizi's pact with Peron allowed labor to reenter the

political fray but this time the divisions within its
ranks would become more prominent.

A new generation of

labor leaders emerged in this period who would seek

independence from Peron.

New strategies were tried in

seeking accommodation with the regime, rather than

outright opposition.

Nevertheless, the denial of

political participation to the Peronists eventually

intensified the criticisms of the Radicals, helping to
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bring about their downfall and
the asoendanoy of
military regime.

a

The first bureaucratic-authoritarian
experiment

failed to bring prolonged peace
to the nation.
Instead,
by 1966 it was clear that
many competing groups were at
war against each other, each
strong enough to disrupt
society but too weak to overwhelm
the others.
Labor
again was a special target of
repression
and the

internal divisions over strategy
continued to plague its
leadership.
Juan Peron maintained a heavy hand in

exacerbating these divisions as he fought
to remain the
undisputed leader of the working classes.
It would be
in the city of Cordoba that labor
would first erupt

against the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime.

The

Cordobazo laid bare the naked force of Ongania's
peace
and it also demonstrated the failure of the fourteen
year effort at de-Pe r6ni zat ion

.

The Cordobazo led to

the end of the first bureaucratic-authoritarian

experiment in Argentina.
The spectacular return of Peron in 1973 illustrated
the failure of Argentine elites

—

military, urban

middle classes, urban industrialists, agriculturalists,
labor

—

together.

at finding some means of living peacefully

Per6n was

a

throwback to another time when

life was less complicated and the state treasury was
full.

The labor elite was cautious about his return,
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but nevertheless saw the
opportunity to exercise real
power and influence again.
By then, other people
had
joined the Persists and
the movement was no longer
solely labor but incorporated
various sectors of the

intelligentsia and disillusioned
middle-class youth.
Perc-n unfortunately
could not heal the divisions in
society.
Even had he lived, he probably
would have
failed, especially since he
turned his
back on radical

student groups, thereby unleashing

terrorism on society.

a

renewed bout of

Isabel Peron's short tenure at

running the country almost brought
the nation to ruin.
Again, the only solution seemed
to be a military coup
and on March 24, 1976, that was
what precisely happened.
As in 1955, the labor leadership
did little to protest
the removal of Peron from power.
Rather
they,

every other group in society, awaited

housecleaning

—

a

like

new round of

some with alarm, most with relief.

Little did anyone anticipate the nightmare
to come.
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CHAPTER IV

DIVISION AND DEFEAT

ARGENTINE LABOR

1976-1978

The Development of State Terrorism
In Robert Potash's seminal
study of the army and

politics in Argentina from 1898 to
1964, one of his
concluding observations is that every time
the military
has taken over the reigns of government,
it has
done so

with the popular support of the Argentine
people.

No

doubt, the military takeovers of 1955, 1966,
and 1976

faced little substantive opposition from the many

interests

—

political parties, landed elites, urban

industrialists, labor union leadership
the Argentine political scene.

Yet,

—

which make up

to translate this

initial support on the part of some groups into longterm support for policies enacted by these military

regimes does not necessarily follow, especially as

regards the labor movement.

On the contrary,

the

widespread use of force and repression against the labor
movement on the part of all three military regimes
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. .

illustrates the lack of legitimacy
each military regime
has had in the eyes of
some sectors of the labor
movement
The relative ease with
which the military came to
power in 1966 and 1976 was
due to the state of affairs

existing at the time and to

a

political power vacuum

where no alternative existed
save for
in 1966,

a

military one.

the specter of Peron's return
was threatening

enough to move the army out of
the barracks and into the
Casa Rosada.
The ensuing repression and
experiment with
a

bureaucratic-authoritarian mode of rule only served
to
pave the way for Peron's return in
1973.
The violence
of the Cordoba riots enabled workers
and students to

effectively unhinge the seeming control Ongania
held
over the political arena.
By 1976, Peron

had died but

the previous three years of

a

Per6nist government just

reaffirmed to many the dangers of Peronism.

This along

with an onslaught of urban terrorist attacks and

economic chaos led to the inevitable return of the
mi

1 i

tary

Initially, the mandate of the military was clear

— to

put an end to the guerrilla activity in the streets of

Argentina's cities.

Next,

to reform the nation's

economy which under Isabel Per6n had come to near

bankruptcy with spiraling inflation and irrational
policies.

For the military junta, which consisted of
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a

—ber

^

from each branch
Qf

^

^

General Jorge Rafael
videla of the army as
its

P^sident, the tas k

setting the economy
bact on

-vel

^

of maintaining law
and order and of
.

one to most Argentines,

straight

^

^

since 1930, Argentines

had experienced several
military coups. Military
dominance over political
and economic affairs was
to be
expected of those who too,
control of the Casa Rosada.
Law and order, of
course, is the mainstay
of any
military regime, and in
Argentina, many held high
expectations that the military
junta would deliver

Argentina out of its Per6nist
nightmare.
On law and order,

the military junta acted
swiftly

and soon after taking
power, the streets of Buenos
Aires
and other cities were
quiet.
However, the military

junta's goals went beyond the
elimination of bombwielding terrorists as it viewed
Argentina's political
problems as more severe, necessitating
drastic remedies.
The junta sought to reorganize
society and it called its
project the "Process of National
Reorganization," later
to be called simply "el Proceso."

Its ideological bent

combined the Doctrine of National Security
with

messianic Christianity which
an ordained right to rule.

infiltration necessitated

it

a

perceived as giving it

Protection from communist
a

heavy hand in weeding out

domestic subversion, and Argentines, with their
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.

conservative leanings, embraced
the anti-communist
stance wholeheartedly. After
all, they considered
themselves of the West and were
Christians above all
else.

The communist conspiracy
was neither Western nor
Christian and its alleged expansionist
designs in the

western hemisphere posed threats
to nations such as
Argentina.
The very worst of the Cold War
mentality
embraced the notion of an ongoing
struggle between East
and West in all political conflicts.
The leftist

insurgency in Argentina was interpreted
in this light
and so the battle against it was
seen
as one global

effort in the struggle to defeat the
spread of
communi sm

Against this ideological backdrop, the military
viewed terrorism as "subversion" of the Argentine
way of
life and they struck back mercilessly.

Never mind that

the enemies they were fighting were other Argentines.
To the ruling junta,

the entire fabric of Argentine life

had been poisoned and diseased by subversion, leading to
a

sick society rent with chaos and corruption.

solution was

a

The

concerted campaign to purge Argentina of

those subversive elements and to bring back the real

traditional values of Argentine life.

Indeed, one of

the self-proclaimed mottoes of the military junta was

"Tradition, Family, and Property."

While further

explanation of what "traditional" Argentine values meant
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was never forthco mi
„g, the junta continuously
evoked the
-oral r igh tness of its
cause, always justifying
its
actions through religious
principles and Argentine
conservative nationalise The
Argentine Catholic church
hierarchy offered little as
a counter to the
junta's
2
claims
The methods used by the
military junta are by now
famous.
Green Ford falcons with no
license plates

chauffeured by nondescript men
sped through the streets
of Buenos Aires both day
and night,
in

search of

specific individuals believed to
be subversives.
Illegal detention centers were set

up all over the

country with sophisticated apparatuses
for torture.
The
junta created clandestine groups from
within the state
and police forces whose jobs were
to
weed out and

eliminate the subversives within Argentine
society.
These groups operated with impunity and

were given carte

blanche in their covert activities.

while the junta

often did not know the exact nature of these
groups'

activities nor who their victims were,
and supported their efforts.

it

fully approved

By distancing themselves

from their work the junta was able to deny that it
was

violating human rights.

This position allowed the junta

to promote its image as good moral Christian soldiers.

The result was

a

3

society gripped in fear and

paralyzed by state terror.
151

Thousands upon thousands of

people were kidnapped, jailed,
and tortured without any
recourse but to pray that
their lives be spared.
The
"lucky" ones were freed
after a time in detention and
after being subjected to a
full array of torture
techniques.
More often than not, the
torturers remained
anonymous as the victims were
almost always kept
blindfolded during their "interrogation"
sessions.
Even
if they were freed with
all their anatomical parts
intact, the psychological trauma
alone was enough to
send most of them fleeing the
country.
The ones who
were never heard from again most
assuredly died in a
violent manner. Today, common graves
are continuously
being discovered, filled with
skeletons marked by

bashed-in skulls and broken bones.

One favorite

recourse used to dispose of bodies was
to throw them
into the River Plate in the hope that the
bodies would
flow out to sea and be eaten by sharks.
One month
several dozen bodies washed ashore on the Uruguay
side
of the River Plate.

4

No sector of Argentine society was immune from this

war of subversion; the hardest hit were the working

classes, students, labor movement activists, and urban

professionals.

The wandering Ford falcons operated at

all hours of the day and night, and people "were

disappeared" without

a

trace.

Any attempts by friends

and relatives to find out what was going on from the
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authorities only led to the
danger of the. being
"disappeared" without a trace.
Meanwhile,

bahies borne

to »o, e „ held in captivity
were "adopted" by others,

often by military men and
even by the torturers
themselves, while the junta
maintained strict
censorship over what was
happening, the pervasive
extent
of this war against
subversion, the "dirty war,"
filtered its way into the
Argentine consciousness.
Between 1976 and 1979, Argentina
was a nation under
siege from within and the
5
junta was at its
helm.

Tne Economic Imperative

While the junta was waging its
dirty war on the
social and political front, it
delegated the running of
the economy to Jose Martinez
de H02.
Martinez
de Hoz

came from an old Argentine family
and had been active in
the Rural Society which represented
large cattle and
wheat interests.
He was also an industrialist and
financier.
He had served in various capacities
during
several military administrations and had
a modest

international reputation,

when he was called to take

over the helm of the economy, he went to work
and lasted
five years as the minister of economy,

tenure for an economics minister.

post-World War

II

a

record-setting

The usual norm in the

era was eleven and

a

half months.

6

The economic program of Martinez de Hoz was to force
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Argentina into an economy regulated
by free market
forces.

m

order to curb inflation and
restimulate

production and growth, Martinez de
Hoz set about
freezing wages and setting up price
controls, allowed
the peso to devalue, and attempted
to dismantle
the

state bureaucracy involved in the
regulation of the
economy.
Using a standard free- market approach,

Martinez de Hoz attempted to curb public
employment and
sell state-run enterprises to public
investors.
To

stimulate economic growth, he lowered tariffs
so as to
encourage international competition. He imposed

severe

restrictions over labor union activity in the
areas of
wages, collective bargaining, and control over
union
benefits.

To promote productivity,

he instituted

technical rationalizing schemes to stimulate

industrialization

7

The results were

a

disaster.

Inflation was curbed

for only a short time and its long-term consequences

were to drastically lower the standard of living of most

Argentines and to allow inflation to spiral out of
control once again.

Rather than promoting competition,

the loss of protectionism caused Argentine markets to

become flooded with imports driving Argentine industry
to a state of near bankruptcy.

Attempts to curb the

state's role in the economy met with stiff resistance
from the military which had become used to (and very
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wealthy

f rom)

the control of certain

.

ndustrus

^

other problem arose
over his policies. M
artine 2 de
would make changes,
but these would lead
to other

problem.

By l979

,

the country

^

^

^

„ 02

^^^

Positive change in the
economic situation and,
as things
oontinued to worsen, the
tenure of M artine z de Ho,
ca.e

to an inauspicious
end.

8

The reasons for the
failure of Martinez de Ho
2 <s
grand project will be
debated for some time to come.
What bears noting at this
point is that any strategy
for

economic development necessarily
requires an appraisal
of social, political,
and historical factors.
while
people in the Economics Ministry
spent their time poring
over graphs and charts and
came up with sophisticated

econometric formulas in the name
of rationality and
science, they forgot that
judgments and values were at
the heart of any economic
planning.
Given the "cult of
fear" within which Argentina
lived throughout the
Proceso, Martinez de Hoz was able
to impose policies
over the working classes without
much fear of massive
resistance; but this only bottled up
their resentment

against the regime to be expressed later
on.

His

attempts to affect other groups met with
greater
resistance, which forced him to abandon or
modify many
of his policies.

Throughout his tenure, it was

irrelevant to him whether there existed consensus
over
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his policies.

„e

held

Argentina should be like

.

particular visiQn Qf
and as

,

acted out its moral
crusade under
Martinez de Hoz carried

^
a

^

reign of terror,

out his crusade for

a

free-

market economy without
any consideration to social
and
political consequences.
Vet, it was precisely these
considerations which forced
his economic program tc
fail
in sum,

the Argentine political
and economic

situation between 1976 and
1979 was dismal indeed.
Fear
and terror reigned throughout
society as almost all
avenues for political expression
were repressed.
The
usual accoutrements of military
rule,

such as

censorship, suspension of civil
liberties, and illegal
detentions were supplemented with
massive

disappearances, deaths through both
primitive and
technologically sophisticated forms of

torture, and an

ideology of moral uprightness which
mangled the meaning
of "Christian behavior".
These oppressive policies
along with economic policies which affected
the working
classes more adversely than other groups,
substantively
effected the political power of the labor movement.
This is the political and economic context within
which
I

examine the political activities of the labor

movement
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The InUial Blows

-

BeEression and Intervention
The labor movement
at the

beginni^TT^

1976 was

divided over what course
of action to follow within
the
political arena.
Partisans of Mrs. Peron attempted
to
hold her shaky government
together while critics, at the
behest of rank and file
demands, undertook strikes and
refused to accept her
policies.
Many of these critios
of Mrs. Peron were
disposed to a military coup being
the
only solution to the problems
at hand.
Unfortunately,
no one realized the
consequences such a coup would
engende r
In 1976,

the labor movement was overlord
of a vast

labor bureaucracy which substantively
affected the wellbeing of all workers. Due to
their growth in the 1960s,

labor unions controlled all social
welfare benefits
programs (obras sociales), which covered
everything from
health care to paid vacations for workers.
Internal

commissions set up within factories by unions
oversaw
the enforcement of labor contracts and
each union had

its own elected officeholders, who were in
turn

represented by
CGT.

a

larger federation and ultimately by the

The CGT coordinated all these groups and

determined the political strategies of the labor
movement.

This centralization of labor power, which had

been accomplished by Juan Per6n so as to maintain
control over the movement, was also in later years to
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enable labor mobilization
against standing regimes.*
The coup of March
24, 1976, dealt a powerful
blow to
the labor movement.
while a military takeover
was of
little surprise to anyone,
the rapidity with which
the
junta acted to repress
labor "agitators" came as a
shock
to most of the labor
elite.
Several policies aimed at
destabilizing labor's power were
enacted from the very
day of the coup.
The most prominent leaders
were jailed
and in their places were
installed military personnel
(interveners) to oversee the running
of the bureaucracy
of the unions.
The leadership of the CGT was
replaced
and so was that of the thirty
most important unions,
mainly those involved in heavy
industry
such as the

metalworkers and construction unions.

Leaders who were

jailed were for the most part released
after several
months in confinement.
Lorenzo Miguel, head of the

Metalworkers Union and leader of the Peronist "62
Organizations" (the political arm of the union
movement)
and the most influential of the labor
leaders at that
time, was kept in confinement for four years. 10

Over the course of three years, approximately twelve

hundred unions were intervened and their leaders
replaced by military personnel,

what this often meant

was the presence of armed soldiers within the factories

ensuring the workers' passivity and compliance.

The

military sought the smooth running of the factories, not
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to look after the interests
of workers,

and as the

military controlled all aspects
of work life, including
the dispensing of worker
benefits, the obedience of many
workers was ensured.
The Ministry
of Labor was also put

in the hands of military
personnel.

General

H.

T.

Liendo of the army was named the
minister of labor and
all the key offices within the
labor ministry went to

other military personnel as well.

m

all,

twenty

percent of all labor unions were intervened
during the
initial three years of military rule, but
this twenty
percent represented eighty-five percent of all
workers
covered by collective bargaining agreements.

The ruling

junta was highly selective in choosing which unions
to

intervene by maximizing effect and minimizing effort. 11

The Weight of the Laws

Not only was threatened physical coercion used to

pacify the labor movement, but the derogation of labor

legislation and the enactment of repressive laws also
served to contain the movement's activism.

Among the

first decrees enacted was Decree #9 which suspended

activity in all types of unions, using the justification
of cleaning up disorder,

corruption, and subversion.

Decree #10 dissolved the "62 Organizations," which had
in the last Peronist government been closely allied to

Mrs.

Peron.

The first law enacted,

159

Law 21161,

suspended

the right to strike and
of any direct action toward

disrupting production.

Law 21356 passed in June
1976,

reaffirmed Decree #9 and outlawed
elections, assembl les
and conqresses within the
unions.
Moreover, it
authorized the Ministry of Labor
to enforce mandates
handed down by the junta, to
carry out interventions,
and to replace union leaders
with ones who would do the
military's bidding. The Law of
Professional

Associations was suspended as well. 12
Law 21400 passed in December 1976
dealt with

industrial security.

This law suspended the right to

strike and any other action which affected
production.
It listed penalties

ranging from jail terms to cuts in

pay for activities leading to
Law 21250 was

a

a

decrease in production.

resurrection of the Law of Residence,

which stated that the executive had the power to
expel
any foreigner suspected of threatening national
security.

Law 21297 was enacted to curb workers'

right

in areas of due process and conflicts with employers.

Employees now had the burden to prove they were being

discriminated against by their employers rather than
simply showing just cause that discrimination existed.
It also established the

right of employers to dismiss

workers before guilt was proven over any transgression
or crime.

Law 21576, passed in December 1976, created sweeping
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3

changes in collective-bargaining
agreements between
unions and employers by allowing
reform in matters
concerning vacation, compensatory
work, and leaves of
absence.
it also allowed for government
interference in
union affairs, such as the
appointment of officers, the
collection of contributions, and the
allocation of
funds.
This law was used to intervene in
the social
welfare (obras sociale s)
system of the unions.
obras
SOCiales insisted of the running of
health facilities
which dispensed services such as
in-patient and outpatient care, dental and diagnostic care,
and

pharmacies.

Obras sociales also covered hotels, sports

camps, nurseries, old-peoples' homes, and
cultural

benefits.

The goods and services this produced

accounted for four percent of the gross national
product
in 1976.

The economic weight of controlling the social

welfare network accrued to labor much economic power
over the rank and file.

The military took over

approximately ninety percent of the obras sociales and
installed military personnel as administrators over
these programs.

1

While the above-stated laws and decrees were all

enacted within the first year of military rule, the most
sweeping piece of anti-labor legislation,

a

new Law of

Professional Associations, was not passed for three
years.

The Law of Professional Associations, which was
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first enacted during Peron's
first regime, is the
premier set of principles
delineating state-labor
relations.
it set up the structure
of all the groups
which "represent" labor,
established a system of
judicial oversight of labor
matters, and delimited the
power of the state over labor
affairs.
It was the
original Law of Professional
Associations which
established the CGT as the only
confederation

representing the labor movement and the
system of
personeria gremial.
it allowed only

state- recogni zed

unions to have legal and representative
status.
The enactment of such legislation made
the labor

unions organizationally dependent on the
government and
many labor leaders had fought against it when
Per6n

instituted it.

However, after Peron's demise,

successive military and civilian governments attempted
to de-institutionalize the labor movement by
doing away

with the Law of Professional Associations and with the
CGT.

This caused labor to rally around the CGT and to

argue for the continued legality of this law.

The

existence of the CGT and the continued standing of the
Law of Professional Associations statutes have often
been the rallying points for labor in the past thirty
years.

Perhaps this centrality of the Law of

Professional Associations for the labor movement caused
the military junta to keep its "reforms," all
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debilitatin 9 to iabor's power,
from being enacte(J for
three years.
The "reforms" proposed by
the junta oalled for
- The permanent abolition
of the CGT.
- The prohibition of politioal
aotivity on the part of

unions
- The

separation of pbras sociales
from the unions.
- The separation of categories
of workers within one
union into separate unions (i.e.,
within one industry,
workers, technicians, and
supervisors were often
represented within one union. The
new rules would make
intra-industry unionization difficult.)
Those running for union office would
have to have
clean slates
i.e., no police records, which in
effect
meant no one engaged in prior strike
activity would be
able to hold office in the union.
-

—

Circumscribed the activity of unions to only the
region from which they came, thereby making

-

illegal,

it

for example,

for unions in Cordoba to work with unions

in Buenos Aires.
-

Modified the system of elections for union delegates

and leaders to effectively prohibit re-elections and to

keep leaders from interacting with the rank and file.
Once elected, leaders would have to answer to

a

government agency.
-

Encouraged the formation of many unions representing
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comparable types of workers so
as to divide the
federative nature of the labor
movement.
Traditionally,
labor had a centralized system
of representing workers,
whereby unions of workers engaged
in the
same or

comparable activity were grouped into
one federation
from which collective bargaining
could be done from

a

position of strength.
Gave the state power to regulate
union elections,
control funds, preside over judicial
matters, and to
modify union statutes when it deemed
necessary.

Allowed for meetings, assemblies, and
congresses only
with the knowledge and consent of government
-

authorities, thereby making illegal any attempts
to

organize independent union actions.

14

The military junta promulgated these reforms in
the

name of cleaning up the entrenched corruption endemic
in
the labor movement.

Many non-military sympathizers

favored these reforms, most notably the editors of La

Nacion

,

the influential conservative Argentine

newspaper.

True,

the labor movement in 1976 suffered

corruption and misuse of power on the part of many who

benefited and profited from union leadership positions.
However,

the military's overall goal was to depoliticize

and de-Per6nize the labor movement so as to create

docile labor force in the economy.

a

Attempts at

decentralization were aimed at destabilizing labor's
164

political power and the curtailment
of labor activity
was to prevent any opposition
to the junta's economic
policies.
it was hoped that by
passage of such a
sweeping Law of Professional
Associations, the labor
movement would finally be put
in its place,

that is,

removed from effective political
participation. 15

The Preliminary Attempts at Labor
Unity

While the military junta was busy
jailing and
harassing the major labor leaders,
other labor leaders
busied themselves with resurrecting or
creating a new
agenda for the labor movement.
In the period in
question,

a

group of labor leaders came into prominence,

who were to seek accommodation with the
military junta
while at the same time attempting to appear
in

opposition to the regime's policies.

These leaders were

often heads of unions which were not intervened and

unions which historically had not had much political
clout within the labor movement.

In the

intervened

unions, there emerged leaders from among the lower-level

union delegates and internal commissions members.

All

these new-found power wielders were courted by the

military junta, which to varying degrees was successful
at coopting them into acquiescence to its policies. 16

Labor leaders made various attempts in the first

months of the military regime to stem the tide of
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military repression by opening

m

military intervenors.

a

dialogue with the

April 1976,

leaders made the first attempt
at

a

group of uni..on

union meeting at the

a

headquarters of the Federation of
Sanitation.
goal was to set up

a

Their

"Commission of Liaison" between the

government and labor to discuss labor
issues.
Fabrizzi, the military intervenor of

Colonel

the CGT at the

time, declined to meet with this
group and nothing ever

came of its initial meeting.
In August of that year,

the "Commission of 10" was

formed which eventually became the "Commission
of 12".
This group brought together

leaders.

a

number of diverse union

There were two representatives from two of the

most important intervened unions, Metalworkers and Light
and Power; two representatives from the Group of
Eight-

labor leaders who had attended the annual meeting in
June of the International Labor Organization in Geneva,

Switzerland; six members from the working groups of the
CGT; and two representatives from regional CGTs

aim of this group was to formulate

a

The

set of goals and

programs for the labor movement, and to hold
for discussing which goals to adopt.

.

congress

a

Due to military

intimidation and internal disagreements,

a

congress was

not held, but this Commission of 12 continued to meet.
In September 1976,

a

group of representatives from

non-intervened unions joined together to form
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a

delegation to meet with the temporary
intervenor of the
CGT, Commandant Julio Cesar
Porcille.
This group which
later took the name "Commission
of 25," appealed to
Porcille for a meeting to discuss
the labor situation,

especially concerning the military's
suspension of labor
activity.
The existence of two commissions
was

disquieting to enough leaders in several unions
that
they attempted, through the Commission of
5
to unite

Commissions of 12 and 21.

The Commission of

5

the

consisted

of representatives from intervened and
non-intervened

unions and was headed by Oscar Smith, head of the Light
and Power union.

During September and October 1976,

this group attempted to hold

a

meeting to seek common

ground between the Commissions of 12 and 21, but due to
labor conflicts surrounding the Light and Power union,

discussions were terminated.
attempt at creating
by

a

a

November witnessed another

dialogue with Commandant Porcille

group of union leaders calling themselves the

"Commission of 7."

This group did succeed at procuring

an interview with Porcille, but he declined to hold

a

meeting to discuss state-labor relations, citing that
the conditions were not appropriate for such

a

meeting.

The first nine months of military rule saw various

attempts at creating unity and dialogue among the
unions.

It

should be noted that these meetings were

held in spite of the overt repression taking place where
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union members were being fired,
jailed, kidnapped, and
disappeared.
most instances, the desire for unity
was to create one voice in dealing
with the government
and to reach agreement over what long-term
relationship
would exist between the state and labor.

m

This,

course,

required trade-offs and agreements.

If

of

the

various commissions had been successful at this
time in
gaining an audience with the junta, they most assuredly
would have acquiesced to the military regimes' demands.
As it was, the junta being in

a

position of strength,

remained deaf to labor's pleas. 17

The Commi ssion of 25
It was not until March 1977 that there emerged the

first major coalition of labor union groups to which the

military junta eventually gave legal recognition as
representatives of the labor movement.

A planned visit

by Otto Kersten, general secretary of the International

Confederation of Free Trade Unions, gave
unions an excuse to organize

a

group of

commission to greet him.

a

Secretary generals from eighteen non-intervened unions
and representatives from the CGT created the "Commission
of 25."

The Commission of 25 like all other commissions

before it, was intent on revitalizing the political

activities of labor.

To do so,

recognition from the junta as
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a

it

sought legal

legitimate

"

representative of labor.

The military junta was not

happy with this group, but
after the International Labor
Organization gave recognition to
the 25,

the junta felt

compelled to do so as well. 18
The Commission of 25 consisted
of unions which were

members of the CGT and unions of
secondary importance in
terms of historical influence within
the labor movement.
Throughout its entire existence, there
were many
cleavages and defections within its ranks.
In

two years,

its first

there were five identifiable sectors within

the Commission.

The first group were the

"Verticalists."

These were supporters from the largest

group of hard-core Per6nist unions.

argued for

a

resurrection of

a

The Verticalists

closed and hierarchical

labor leadership organization, as was the case under

Per6n's regimes.

Power and policy emanated from the top

down and dissent from the lower ranks could not be

tolerated.

These unions recognized the leadership of

Lorenzo Miguel, head of the Metalworkers union and of
the 62 Organizations.

The second group called itself the "ex-Combat ives

They were

a

group of leaders who were also

a

.

faction of

the Peronist "62 Organizations" but in the late 1960s

had been members of the CGT of the Argentines (a group
that led the Cordoba rebellions which brought down the

government of General Ongania).
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A third group was the

.

"

.

"anti-Verticalists" or "Group of 6."

These were ten
(sic) unions which had broken
from the Peronist 62
Organizations in 1969
They were very

anti-Peronist and
collaborated with the military regime
of General
Ongania
.

The fourth group were

the "Independents".

They were

non-Peronist and were former supporters
of Augusto
Vandor.
The last group were the
"Participationists
They were heirs to Vandor's strategy
of collaborating
with the military regime under General
19
.

Ongania.

Constant conflicts occurred among these
groups and
leaders would change allegiances on a
frequent
basis.

Alliances were never permanent and each new
week would
bring new configurations of who was a member
of what

group.

Old rivalries from the past continued to
play

important roles in how labor leaders dealt with
each
other.

Other groups would arise to deal with

a

particular crisis, but the groups would remain in
existence long after the crisis which engendered its

existence was resolved.

Perhaps the major reason for

the intense factionalism lay in personal ambition.

Heading up

a

splinter group gave unionists opportunities

to climb up the movement ladder.

Being leaders of this

or that faction would ensure press attention for their

views.

This would open up opportunities for greater

influence
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Of course, not all the various
factions were
of opportunistic maneuvering.

a

result

Leaders had genuine

differences of opinion concerning how
to deal with the
junta.

out of the factionalism of the
25, new labor

coalitions formed which would rival
the 25 for control
over labor.
Before addressing other key groups
though,
something needs to be said about the
25's general goals.

The goals or demands of the 25 centered
around the
release of jailed unionists, the normalization
of

intervened unions, the normalization of the
CGT, the
renewed standing of the Law of Professional

Associations, and

a

host of other measures seeking to

regain labor's previous control over the workplace. 20
The Commission of 25,

in most cases wanted

to open up a

dialogue with the military junta, so their initial
demands did not call for

a

return to democracy nor did

it stress its concerns over the kidnappings and

disappearances taking place.

Rather,

it

concentrated on

labor-specific issues such as salaries, collectivebargaining, and normalization of the labor movement.
The group's dominance of the labor arena lasted until

mid-1978 when another group emerged to rival the 25's
powe r

2^
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The National Commission of
Labor (CNT)
in April 1978,

after two years of military rule,
the

Ministry of Labor decided that the
time was ripe for
improving relations with the labor

movement, given that

most labor leaders had been
"ideologically de-purified"
or, more accurately, no longer
towed the Peronist line.
What the Ministry of Labor was attempting
to do was to

prepare the stage for Argentine
representation at the
annual June meeting of the International
Labor

Organization (ILO) and also to court those labor
leaders
who appeared most willing to collaborate with
the

regime. 22

leaders,

Viewing this as

a

political opening, several

representing the most powerful intervened and

non-intervened unions, decided to form

a

separate labor

organization from the dominant Commission of 25.

This

new organization was called the Commission of Effort and
Labor.

The stated aims of the new Commission were to

improve the salary situation of workers, to appeal for
the normalization of the intervened unions, and to lobby
for the release of detained unionists.

The group stated

that it would undertake such efforts without interfering

with the work of the Commission of 25.

Although both

had similar stated goals, the Commission of Effort and

Labor viewed the Commission of 25 as too confrontational
and openly stated that it wished to be the "dialogue

wing" of the labor movement.
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It

claimed that it would

act in the "professional plane,"
which meant that its
concerns would be strictly
labor-oriented,
and it would
not interfere in politics.

in other words,

while the

Commission of 25 maintained some
oppositional stance
toward the regime and left itself
the prerogative of
making political statements, the
Commission of Effort
and Labor was willing to play by the
23
regime's
rules.

The seeming rivalry between the
Commission of Effort

and Labor and the Commission of 25 was
disquieting to

several labor leaders who sought to unify both
groups
into one coalition.

However, attempts at unity failed

for in September 1978,

split.

the Commission of 25 itself

This is not surprising given the disparate

groups which made up this unstable alliance.

moderate faction of the
Vert i cal i sts
and Labor.

,

25— the

The more

Independents and anti-

decided to join the Commission of Effort

The newly constituted group took the name

the "National Commission of Labor"

(CNT).

The remaining

groups in the Commission of 25 continued to agitate for

changes in regime policy, and its criticisms of the
regime became more strident.

The new CNT utilized the

strategy of collaborating with the government and
confined itself to issues strictly related to labor.
This group openly rejected the Commission of 25's

monopoly over labor representation while at the same
time claiming to work for the same goals.
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The existence of the CNT
was at first disconcerting
to the military junta.
it attempted to discourage
the
group from forming, mainly
through jailing several of
its leaders for a brief time.
However, 1978 was a good
year for the junta as it perceived
itself as winning the
war against subversion.
Despite being criticized by

certain international organizations
and the United
States over human rights violations,
Argentina's hosting
of the World Cup Soccer Championship
games and its

subsequent win of the title enabled the
junta and
Argentina to forget about its economic and
political
troubles for a while.
Besides, having two separate
groups claiming to represent labor would
enable
the

junta to play one group off the other, thereby
ensuring
the labor movement's continued weakness in
fostering
real,

significant opposition to the regime. 25

The Importance of the International Labor Arena
The strategies pursued by the Commission of 25 in

1977 and 1978 involved attempts to lobby the regime

toward restoring labor's pre-1976 power and influence.

When the CNT was founded in 1978, it openly espoused the
need to promote

a

dialogue with the powers that be.

Much time was spent on making public declarations

concerning the state of labor and the economy.

Much

more time was spent on these two groups of union leaders
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negotiating with each other
in attempts to arrive
at
consensus over goals and
strategies.
However, unity
between the two groups was
not to be achieved until
1983
when military rule finally
26
came
to an end.

Of primary importance
to labor during 1977 and
1978
was the recognition of the
international labor

organizations, specifically that
of the ILO and the
international Confederation of
Free Trade Unions.
Given
that effective action was
impossible at home due to

military repression, labor leaders
sought contact with
the international labor arena
to air their concerns and
criticisms of the domestic labor
situation.

They felt
that their demands would carry
greater weight with the
regime if they had the support of
the principal

international organizations of labor.

So too,

they

viewed the forums of these international
organizations
as

"safe" situations for criticizing government

policies, and there they promoted themselves
as opposed
to the military regime,
or not.

regardless of whether they were

This appearance of opposition to the regime

enabled many of them to maintain their credibility in
the eyes of the rank and file.

It also provided

them

with opportunities to form strategy and plan without the
fear of reprisals. 27
The yearly meetings of the ILO were particularly

fertile ground for the type of politicking described
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above.

For its annual June
meetings in Geneva,

Switzerland, the ILO requires
each nation to send
delegation representing three
sectors of society:

a

representatives of the government,
of the labor movement
or principal national
labor organizations, and the
entrepreneurial sector.
it is assumed that the labor

representatives will be elected from
among the ranks of
labor,

rather than be appointed by
the government.

These requirements proved
problematic to the junta.
many ways their thinking was
similar

In

to that of the

labor leaders: the military
junta viewed the forum of
the ILO as important to fostering
Argentina's

international image.

Despite worldwide condemnation for

its repressive policies,

make the ILO meetings

a

the junta always attempted to

showcase for its membership in

the civilized western world.

As elsewhere,

it

sought to

reaffirm its ties to the capitalist, industrialized
West.
course,

It also sought to win

friends abroad but, of

failed.

In 1976,

the government and labor delegations to the

ILO meeting did not clash in any way, nor did the ILO

make any statements concerning Argentina.

minister of labor made

a

presentation

The Argentine

concerning the

need for foreign investment to generate greater

employment, and the labor delegation made

a

mild

statement concerning the desire to see the normalization
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of the labor movement.

Both groups were very
cordial;

the meeting went well
and without incident.

returning

f

r0 m Geneva,

negotiations to form

a

Upon

the labor delegation
began

representative labor body.

It

was these discussions
which eventually led to the
formation of the Commission
of 25 in 1977.

The year 1977 proved
markedly different from 1976.
The Commission of 25
had been formed in March and
the
regime was further entrenched
in power.
The labor
situation wasn't improving;
rather it was getting worse
and attempts by labor to
gain an audience with the junta
fell on deaf ears.
Preparations by the government to
form a delegation to the ILO
meeting were attempted.
Labor reneged on appointing
representatives to the

meeting and
not attend.

a

delegation from Argentina therefore did
The minister of labor had attempted
to

dictate to the labor leadership how
it should select
delegates to the ILO meeting, but labor
was unwilling to
go along and so refused to appoint
representatives. 28
The year 1978 saw competition between
the Commission
of 25 and the Commission of Effort and
Labor over

sending delegates to the ILO meeting.

By this time the

Commission of 25 had received recognition from the ILO
as the official legitimate representative of the

Argentine labor movement.

Despite the protests of the

Commission of Effort and Labor, the 25 succeeded in
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gaining control of the delegation to
the ILO.
Argentina was represented at the 1978
meeting by this
delegation along with the minister of
labor.
Members of
the labor delegation made several
critical presentations
concerning the Argentine situation.
Criticism was

levelled at the economy, which was causing
the loss of
jobs and the decreased purchasing power
of workers'
salaries; at the laws in force prohibiting
labor

activity; and over the status of jailed
unionists.

Critical statements by the labor delegation
embarrassed
the minister of labor.

In its annual

report,

the ILO

cited Argentina for violations in the labor sphere.

All

this was important in affirming the legitimacy of the

Commission of 25 as speaking for the movement.

Also,

this international recognition made the Commission less

vulnerable to repression by the government at home. 29
Argentine labor activism in international labor

organizations was not new to the labor movement in the
late 1970s.

Since the 1960s, Argentina had always

participated in the ILO, and several labor leaders held
key positions on its committees.

It was during periods

of government repression,

that membership took

though,

on added significance in that it provided the movement

with

a

forum to voice its criticisms and to gain

international support.

The only means of gaining

attention from the military junta during 1977 and 1978
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was when the junta began
to look into forming
a
delegation to the June ILO
meetings.
it was the period
between April and June of
each year which saw greater
activity between the junta
and the labor movement, as
each group attempted to
gain political leverage over
the
other.
The domestic battles were
then played
out in

Geneva, with labor attaining
the upper hand.
This,
along with periodic visits
by labor delegations from
other international labor
organizations-all of which
condemned the repressive policies
of the

labor leadership

certain degree of power and

a

legitimacy within

junta-gave the

a

climate of repression.

Strike Activity 1976-78

It would stand to reason that during
this most brutal

period of repression against labor, there would
have
been

a

paucity of strikes in both the public and private

sectors.

Yet,

there were several significant strikes

during these (almost) three years, always undertaken
in
a

climate of fear and threatened violence.

The first

labor conflicts under the military regime occurred in

September 1976.

In that month,

the General Motors,

Ford,

Fiat,

strikes took place at
Peugeot, and Chrysler

plants in Greater Buenos Aires province.

The issue

concerned salaries, and the situation was aggravated by
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management's harassment of the shop-floor
union
representatives.
General Liendo, the minister

of labor,

attempted to resolve the crisis by going
to the General
Motors plant to hear their concerns
from the union
representatives themselves.
This action was preceded by
the installment of armed officers
in the factories,

that discussions were held basically at
gunpoint.

so

The

conflict was resolved through jailing the
protagonists
of the strike and the threatened use of
force against

others. 30
A more serious labor conflict took place in October
1976,

lasting until February 1977.

military undertook

a

In October,

the

review of the legislation

concerning the handling of collective bargaining
agreements with unions representing public utilities.
It made several changes which effected working hours,

ability to negotiate over wages, working conditions, and
vacations.

In response to proposed government policies,

the Light and Power union, headed by Oscar Smith,

a

hard-line Per6nist, decided to mobilize against the
changes.

Workers undertook

a

series of work stoppages

which seriously effected the prevision of electricity to
the population of Buenos Aires.

SEGBA, whose head was

a

The electric company,

military admiral,

reacted by

dismissing the leaders of the union, among them Oscar
Smith, and threatening physical retaliation against the
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1

.

striking workers.
situation.
of labor,

This only served to aggravate the

The military junta,

made

a

rather than the minister

public statement intimating its

willingness to use force to end the conflict.

it also

accused Light and Power of being infiltrated
by
subversives.

Fifteen days after the start of the

conflict, electricity was returned to almost
normal
levels, although no concessions were won by
the union.
It instead had succeeded in making the
government enter

into discussions and negotiations over collective

bargaining issues.

The rest of the year witnessed

periodic slow-downs and stoppages by Light and Power
workers

3

Despite negotiations, in December the junta enacted

Law 21576 which put into effect revisions in collective

bargaining procedures.

January witnessed

a

renewed

outbreak of labor stoppages not only by Light and Power
but by other public utilities (such as Water and Energy)
as well.

Conflicts also occurred in cities other than

Buenos Aires including Rosario, Cordoba, and Corrientes.

Thousands of workers took to the streets on January 26,
1977,

to voice their dissatisfaction over the labor

situation; energy outages became common.

The state

responded by dismissing labor "agitators," jailing
others,

"disappearing"

a

few of the more radical union

representatives, and sending police troops into the
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plants to force workers back on
the job. 32
The solution to the conflict
was formulated by Oscar
Smith at the beginning of February
1977.
However, his

disappearance several days later made
the immediate
solution to the conflict insignificant
as all

shocked at his kidnapping.
a

sides were

Labor union leaders demanded

full investigation of the affair
and called for

Smith's release from captivity.

The government claimed

it knew nothing of his whereabouts.

What is known was

that on the early morning of February
11th, Smith's car
was intercepted by two green Ford Falcons
driven by non-

descript men and that Smith was whisked away in
one of
the Fords.

The disappearance of Smith was not the first

disappearance of
one of

a

a

labor leader, but it was the first

major leader of

military regime.

a

major union during the

Because the Light and Power union is

one of the most powerful unions in Argentina,

its

leaders carry great political clout in the labor
movement.

The state had historically not harassed Light

and Power's leaders as much as leaders of less important

unions or shop-floor labor representatives, mainly

because major labor leaders have been more willing to

negotiate than agitate.

Because of this,

it

is

not

clear whether the state ordered the disappearance of
Smith, especially since he had succeeded in ameliorating
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the labor conflict.

Evidence does point to the
security
forces as having played some
role, considering the
cars
which intercepted Smith
were Ford Falcons, a trademark
of the junta's security
forces.
Whoever is to blame
(and to this day, Smith's
disappearance has not been
explained), his disappearance
became a cause celebre for
the labor movement and
made him a martyr representing
the sufferings of labor
under the military junta.
The rest of 1977 was punctuated
by a series of "shows
of force" by telephone workers,
railroad workers, and
petrochemical workers.
This involved work stoppages
which caused inconveniences in the
provision of

services.

The government's response was to
utilize two

strategies: threatening to use force
against the workers
supplemented by detentions and jailings, and
maintaining
a

dialogue with the unions in question to give
the

appearance of real concern over the labor situation.
The concerns of these unions revolved around
the

reformed collective bargaining agreements and the
salary
situation.

Minister of the Economy Martinez de Hoz

refused to negotiate changes but Minister of Labor

Liendo took
1977,

a

a

much more flexible stand.

By the end of

genuine reappraisal was begun over the salary

situation of public sector employees.

Negotiations

continued into 1978 as some genuine dialogue between
labor and the Ministry of Labor seemed to take hold 34
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In 1978, more strike activity
occurred within private

sector industry than in the public
sector.

The

recession was accompanied by more layoffs
and
dismissals, and the worsening salary
situation caused
strikes in the mechanics, textiles, and
garment
industries, among others.

All these strikes centered

around specific labor issues, such as wages
and

conditions in the workplace, and were pretty much
limited to the specific unions in question.

Strikes

during 1978 did not cause the political problems those
in the public sector had the year before.

Public sector strikes of significance were held by
the railroad workers union over dissatisfaction with

wage increases.

In March,

the railroad workers

promulgated work stoppages, which effectively disrupted
rail service in Greater Buenos Aires.

An all-out strike

was attempted, but the promoters of the strike were

jailed and no strike occurred.

In December

1978 the

railroad workers union threatened another strike.
was
a

a

This

critical time for the junta for it was engaged in

dispute with Chile over rights to the Beagle Channel

Islands.

Tensions had reached

a

high point and

Argentina was preparing to mobilize military forces in
the south.

The running of the railroads would be

critical to this venture.

After negotiations between

the government and labor leaders,
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the union decided not

to strike and impede the
Beagle channel dispute, mainly
out of fear of appearing
unpatriotic to the Argentine

cause 35
.

In all,

the strikes of 1976,

1977, and 1978 which

occurred among rank and file
revolved around labor
specific issues and were not
designed to criticize the
legitimacy of the ruling military
junta.

Yet,

these

strikes were problematic for
the regime, because their
very existence pointed to a
lack of consensus by the
working class over the regime's
economic policies.
The
very fact that many rank and file
union members were
willing to risk their jobs, and many
their lives, by

striking over labor issues illustrates
the inherent
destabilizing power of the labor movement
sector of
society.
The critical underpinnings of the Argentine
junta were to maintain law and order and to
oversee the

recovery of the economy.

These critical goals were

undermined every time there was

a

strike called,

regardless of whether or not the strike leaders had as
one of their motives to criticize the regime as their

legitimate governors.

While the strikes were resolved

more or less to the regime's benefit, they nevertheless

hindered the regime from enacting all of its economic
and social policies with impunity.

No other sector of

Argentine society during this period put forth any
public show of disapproval to the regime's policies.
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An Assessment of the First
Three Years
The period from March 1976
through 1978 saw

a

concerted attack by the military
junta against the
political and economic power of
the labor movement.
Through the use of repression,
threatened violence, and
legal statutes, the junta effectively
stripped

the labor

movement of
policies.

a

central base from which to protest state

The jailing of the most important
labor

leaders effectively removed any initial
opposition to
the regime.

The kidnapping and disappearance of other

labor leaders and unionists served notice
to many others
that the junta was willing to use all means
to liquidate

dissension.

The derogation of labor laws replaced by

the enactment of proscriptive labor legislation
served
to make legal the de-politicization of the labor

movement as

a

whole.

The very harshness with which the military junta

acted against labor illustrates one of the

characteristics of the O'Donnell paradigm of
bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

The system imposed in

1976 was one of "exclusionary bureaucratic-

authoritarianism," i.e., it required such harsh measures
because it was dealing with

a

sector of society that was

highly organized and politicized.

Along with the

perceived threat to society posed by urban terrorists,
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the regime opted to use extreme
force for it was

attempting to de-politicize

already politicized

sectors of society.
The reactions of the labor
movement to the regime's
repressive policies were twofold.
On the one hand,

certain sectors of the labor movement
attempted to
negotiate and accommodate labor to the new
regime.
the other hand,

On

the persistence of strikes over these

almost three years posed constant worries
to the regime
and inherently effected its legitimacy
as governor.
The
overall impact of these three years, however,
was

labor's preoccupation with reconstituting itself
and

redefining its goals as

a

movement.

The labor leaders who owed their power to the regime

were undoubtedly more accommodating to the regime than
others.

Generally, leaders of non-intervened unions,

leaders from unions outside of Buenos Aires, and labor

activists who had been marginalized from the previous
Peronist regime, were anxious to open
the regime.

a

dialogue with

These unions made up the initial nucleus of

the Commission of 25 when it was formed in 1977.

The

other major nucleus of the Commission of 25 consisted of
small unions which, historically, had not been powerful

within the labor movement, labor activists allied to the
last Peronist regime, and

groups.

a

number of radical labor

With the eventual release of the major labor
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leaders, there is growing divergence
within the
Commission of 25 over who should
determine policy
di rection
The formation of the CNT in 1978
represented

major

a

schism which was to divide the labor
movement until
1983.

The CNT represented almost exclusively
those

unions which were not intervened.

A sector of the

Commission of 25 joined CNT, and by the end
of 1978, the
25 found itself in crisis.
During 1978, both
the CNT

and the Commission of 25 espoused the same
goals, but

they each claimed to represent different strategies
in

reaching these goals.
was working toward

a

The Commission of 25 claimed it

dialogue with the regime, but it

reserved for itself the prerogative of making political
statements.

The CNT claimed to want nothing but

a

dialogue with the regime over questions in the labor
sphere.

In actuality,

both groups during this time

eschewed political statements for the climate then
existent in Argentina precluded any real dissension
against the regime.

powerlessness

,

Rather,

in a climate of

the labor movement was reduced to

internal infighting, often encouraged by the regime
itself.
One exception to the collaborationist tone put forth
by labor was in the annual meetings of the ILO.

The

critical statements made by the labor delegation in 1978
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illustrated the fact that labor
was not wholeheartedly
endorsing the regime. Rather,
the labor leadership used
these meetings to attempt
to wrest concessions from
the

regime and to give notice
that it was not working hand
in glove with it.
So too, the labor leadership
was
seeking to show the rank and
file that it was fighting
for labor's interests.
For its part,

the rank and file continued to
strike

over labor-specific issues, but
this did not at the time
serve to seriously undermine the
regime.
However, the
very existence of labor strikes during
this period was
another illustration of how the regime
was not totally
successful at imposing its will over labor.
In order to
end most of the strikes, it threatened
force and in many

cases actually used force, thereby laying bare
its

inherently violent nature.
In summary,

the first three years of its rule saw the

military successful at preventing significant opposition
from the labor movement.

The ferocity of the repression

against labor precluded any dissension from its
leadership.

leadership

Yet the ensuing three years saw the labor
f actionalized

over what to do.

Throughout

this period, there existed an undercurrent of criticism

against regime policy, although not against the

legitimacy of the regime itself.

By the end of 1978,

the regime seemed to be fully in control.
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CHAPTER V

LABOR COMES OF AGE

1979-1983

Th e Political and Economic
Setting,

1979-1983

At the beginning of 1979, the Videla
regime appeared
to be winning its war against
subversion.

The

repression had succeeded in attaining law
and order, but
to many outsiders, Argentina had gone
beyond
the brink

of no return,

spiraling toward self-destruction.

junta, after three years,

The

seemed satisfied with the

state of affairs, and with the economic policies of

Martinez de Hoz still taking shape, in general little

dissension occurred among the military. However, the
complacency of 1979 quickly disappeared as the year 1980
began with the collapse of Argentina's most important
banks.

This most dramatic failure of

a

part of Martinez

de Hoz's economic policies fostered public disagreements
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between factions of the
military over the course of
Argentina's economic future.
Fo r the first time,

the

heads of the navy and the
air force voiced concern
ove r
the economic situation.
As capital began to flow
out of
Argentina once again, Martinez
de Hoz and his staff were
called on the carpet more
than once to explain their

strategies to the armed forces.

Despite this downturn

in the economy and
despite mounting disagreements
from

factions of the military over
Martinez de Hoz's
strategies, General videla stood
firm in supporting his
minister of the economy. 1
However, the worsening economic
situation complicated
Videla's plan for an orderly transition
of power.
in
1976, Videla had agreed to serve for only

a

four-year

term and in mid-1980, he sought his
successor.

Martinez

de Hoz tried to get Videla to
extend his tenure so that
he could continue his economic
policies.

Videla

declined and chose his long-time friend and
colleague
General Roberto Viola to succeed him. viola was

not the

clear-cut choice of the armed forces.

The navy was very

much against him because they worried about his

intentions to pursue
opening.

a

greater political and economic

However, the army and air force were behind

Viola so Videla's will prevailed.

On March 29,

1981,

Viola assumed the presidency, but right away opposition
surfaced against his policies.
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The program set forth
by viola in his first
public

statements appeared to open
up the possibility of an
eventual return to civilian
rule.
Among his proposals
were to create a dialogue
with the opposition and
the

gradual normalization of
certain groups such as unions
and political parties.
indeed, the Viola regime was
marked by a decline in the
kidnappings and

disappearances which had characterized
Videla's regime.
As for the economic program
of Martinez de Hoz, Viola
was dubious of his measures to
shore up the economic
situation and refused to lend support
to Martinez de
Hoz's more drastic measures. 3
The political opening hinted at
by Viola had several

consequences.

it mobilized certain factions of
the

military, who were suspicious of Viola's
"democratic"

posture to begin plotting for his overthrow.

Disagreements within the junta became public with
General Leopoldo Galtieri taking

undermining Viola's authority.

a

lead role in

Galtieri made public

statements concerning the regime without even consulting
Viola.

The apparent schisms within the junta enabled

opposition groups to speak more vocally against the
regime.

The labor movement leadership became

increasingly more militant during this period and the
major political parties formed

a

coalition called the

Mul tipartidaria and began to lobby for
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a

return to

democracy.

4

The emergence of a
multiparty coalition on the
political scene was quite
disturbing to many of the
hardliners in the regime
who felt the "political
opening" advocated by
viola was at best premature
and at
worst antithetical to
the regime's interests.
Given
that Viola's power was
shaky to begin with, it
took
little for Galtieri to
depose him in December 1981,
less
than nine months after
Viola came to power.
Once again,
Argentina had failed to provide
for an orderly transfer
of power.
tr

Galtieri inherited

a

f ac t i

onal i zed military and

continuing economic problems.

While he made references

to a return to democracy
at some point,

he was really

interested in having himself "elected"
to the office of
the presidency.
As a result of this, he pursued
erratic
policies which alienated him from many
within the
military.
Galtieri began to court sectors of the

civilian population such as Peronists
and political
party leaders, and he purportedly met
secretly with
several Peronists to gain their support
for
his

continued rule in return for
restrictions.

a

relaxation of union

It quickly became clear among those who

had supported him that he was seeking his own
personal

gain above that of preserving the political hegemony
of
the military.

Dissension among the military ranks grew,
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which enco uraged
civilian groups
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going

war

The Malvinas/Falklands
war succeeded in unifying
all
sectors of the population
in support of the
military,
albeit for a brief time.
Censorship of the press by

government authorities made
it appear that Argentina
was
actually winning.
The opposite, of course,
was true.
The fact was the war
was mismanaged from the
start.
initiate a conflict in the
South

To

Atlantic at the

beginning of winter was an
error; to send eighteen-yearold conscripts (Argentina
requires two years of military
service from all males, starting
at age eighteen)

without adequate training,
supplies, or clothing was
abominable; and to send battalions
into battle without
commanding officers was unconscionable.
Rather
than

being

a

shining victory for the armed forces,
the

Malvinas/Falklands fiasco laid bare the
corrupt and
inept nature of the Argentine military.
That the

military failed at its premier function,
its reason for
being, was

a

fault no Argentine could forgive.

When it

finally had to be made known to the public in
June 1982
that Argentina had been defeated, the popular
reaction

was swift and violent.

7

Galtieri was quickly replaced and General Reynaldo
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B^none put

in power for the
purpose of preparing
Argentina for elections.
The initial date was
set for
1984 but as popular dissension

became more vocal and

younger officers voiced
their desire to hasten the
transition, the date was
moved up to December 1983
and
finally up to October
30,

1983.

While military bickering
undermined the power of the
regime, the economy was
going
from bad to worse.

The

liberal economic program of
Martinez de Hoz produced
drastic consequences for
Argentine society.
Short-term
modest successes led to long-term
disasters in regard to
inflation, production, deficits,
and the standard of
living of most Argentines.
In an effort to quell
inflation, Martinez de Hoz instituted
a plan called the
"tablita" whereby he allowed the
devaluation rate of the
peso to trail behind the domestic
rate of inflation.
His theory was to attract cheap
imports
due to an

overvalued currency and eventually to
"induce
convergence" between domestic and international
prices.
He also maintained free interest rates.

worked to stem the tide of inflation.

Neither policy
what occurred was

the basic deindustrialization of the Argentine
economy.

The attraction of cheap imports drove much Argentine

industry out of business.

The free-floating interest

rates encouraged speculation of all kinds, bringing ruin
to Argentina's financial sector.
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The overvalued peso

enabled hordes of Argentina's
mi ddle classes to
go
abroad, as suddenly, the
dollar was cheap compared
the peso.

8

to

inflation reached over 200%
in 1982, the Gross
Domestic Product declined
by 12% between 1980 and
1983,
and industrial production
fell 25% between 1976 and
1980.
Average salaries between 1975
and 1978 were
reduced in real terms by half.
The downturn in

industrial production resulted
in massive dismissals of
workers.
The hardest hit was manufacturing
whose share
of Gross Domestic Product
shrank
from 38.1% in 1974 to

35% by 1979.

Production in textiles contracted by
50%.
Many small and medium firms went
out of business. 9

Despite the worsening economic
situation and despite
the growing dissension by civilian
groups
(even

agriculturalists were unhappy with the economy),
Martinez de Hoz pursued his course.
in
1980,

he

attempted without success to convince Videla
to remain
in power so as to continue the economic
program.
By

then, Videla was beset by discontent within
the military

over Martinez de Hoz's policies and so he followed

through on handing over the reigns of power to Viola.

Martinez de Hoz was replaced by the end of 1981 but the
following two years proved to be no better for the

Argentine economy.

The Malvinas/Falklands War and the

subsequent elections gained center stage as inflation
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proceeded to spiral out
of control once again. *°

^^jiu^taj^
The year 1979 witnessed
the first strike action
by a
leading faction of the
labor movement leadership.
Owing
to the worsening salary
situation and to the imminent
passage of the new Law of
Professional Associations,
labor militancy against
the regime made its first
appearance since the start of
military rule.
At the beginning of January,
the government released
its plans for wage increases
in which over an eight

month period there would be
fixed monthly adjustments of
The wage increase for
4%.
employees in the public
sector would be fixed at 40%.
Almost immediately, the
two leading factions of the
labor movement, the
Commission of 25 and the CNT issued
statements
denouncing the government's salary policy.
The CNT

issued

statement saying that such an economic
policy
was leading "inexorably" to a confrontation
among the
a

Argentines.
calling for

The Commission of 25 issued
a

a

statement

state of emergency on the part of all

sectors of labor in regard to the economic situation.
few days into February, the government released
on the cost of living index which showed
for the month of January.

a

a

A

report

rise of 12.8%

This news was not received

well by labor, and both the CNT and the Commission of 25
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calculated that the
buylng power Qf workers
8.8% in one month
alone
Demands
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the salary increases
became

_

the Commission of
25 which

becoming

^

its criticism of the
regime. 11

Two other events in
Feb ruary serve(J

mcreasingly tense labo r
situation,
of Lorenzo Miguel

,

^

fc<)

one was the release

head of the 62 Organizations
and

displaced reader of the
Metalworkers union, from prison
tc house arrest, and
the
other was a change in the

Minister of labor with
General Liendo leaving to
be
replaced by a General Reston.
The release of Lorenzo
"iguel, the most powerful
and influential of Peronist
labor leaders, enabled him
to start recouping

his power

after almost four years in
jail.

He would attempt to

reign in the various factions
of the labor movement
under a Perinist banner. 12
The departure of General Liendo
from the Ministry of
Labor signified a hardening stance
on the part of the
regime toward labor. As will be
recalled from chapter
4,

General Liendo had pursued

a

more moderate line with

labor throughout his tenure as labor
minister.

in his

dealings with Economics Minister Martinez de
Hoz, Liendo
usually lobbied for greater wage increases and
for

liberalizing some restrictions on labor activity.

in

his last meeting with leaders of the Commission of
25
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-ving toward normalization

of the labor movement
and

for a reinitiation of
labor activity. His
successor

thought otherwise.

General Reston began his
tenure by
declaring that the government
would in no way modify its
salary policy.
Both the Commission of 25
and the CNT
continued to call for
adjustments to salary increases. 13
in March 1979, the
government decided to enact the
new Law of Professional
Associations, which the labor
movement had lobbied hard against
for the past three
years.
Recall that this new law, f
irst proposed in
1976, called for the abolition of
the CGT prohibition
of union activism in political
matters, and
,

the

proscription of labor control over
internal economic and
organizational matters.
Final passage would not take
place until November 1979.
The CNT
reacted to this news

by seeking audiences with the heads
of the navy and air
force.
They hoped that they could convince the
navy and
air force to appeal to the army-dominated
regime for

modifications in the law.
On the 27th of March,

held

a

This effort failed. 14
the CNT and Commission of 25

meeting in which "programmatic unity" was reached

by various members of both groups.

both groups established

a

At this meeting,

list of concerns each had in

common: salary situation, union freedom, freedom for

detained unionists, investigation of the disappeared
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.

.

unionists, and the
defense o£
interests. Negotiations
followed with the ostensible
goal of fostering
unity between the two
groups, but
after several days,
negotiations were broken off
by the

emission

of 25 over what they
viewed to be the lack of
"positive results" offered
by the CNT. 15

The Commission of
25 deoided to call a
general strike
for April 27, the first
political strike oalled by the

labor movement leadership
sinoe the advent of military
rule in March 1976.
The strike called "The
Journey of
Protest" was called to seek
the following:
1. Salary increases to keep
pace with cost of living
increases

Opposition to reform of the old Law
of Professional
Associations
2.

Opposition to the newly enacted
repressive labor
legislation
3.

4.

Normalization of union activity.

5.

Liberty for detained unionists.

Expediency in investigating the cases of
disappeared
unioni sts
6.

7.

Defense of the economy, production, and national

industry
From the very start, plans in preparation for the
strike were beset by serious obstacles.

The CNT opted

not to participate in the strike on the grounds that the
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8

decision to strike was
taken unilaterally by
the

Mission
Mission

of 25, out it stated
support for the
of 25 -s dema n d s.
The most serious

obstacle
from the military
authorities who were not
disposed
to any forn, of public
protest at that time.
Their
solution was to Jail all
the principal leaders
of the
strike several days
before the strike was to
occur.
Liberty for the detained
leaders was not gained until
July of that year and in
the case of six leaders,
not
until March of the following
17
year.
ca,ne

On the day of the strike,
activity appeared normal in
downtown Buenos Aires and other
cities,
where the
effects of the strike were
most noticeable were in the

industrial sectors just outside
of Buenos Aires.
There,
industrial activity was almost at
a standstill.
So too,
railroad service in Buenos Aires
was severely limited as
the railworkers' union adhered
to the strike call
despite the jailing of many union
leaders and despite
the illegality of the strike.
The military-censored
press played down the strike and portrayed
life as
normal in Buenos Aires.
Several reports from foreign
presses, in Mexico and Spain tor instance saw
the strike
as the first significant display of
opposition to the

regime.

1

in hindsight,

union leaders from the

Commission of 25 viewed the strike with mixed feelings.
On the one hand,

the turnout was small and the strike
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not succeed at
paralyzing the economic
tne nation,
on the other hand
the strike was ,
cleaf _
cut states that
labor was unhappy
wlth the economic
situation and that
protest would continue
despite
threats of military
reprisal. 19

^

,

in great numbers for
the stride.

-ne g ed

The fact that the CNT

on participating in
the strike and the
detention

of the strike's
planners can be attributed
in large part
to this lack of
response.
However, despite these
obstacles, the strike did
occur and did have some

noticeable impact on daily
routine in Buenos Aires.
most important aspect of

The

this strike was that it was
the

first political action
taken by

a

sector of the labor

movement leadership in three
years of military rule.
The years of attempting
to achieve a dialogue with
the
military regime over salaries
and labor legislation
proved unsuccessful as the events
of early 1979 showed
the economic and political
situation to be getting worse
rather than better.
The decision
to call a strike was

all the more daring because in
1979 the power of videla

and Martinez de Hoz appeared stable
and secure.
other sector of Argentine society up

No

till then had

voiced opposition to the regime.
27,

The strike of April

1979, was a watershed in Argentine labor history,

taking place as the political situation began
to unravel
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•albeit slowly at
this point)/and
began to take more
militant stands.

^°iiMnuin 3_ImE

^

iabQc

^

o^^

Arena
As it had in the
three years prior to
1979,
through 1982 the annual
June meeting of the

in 1979

international Labor
Organization enabled labor to
voice
criticism of the regime
in an international
setting
without fear of reprisals
by the military authorities.
Far away from Argentina,
labor leaders could condemn
the
iabor situation in their
country and appear to be in
the
vanguard of the opposition.
This strategy helped the*,
to make friends abroad
and demonstrated
to the rank and

file that the leadership
was truly working for its
interests.
The situation in 1979 and
subsequent years
was a bit different in that
the existence of two rival
groups jockeying for control of
the labor movement made

preparations for the ILO meetings all
the more heated.
On the heels of the April 27th
strike, preparations
were begun to form a delegation to
the ILO meeting in
Geneva,
within the Commission of 25, disagreement
arose
over whether or not to attend the meeting.

Members from

the Verticalist faction of the 25 argued
that labor

should refuse to send

a

delegation as

protest over the

labor leaders still in jail for the April 27th
strike.
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The other groups
of the
tne 25 disagreed,
and after some
negotiations with the
«ie CNT,
CNT aa adelegation
was chosen to
attend the June meetlng
with jQrge
i

^

^

CNT being appointed
the leader of
2fl
-Y- before the group's departure
Minister q£
Reston, announced that
he would not be
attending
,

-eting.
Daher.

IB his stead would
go

Reston

.

s

^^^^

^

^

^
the

Genecai

stated reasons Eor not
attending

the many matters he
had to attend to at
home, but the
real reason was to
avoid being criticized by
the ILO for

labor violations.

m

early Hay

,

the IL0 had named

Argentina as one of twenty-three
countries in violation
of labor rights and
Reston knew he would be
criticized
at the meeting.

To offset this criticism,
he decided

not to appear, thereby
marginalizing the importance of
the conference to the
regime. 21
in a speech delivered
before the ILO, Jorge Triaca

issued

a

stinging criticism against the
Argentine

regime's economic policies.

He used the term "economic

terrorism" to describe the regime's
policies in
destroying the fabric of the labor
movement, and he
constantly brought up the names of
disappeared labor
leaders to illustrate the severe repression
the labor
movement had suffered under the military regime. 22
The harshness of Triaca's words resonated
back to

Buenos Aires where General Reston was attempting
to
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minlmiZe

^

imP
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IM

•« the

"*•»«. as representative
of the
to Triaca s speech
but
.

.eetina.

g overn m ent,

^

General
mad e no

^

retucn
Buenos
Aires, he remarked
that
su*
at Trisn,
Triac ^ did not represent
the
majority feeling of
23
workers.
in 1980,

the Commission of 25
and the CNT again

fought over representation
to the ILO meeting,
initially, the Commission
of 25 stated it would
not be
attending;
the CNT formed a
delegation, again to be
headed by Jorge Triaca.
Several weeks before the
meeting, the government
decided not to send the usual
tripartite delegation; because,
it claimed, the labor
delegation only represented one
faction of the labor
movement.
The real reason for not
sending an official
delegation was the government's
fear of another stinging
rebuke for labor's rights
violations.
Despite the fact
that the government would not be
represented at the

meeting, the CNT decided to go
to Geneva.

At the last

minute, the Commission of 25 also
decided to send
delegation so that two contending groups
of labor

delegates appeared in Geneva.
year, Triaca delivered

a

Again as in the previous

stinging critique of

a

government policies toward labor.

other labor leaders

called for sanctions against the Argentine government
for violation of labor rights.

The government was so

incensed over the situation that it seriously considered
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)

Pulling out of membership
in the ILO. 24

m

1981,

the government formed
a labor delegation
to
the ilo meeting
(made up solely of
members of the CNT
and the Commission
of 25 (now using the
name General

Confederation of Labor)
sent its own group of
delegates
Thxs meeting was not
as tumultuous as by
then General
Viola had come to power
and there was respite
from the

repression of the Videla
era.

The year 1982 was

different as Argentina was
engaged in the
Malvinas/Falklands conflict
against Great Britain, and
the ILO convention
witnessed several skirmishes
between
the Argentines and the
British and U.S. delegations.
The main item of this
meeting was the Argentine labor
delegation's calling for support
of Argentina's claims
to the Malvinas.
in both 1981 and
1982,

the two rival

labor factions were less harsh
in their criticisms of
the government.
However, this is in direct contrast
to
their actions at home. By 1982
they had become more
vocal against the regime's policies. 25
The years 1979-1982 once again
showed how labor used
the international labor setting to
serve its goals vis

vis the standing regime.

a

As 1979 and 1980 were years of

continued repression by the Videla regime, and
as
Martinez de Hoz's policies were making the labor
situation increasingly worse, labor leaders found it

necessary to criticize the regime, at least from outside
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The brief poatieal
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conflict in 1982 made
labor appear
less critical o£ the
regime.
In all these cases
politicking at the IL0
meetings was geared toward
domestic consumption to
win the hearts and minds
o£
labor rank and file.
This was particularly i
mpo rtant at
the time as the labor
movement was divided into two
contending factions.
_

^

^-J^!i^d_Attejrip^^

Meetings of the ILO witnessed
repeated negotiations
between labor leaders concerning
strategies to deal with
the situation at home.
1979, Commission of 25 and
CNT leaders held negotiations
to bring about the
unification of the two rival sectors

m

of the labor

movement.

The imminent passage of the new
Law of

Professional Associations made negotiations
all the more
urgent as the year wore on. Also,
the re-emergence of
Lorenzo Miguel, who was a persistent
advocate of
unification, prodded both groups into finding
common
ground
On September 11,

1979,

the CNT and the Verticalist

and Orthodox factions of the Commission of 25
agreed to
form the "Unified Drive for Argentine Workers" (CUTA).
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However, as with every
other labor coalition,
each group
this alliance retained
their separate identities
(e.g., the CNT remained
the CNT although it had
agreed
to be a part of CUTA)
The other factions of
the
Commission of 25 -the
Participationists the
independents, and the Group
of 8-decided to form
their
own separate coalition.
They took the name "Commission
of 20" and argued that
the newly formed CUTA
represented
"pernicious extremes" of suicidal
sindicalism

»

.

,

and

"domesticated and complacent"
sindicalism. what the
Commission of 20 claimed to
represent was a middle way
in finding solutions to
labor problems. 26
The first activity undertaken
by CUTA was to gain an
audience with the Organization of
American States'

Commission on Human Rights which was
in Argentina
investigating alleged violations.
In

its meeting,

the

CUTA representatives stated their
concerns over the fate
of detained and disappeared unionists
and the economic
situation.
in a document published a little
later

(October 1979), CUTA stated its aims to be:
1.

The immediate relaxation of military control over

intervened unions.
2.

The immediate release of detained unionists.

3.

An investigation into the cases of the disappeared.

4.

The derogation of the proposed new Law of

Professional Associations which was about to be passed.
211

With respect to the

l atter

,

CUTA argued

^^_^

°f Professional
Associations would -.to-l...
the labor
m0V6ment
W ° Uld
1 "e achievements
it had made in
labor rights.
I£ passed
CUTft warned; there
wouid

^

^

,

confrontations with the
government. 27
On November 16
°'

+.v„

q7q
iy79
i

'

the new Law of Professional

Associations was passed.

CUTA issued

a

condemnation of

the new law and began
to approach the political
parties
and the Episcopacy to
gain support against the new
law.
It also proclaimed a

"National Program of Action" to

lobby for the unconstitutionality
of the law.
The
strategies for this National
Program of Action were to
be the point of contention
within CUTA.
in meetings
held at the beginning of
1980 to formalize strategies
for combatting the new Law
of Professional Associations,
divisions emerged concerning whether
one or
two

plenaries should be held.

Those who argued for two

separate plenaries represented the
former unions of the
CNT; those who argued for one plenary
represented the
former unions of the Commission of 25.

It would appear

that the CNT unions were attempting to
stake out their
own territory again as they were not
pleased at the

hardening stances of the Commission of 25 unions.
CNT unions won out in holding

a

The

separate plenary from

that of the Commission of 25 unions, but divisions

between the two groups became more pronounced as the
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year progressed. 28

Conflicts within cuta
over

l

abor ^presentation
to

the ILO and ICPTU
meetings revitalized

^

di££erences
between the CNT and
anH t-v,^
the ^
Commission of 25 unions.
On Nay
1st, in honor of
International Workers' Day,
two
documents were made public
by the two separate
grQups>
One document signed
solely by membe rs of the
CNT unions
called on the armed
forces to discontinue their
economic
Policies which had led to
speculation and economic ruin.
The other document,
signed by members of the
Commission
of 25 was more aggressive
in condemning the
economic
situation.
At the June ILO meetings,
two separate
delegations of labor leaders
attended and each attempted
to be more critical of
the government than
29
the other.

On August 15, 1980,

a

new Law of Obras Sociales was

passed which effectively annulled
union control over
monies collected for social welfare
benefits.
The

result was another flurry of labor
activity against this
newest defeat of labor.
Several union leaders, all from
the CNT faction of CUTA met with
Minister of Interior

Harguindeguy to express their concerns over
the
increasingly worsening situation.

while

a

statement

issued by the labor leaders, among them Jorge
Triaca,

again stated criticism

over the handling of the economy

and of labor in particular, the very fact of the meeting

caused tensions to explode.
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The Per6nist party,

Partido

.

-sticialista, at that time
expcessly

«««

en 9 a g in g in any
ulfci

^^

^^

and his COl lea gU es
were severely rebuked
for
-eting with Harguindeguy,
at which point
openiy
espoused his belief i„
dialogue wlt „ the
stance caused several
members of the CNT to break
with
the group.
The Mission of 25
unions decided also to
discontinue attempts to
reconcile with the CNT roup
of
g
unions.
On November 24
lgan
n,
J.you,
thea n
Commission of 25,
with several other unions,
decided to form a new General
Confederation of Labor in open
defiance of the Law of

^

Professional Associations which
banned such a group.
The CU-TA alliance was ended
permanently, and once a ain,
g
the labor scene was dominated
by
two rival labor

factions 30
The urgency for labor unity
brought about by the

imminent passage of the new Law
of Professional

Associations and by Lorenzo Miguel's
prodding resulted
for a short time in a singular
voice for the labor

movement.

it

is

interesting to note that in pushing for

labor unity, Miguel convinced the
hardliners of the

Commission of 25 to agree to
moderate CNT.

a

compromise with the

Given that the CNT curried more favor

with the standing regime, Miguel probably felt
that if
any pressure could be brought to bear on modifying
the
soon to be enacted new Law of Professional Associations,
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it would lie with
the CNT rather than
with the
Commission of 25
mto Mrguel,
25.
a

^

divided labor movement

^

served little purpose,
save to enafcle
manipulate the contendin
g tactions to its interests.
Only through a unified
effort ™,,ih
errorc,
>u
could labor
promote any
substantive change.

^

i

The fragile unity
created with CUTA however,

could
not ameliorate the
long-standing differences
between the
various factions of the
labor movement.
CNT and

Commission of 25 unity did
not prevent or delay the
passage of the new Law of
Professional Associations so
that the desire to remain
in alliance
was no longer of

urgent concern.

The CNT faction of CUTA
pursued

independent actions on its own,
much of which could be
interpreted as "collaborationist"
as it argued that
dialogue was the only way to
promote labor's interests.
The Commission of 25 faction
consistently followed a
more critical position regarding
the regime's policies
and, given the worsening labor
situation, it finally saw
the need to split from CUTA and to
found a new CGT.

A CGT and Renewed Labor Militancy
From the time of the newly created CGT in November
1980 through 1981, an increased militancy on the part of
all the labor movement factions developed.

The creation

of a new CGT in direct defiance of the newly passed law
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served notirp to
t-^ the
regime that labor was
no longer
disposed to negotiation.
Months of lohh
uontns
lobbying against the
new law had achieved
nothing.
Thus
inus, thP
ythe r
Commission of
25 faction, rejecting the
moderate line of the CNT
faction of CUTA, decided
on a more confrontational
stance.
At an end of
I

^^

^

^

sympathizers, Saul ubaldini,
elected head of the new
CGT, severely criticized
the state of affairs in
Argentina.
He called for a
return to the
rule of law
in the nation and
spoke of the kidnapped
and

disappeared.

On the other hand,

the CNT and Commission
of 20 factions of the
labor movement refused to

recognize the new CGT as
representative of labor as a
whole.
response to the CGT, these two
groups decided
to form the "Intersectorial
CNT-20."

m

The Intersectorial argued
for

"concertation and social truce."

a

strategy of
it viewed the

ascendancy of General Viola as an
opportunity to curry
favor with the regime.
The belief that
the new regime

would be more susceptible to labor's
demands was not
totally misguided on the part of the
Intersectorial.
the time of Videla's departure from
government,

At

the

major waves of repression and disappearances
had ended.
General Viola, in his short tenure, attempted
to

decompress the political situation somewhat by
holding
talks with political parties, among them the Peronist
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„. also demonstrated
gcegter
= o 9 n izing the
need tQ Qpen a diaiogue

fay

^

other groups in society. 31
No doubt,

the leaders of the
Inte rsector ial viewed
the re gime change
as an opening to
pursue their own

Personal

actions.

Keener,

the groups which made
up

the intersectorial
could be called the moderate
wing of
the labor movement in
that they consistently
pursued
a

strategy of seeking dialogue
with the regime in power.
These leaders assessed
the political situation
in 1981
as one where negotiations
with the government would

produce fruitful results for
the labor unions they
represented and for themselves
personally.
However,
their assessment of the
political situation proved wrong
and this group began to distance
itself more from the
regime as the year wore on.
The CGT, made up of the Commission
of 25 and various

other factions of labor groups
pursued

confrontational stance.

a

more

The departure of Martinez de

Hoz from the Ministry of Economics
and his replacement

by Lorenzo Sigaut did not result in
any improvement of
the labor situation.

The CGT decided to call

a

national

strike for July 22nd to protest the salary and

industrial situations.

The political opening proffered

by Viola certainly played
it

a

part as labor leaders felt

"safer" to express opposition to the regime.
217

The

economic situation in iqai
1981 witnessed the dire
fruits of
Martinez de Ho Z s po i
,

dosing up

shop,

icies

.

Facfcory

^

leaving thousands
unemployed

was
Xt

4

s

estimated that the
industrial workforce
shrank by 30%
^ring the Proceso. The
hardest hit was
manufacturing sectors.
where there was an
estimated
1,030,000 manufacturing workers
in 1976, the number
had
fallen to 790,000 by 1980.32
Inflafcion

^

_^

^

out of control and
salaries were not keeping
pace.

According to

government survey, only 40%
of the
population was engaged in
productive labor, and strikes
by rank and file continued
unabated. 33
a

A week after the
not-too-successful national strike,
the intersectorial held
a meeting with the
Argentine
Union of industry (UIA) and
Minister of Labor Porcille
to negotiate a social truce
between labor and industry
over the economic situation.
with their rivals of the
CGT in jail and the partial
failure of the national
strike which the Intersectorial
had boycotted, the

leaders of this group hoped to gain
the upper hand in
the rivalry over control of the
labor movement.
Again,
their attempt at wresting concessions
from the regime
34
failed.

Factions within the Intersectorial became

increasingly disillusioned with their lack of success
and several leaders decided to negotiate with the
CGT
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about

a

possible accomodation
between the two groups
The CGT leadership
declined these overtures,
most
probably because they
mistrusted the intentions of
the
intersectorial and perhaps
because they were still
recovering from the latest
bout or government
35
repression.
Bear in mind that while
the CGT and the
intersectorial CNT-20 represented

the two dominant

factions in the labor movement,
there existed a
multiplicity of lesser factions
within these groups as
well as outside of these groups.
a labor leader's power
is always unstable for he
must seek both government and
rank and file recognition in
order to maintain his
status as leader.
Complicating the matter are the

existence of others, always waiting in
the wings to
replace him if he proves ineffective
at walking the
tight rope, balancing rank and file
demands with the
political situation at hand.
Undoubtedly, the rivalry between the CGT and the

Intersectorial CNT-20 impeded the efforts to create

united labor front.

However,

a

the public schisms within

the military junta provided both groups with

opportunities to pursue their own separate goals.

That

the junta continued to remain deaf to labor's problems

forced the more moderate elements of the Intersectorial
to recast their strategies.
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Open confrontation with the

.

.

regime was still rejected
but the public discourse
of
the group took on a
harsher tone against the
regi rae
Coupled with the continuing
militancy of the CGT, the
situation began to heat up
by mid-year 1981.
in July 1981, five
political parties (Radicals and
Peronists being the dominant
ones) formed a coalition
called the » Mu l tipar tidar
ia »
Taking advantage of
Viola's political opening
this coalition sought to lobby
for a return to democratic
rule.
Their appearance on
the political scene gave
the labor movement more allies
with which to build a larger
opposition.
Both wings of
the labor movement sought
the support of this group.
For the next year, labor and
the coalition would often
work together or give support to
each others'
.

.

activities 36

a

At the beginning of November 1981,
the CGT called for
national demonstration organized under the
theme of

"peace, bread, and work".

The march garnered the

support of human rights groups, the Multipartidaria
most importantly the Catholic Church.

,

and

Over 15,000

people, mostly from labor marched through the streets

chanting anti-government slogans.

The march culminated

in a mass at the Church of San Cayetano in which the

plight of labor was among the topics highlighted in the
se rmon

37

The demonstrations of November were the first time
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that several groups in
opposition to the regime had
coordinated efforts to make
a public statement.
The
political parties, as mentioned,
only resurfaced on the
political scene in July of
1981; the Catholic Church had
for the most part refrained
from criticizing the

regime's excesses; the human
rights groups had suffered
severe repression and their
ranks were constantly
decimated by disappearances.
The coordinating efforts
were successful at this time
as General Viola appeared
to be losing control.
Disputes between him and General
Galtieri were becoming increasingly
more public,
enabling opposition forces to take
greater strides in
criticizing the regime. 38
The political situation became volatile
when two days
after the demonstration, General Viola
fell ill and

entered the hospital.

Amid rumors that he had cancer,

General Galtieri began his machinations to take
over.
In December,

he formally ousted Viola and proclaimed his

intention to remain in power for the long term.

Multipartidaria renewed calls for
liberalization.

The CGT,

a

The

democratic

in an end of the year

statement, called for social and economic changes, among

them the need for elections.

The language of democracy

began to filter into the public discourse of the CGT.
The events of the latter part of 1980 and of 1981

illustrate the labor movement's increased militancy.
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The creation of the
CGT in November 1980
signaled a
hardening tone by the
Commission of 25 faction of
the
labor movement in its
defiance of the new Law of

Professional Associations.

From the 1940s on, the
CGT

was the central organ
of labor and the principal
spokesman for labor's interests.
<=„,.
interest*
Successive military
regimes had banned the CGT
from meeting, but Videla
actually outlawed its
existence.
defiance of the
regime, the new CGT was
created, expressly to agitate
for labors' rights.
CGT promotion of national
demonstrations throughout 1981
signalled the end of

m

conciliatory attitudes by this
faction of the labor
movement
The machinations of the
Intersectorial faction also
took a turn toward greater
confrontation, albeit at a

much slower pace.

The Intersectorial viewed the viola

government opening as an opportunity to
pursue
substantive negotiations with the regime over
the labor
situation.
in their rivalry with the CGT, leaders
of
the Intersectorial calculated that

a

strategy of

dialogue and negotiation would garner more concessions
from the regime than one of open confrontation.

They

hoped that if their gamble worked, they would be able to
wrest control of the labor movement from the CGT.
However, after several attempts at dialogue with the
regime failed, leaders of the Intersectorial called for
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more confrontational
stance.
It continued to eschew
any sort of massive
demonstration against the regime,
a

but its public tone
took on

year wore on.

a

harsher character as the

it began to move away
from just labor-

specific concerns and began
to voice criticism over the
regime's repression.
The lack of consensus
between the two rival labor
factions no doubt hindered labor's

effectiveness in

influencing regime policy, but on
one level, these
divisions encouraged greater militancy.
The rivalry
between the two factions in seeking

to be the sole voice

of labor was played out in a
setting where massive

dismissals, eroding salaries, and repression
was taking
place.
Rank and file put constant pressure
on their

leadership to take action in ameliorating
the situation.
In order to gain adherents to its side,

the CGT felt

compelled to act more militantly, not only because
the
labor situation was so dire, but also to undercut
the

support of the Intersectorial

Labor and the Malvinas
The first three months of 1982 were quite busy for

both factions of the labor movement, each heading toward

confrontation with Galtieri's regime.

The first

significant labor action took place with the
Intersectorial.

Leaders of this group held another
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round of discussions
with the minister of Labor,
with
"ttl. result. A second round
of discussions in early
"arch was accompanied by
250 labor activists who
congregated outside the Labor
Ministry with banners.
This was the first
quasi-public protest undertaken by
the Intersectorial 40

Relations between the CGT and
the regime turned
violent at the end of March.
The CGT decided to call a
national day of protest for
the 30th of March, without
the support of the
Intersectorial (although words of
support were proffered by this
group).
The purpose of
the strike was to call for
an end to the "Proceso" which
the CGT claimed had caused the
destruction of the fabric
of Argentine life.
On March 30th, protests were held
all over the country denouncing
the military
regime.

Police brought out to break up the
demonstrations

engaged in bloody battles with the protesters.

An

estimated 1,000 people were detained and scores
were
injured.
it appeared that labor was no longer willing
to remain acquiescent to the regime's policies
and it

showed the growing lack of control Galtieri had over the

domestic situation.

The leaders of the strike were

jailed and the Intersectorial began plans to call

another national strike.

They condemned the authorities

for jailing the strike leaders.

had one more card to play. 41
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However, Galtieri still

Two days after the
bloody clashes of March
30th, the
Argentine armed forces
invaded the

Malvinas/Falklands

islands.

Ml

political activity against
the regime
stopped as everyone mobilized
for the war effort.
The
heightened confrontational
tone of the previous two
days
was quickly turned into
a popular outpouring
of

patriotism.

The labor movement leadership,

especially

the intersectorial,

called rallies in support of the

Malvinas invasion.

The Mul tipartidar ia and the
Catholic

Church also did the same.

when the leaders of the CGT

were let out of jail, they too
promoted support for the
regime's actions, although they
countenanced their
support of the Malvinas takeover with
continued concern
over the domestic economic and
political situation. 42

When the Argentine government established
itself on
the islands, both Saul Ubaldini of the
CGT and Jorge

Triaca of the Intersectorial were there to
witness the
swearing in of the governor. At international labor

meetings in April and May, labor leaders expounded on

Argentina's right to the islands.

As during the World

Soccer Championships held in Argentina in 1978,

Argentines used the Malvinas as
their problems.

a

means of forgetting

Being highly nationalistic and laboring

under the misconception that Argentina had

a

history of

losing land, Argentines embraced the invasion as

reassertion of national pride.
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This,

a

of course, was

P-cisely what Galtieri had
intended would happen

«

"

would be Misleading
to say that the
invasion of
the Halvinas was
undertaken solely fot the
purpose of
appeasing growing do.estic
strife.
Negotiations with
Great Britain over tne
thp islands
ieiar,^.. u
had been going on for
decades, with Great Britain
remaining more or less
intransigent to Argentina's
claims.
The plans for
invading the Halvinas had
been on the drawing board
since early 1 977 when
videla tooR

^^^

air force were particularly
partisan to an invasion as
each sought to demonstrate
the particular prowess of
their weapons.
Galtieri came to power with
the backing
of navy General Anaya on
the condition that there
would
be a retaking of the islands. 44
Due to a great deal of
misjudgment by the military

concerning Great Britain's reactions
and U.S. loyalty,
the military actually believed
that the Malvinas
operation would be swift, short, and
successful. That it
underestimated the historic and symbolic
importance of
the islands to Great Britain and
the historic ties

between the U.S. and Great Britain, illustrates
how
misguided Argentina's view is of itself as a
member
nation of the industrialized West.
While the desire to retake the Malvinas was

a

traditional foreign policy goal, the decision to invade
on April 2nd was based purely on domestic concerns.
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The

regirae was very much
alarmed by

^rch

^

demonst rafcions Qf

30th and with subsequent
threats by labor of more
demonstrations.
Coupled with increased
dissatisfaction
by some ra il itary
factions Qver
dQmestic situatio
Galtieri launched an
invasion.
He gambled on quelling
the clamoring voices
of a dissenting public
and in this
he succeeded.
However, wars are not won
on popular
support and when the British
reacted to the aggression,
Galtieri's gamble was lost. 45

^

Throughout most of the
three-month-long war, the
regime maintained strict
censorship so ordinary
Argentines were deluded over the
military situation.
To
labor's credit, the CGT
attempted to separate support
for the Malvinas from outright
support for
the regime.

As such, when the defeat was
made known on June 14th,
labor was swift to change from a
conciliatory tone to
outright opposition.

The System Unravels
The period from June 15,

1982, up to the elections of

October 30, 1983, was turbulent indeed for
Argentina.
The day of the announced defeat, violent
acts occurred
in the streets of the cities.

Soon afterward, Galtieri

was deposed and General Bignone put in his place to

ostensibly prepare the country for elections.

General

Hector Villaveiran became the minister of labor.
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As ever, the labor
movement continued to be
divided
by two principal
factions: the CGT and the

mtersectorial, which during
the height of the Malvinas
conflict in Hay had decided
to form
CGT-Azopardo.
The first CGT

a

rival CGT, named

took the name CGT-Brasil.

Unity would not be achieved
until October 1983 46
A week after the ascension
of the new regime, the
CGT-Brasil issued a statement
claiming the "Proceso" was
finished and the time had come
for a return to the rule
.

of law.

m

mid-August, General Bignone held
talks with
leaders from both factions of
the labor movement
in an

effort to defuse some of the
hostility being generated
by that sector.
Little was resolved. 47
In September,

the CGT-Brasil called

a

national strike

in protest of the salary and
labor situation for the

22nd of the month.

CGT-Azopardo also called for

a

national strike (its first one during the
military
regime) in protest of the salary increases
offered by
the government.

The government, upon hearing of these

plans, attempted to head off the strikes by offering

higher salary increases,
and

a

a

raise in the minimum wage,

promise to lift the ban on trade union activity in

sixty days.

The CGT-Brasil rejected these proposals and

on the 22nd, between 20,000 and 30,000 workers

demonstrated in front of the Casa Rosada under the
banner of "bread, peace, and work."
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CGT-Azopardo, for the most
part, viewed the
government's proposals as
good faith efforts to
negotiate so they called
off the strike.
However,
several leaders were very
unhappy with the decision
not
to strike.
Jorge Triaca felt CGT-Azopardo
abstention
from striking would work
to the CGT-Brasil's advantage.
He was right.
The success of the strike
even without
CGT-Azopardo support strengthened
the hand
of Saul

Ubaldini 49
A month later,

in October,

a

massive mobilization

took place in the province
of San Juan.

More than

25,000 people gathered in the capital
city and thousands
of tractors surrounded the
central plaza, all demanding
an end to military rule.
At the end of the protest,
demonstrators spilt 5,000 liters of wine
around the
plaza. 50
The end of the year also witnessed more

demonstrations against the regime.

Jorge Triaca managed

to convince his CGT-Azopardo colleagues
to call

for December 6th.

a

strike

The strategy of seeking concessions

from the military had failed and CGT-Azopardo was
losing

support among the rank and file.

It was hoped that the

strike would stem the tide of defections.
not to be outdone,

CGT-Brasil,

supported the strike of December 6th

and over 90% of the productive activity in the country

was paralyzed.

On December 16th,
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the Mul tipartidaria

.

cailed

"March for Democracy" at
which CGT-Brasil sent
over 5,000 workers,
over 100,000 people marched
on the
Plaza de Mayo demanding
the end of military rule.
At
Christmastime, fearing another
strike, the government
issued salary increases in
both the public and private
CI
sectors
a

Aside from the wrangling between
the two CGTs, in the
latter half of 1982, another
important player emerged on
the labor scene— Lorenzo
Miguel, leader
of the 62

Peronist Organizations.

Miguel represented the

verticalist wing of the labor movement
which advocated
loyalty to Isabel PerOn and to the
closed hierarchical
structure of organization. He had been
very close to

the Perons from 1973-76 and was
labor's premier leader
then.
Because of this, he was one of the first
leaders

jailed after the military coup.

He was later put under

house arrest.
In assessing the political situation
at the end of

1982, Miguel sought to regain control over the labor

movement.

He was particularly concerned about the rise

of a more militant group of union leaders who
advocated

greater openness and democracy within the movement.

He

was also very much an accommodationi st to the regime.
In September 1982,

he was

reported to have held talks

with General Nicolaides, commander-in-chief of the army,
about

a

possible rapprochement between labor and the
230

military government.

The government at that
time was

Pushing for "conception"
talks with labor.
head of CGT-Brasil
rejected the overture.

Uba i dini

,

Miguel, on

the other hand,

expressed public support for
the armed
forces at a 17th of
October Persist rally.
His words
caused much violence
amongst the crowd." The
message
was loud and clearMiguel's tactics were not
appreciated by the rank and
file.
However, Miguel would
continue to play an important
role in
1983.

The year 1983 began with

shift of alliances.

a

Brasil had been negotiating
with

called the "non-aligned."

a

CGT-

group of unions

The "non-aligned" group

wanted to join forces with the
CGT-Brasil and after many
drawn-out negotiations, it was
incorporated as part of
the CGT-Brasil.

CGT-Brasil thereupon changed its name

to CGT-Republica Argentina.

strike activity continued

unabated with varying degrees of
effectiveness.

Azopardo called

a

CGT-

national strike for March 28th which

was followed two days later by

a

strike called by CGT-

Republica Argentina. 53
Several significant events occurred in the first
part
of 1983 which led to the final demise of the
military.

The most important of course was the establishment
of

date for national elections.

October 30th was chosen

and the political parties galvanized into action.

second important event was the slow but steady
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The

a

^

^

relaxation of mi l itacy control
Qver
which would spark a scramble
for power a.ong many i„
the
labor leadership. 54
in March,

the government drew up
draft amendments to

its restrictive trade
union legislation.

it indicated

that it would allow unions
to organize on the

confederation level and allow them
some control over
social security.
it also said it would

repeal the ban

on strike activity.

legal again.

m

This meant that the CGT would
be

April, the government indicated
that it

would be starting the process of
"normalizing unions."
This meant it would return union
leadership positions to
unionists as the military personnel
would be pulling
out.

To facilitate this process,

the military set about

creating normalization committees to oversee
the

transition back to civilian control. 55
These actions set off
labor leaders.

a

flurry of activity among

Union leaders who had been relieved of

their duties in the last military regimes sought
to

regain control.

Leaders who had emerged to fill the

vacuum attempted to stay in power.

The military used

the normalizing committees as carrots to gain

cooperation from the labor elite.

General Nicolaides

held negotiations with the CGT-Azopardo but they
stalled,

so he reinitiated talks with Lorenzo Miguel. 56

What Nicolaides wanted from Miguel was an
232

understanding.

Persists

In return f

„

Nicolaides

,

^

s

to retake control of
their unions

(most of the

displaced leaders were
hard-line Pe roni s t s -and
therefore be assured of
winning the presidential
)

elections-the Peronists would
not investigate the
military for human rights
abuses committed in the past
seven years.
The logic of this was flawed.
Nicolaides
assumed that the Peronists
would win the elections. As
labor was the backbone of
Per6nist
support, he thought

he could enter into a
pact with the most conservative

wing of the Per6nist labor
movement.

Miguel saw this as

an opportunity to re-assert
his control over labor. 57
This attempt at an alleged "mill
tary-sindical » pact

backfired for both of them, but it
hurt the Per6nists
the most.

Saul Ubaldini condemned these actions
and so

did Perimist party leaders.

Already strife-ridden as to

who to nominate for their presidential
candidate, the
Per6nists did not need this behind-the-scenes
conspiracy
to further taint their reputation.

Miguel denied any

such negotiations had taken place.

(It is still unclear

whether such negotiations ever occurred). 58
What was happening on the political scene mirrored

much of what was happening within the labor movement.
Factional infighting was endemic as the Per6nist party

attempted to organize for the elections.

In general,

the main factions were those of the ultra-hardliners,
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hardliners, and the moderates.

The ultra-hardliners

wanted Isabel Per6n to
take up the leadership role
of
the party.
The hardliners were
intent on exorcising the
leftist elements out of
the party and advocated
the
candidacy of old-time Peronist
Italo Luder.
The

moderates wanted greater internal
democracy, less
identification with Peron, and were
partial to Antonio
Robledo.
The key figure here again
was Lorenzo Miguel.
He counseled the party to
wait and see what Isabel Peron
wanted to do, although by April
he was favoring Luder's
nomination. when several months
passed without

any sign
from Peron, Miguel threw his lot
in with Luder who
became the nominee. 59

Meanwhile, on the labor front,

legislation was being repealed.

repressive labor

Military interveners

were leaving unions and the CGT building
once again was
placed under the control of labor.
By July, the
two

factions of the CGT were negotiating the possibility
of

uniting once again.
support of

a

In late July,

both CGTs came out in

Plan of Emergency which appealed to the

military authorities to do something about the worsening
economic situation.

On October 4th,

both CGTs held

labor strike over the salary situation.

a

Finally, on

October 14th, the two factions united into one CGT. 60
On the traditional 17th of October rally held in

honor of Peron, Lorenzo Miguel was booed off the stage.
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Ubaldini was given
was clear.

a

Labor rank and £ilf

way of doing things.

^

was of

standing ovation. 61

_

The verdict

^^

L0 ren 20 Miguel was
past his prime;

a

generation which ran things
by fiat and by
bowing to the powers
that be, even if it meant
selUng
out labor's interests.
ubaldini represented the new
generation, being muc h mo
re open
and having proved
himself in leading the
hardline faction of labor
against
the regime.
Unfortunately, the candidacy of
Italo Luder
represented Miguel's generation
of Persists,
and so,

the rank and file defected
from their party, not so much
out of support to Alfonsin
but in repudiation of the
excesses of Peronism.

The last fifteen months of
military rule bore witness
to a level of social protest

unprecedented in Argentine

history.
War,

Riding on the defeat of the
Malvinas/Falklands

labor and other groups embarked on
concerted

campaigns to force the military out of
power.

strikes

by individual unions coupled with
national

demonstrations gave notice that Argentines were
no
longer willing to put up with military rule.
Attempts
by the military to exacerbate differences
among labor

failed as the leaders who were negotiating

a

military-

sindical pact were severely rebuked for their actions.
The scheduling of elections and the normalization of

unions provided opportunities for all sectors of society
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to exercise newly
recaptured
in the

freedom.

The divisiveness

Persist party cost the party
the erections.

The

divisiveness in the labor
movement was eventually
resolved, as two weeks
before the election, both
factions of the CGT united
into one.

in the last months of
military rule,

Lorenzo Miguel
and the moderate CGT-Azopardo
finally jumped on the

bandwagon of democracy.

Their efforts at negotiating

with the military had failed
and had cost them rank and
file support.
Before it was too late, they joined

their

CGT-Republica Argentina colleagues
in clamoring for
return to civilian rule.

a

Conclusion
The years 1979-83 saw the decline
of military rule,

punctuated by increasing social protest and
destructive war with Great Britain.

After

a
a

needlessly
period of

prolonged repression, which served as the regime's
raison d'etre, the greater task of governing and

managing the economy seemed to be eluding the regime.
The policies of Martinez de Hoz were failing to provide

long-term stability in the economy and instead were
causing the de-industrialization of the industrial
sector and rampant speculation in the financial sector.
The issue of presidential succession arose in 1980 as
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-dela chitted himself

to an orderly
transfer

after four years in
office.

^

^

That nis chosen

illustrated the growing
schisms within the military
over
the course of Argentine
politics.
while an eventual
return to civilian rule
was hinted at by viola,
m0 st of
the armed forces were
still dead set against it.
This
and the desire of General
Galtieri to become president
made the political situation
volatile by the end
of 1981

when Galtieri succeeded in
ousting viola from power.
From the very beginning,
Galtieri's rule was tenuous
as he was intent on
aggrandizing his power,

thereby

alienating factions of the
military.

The growing civil
strife perpetrated by the labor
movement, the political
parties, and others made the
situation intolerable.
His
solution was to launch a campaign
for retaking the
Malvinas on the assumption, of course,
that Argentina
would win.
His failure to obtain victory all
but sealed
the fate of the military.
After a year of intense
domestic opposition, the military called
elections and

Argentina returned to civilian rule.
Given this backdrop of palace intrigue, the
labor

movement sought to capitalize on the seeming
dissension
in the

ranks of the military.

However,

it

too was

racked by continuous conflict which expressed itself
in
the existence of two dominant competing factions.
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One

faction consistently
took

a

more confrontational
stance

toward the re g i me and
the other took

a

more conciliatory

tone.

The first political
action taken by the hard-line
Commission of 25 was the
national strike of April
27,
1979, which was partially
successful
in paralyzing the

nation.

This strike was the first
public display of
opposition to regime policy
since the inception of the
regime and was held in
response to the proposed passage
of the new Law of
Professional Associations.

This strike paved the way
to

a

short-lived

reconciliation between the two labor
factions but as the
regime enacted the new Law of
Professional Associations
anyway, reconciliation led to
outright opposition with
both groups claiming the other was
trying to exploit
the

labor situation to its own gain.

Not soon after the

final passage of this new law in

November 1979,

CGT was formed in direct defiance of
its ban.

a

new

From this

coalition of labor groups emerged the demonstrations
and
confrontations of 1980 and 1981 culminating in the

bloody battles of March 30, 1982.
The more conciliatory wing of the labor movement

coalesced into the Intersects ial and pursued

negotiation with the military regime.

However, as the

regime remained more or less intransigent to this

group's demands, it too began to take

a

more

confrontational posture and began to call for national
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demonstrations.

At meetings of the ilo
and ICFTU,

leaders of the Intersectorial
voiced harsh criticism
against the regime in
efforts to appear to be working
for labor's interests,
rather than to appear
collaborationist.
This was important given
that
throughout this period, labor
rank and file continued to
hold strikes against the
economic situation.
Up through 1979, both
factions of the labor movement

concentrated on labor specific
issues in their dealings
with the regime.
issues such as salaries, dismissals,
COntro1 ° f ^M_^iales, and
union freedoms were
always at the top of labor's
concerns.
Starting in
1980,

the hardline faction began to
emphasize particular

"political" concerns.
of law",

Words such as "elections",

"rule

and "justice" became prominent in
labor's

public discourse.

The plight of jailed unionists and

the disappeared also became more
prominent and labor

leaders' characterization of regime policies
took on

condemnatory tone.

a

In the period after the Malvinas

defeat, the weakened regime began to capitulate to long-

standing labor demands.

The CGT was relegalized,

strike

activity and union elections permitted again, and
intervened unions became free of military control.
The months before the elections continued to be

plagued with divisions among labor and the Per6nist
party.

Lorenzo Miguel, long-time Per6nist union leader
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apparently attempted

a

behind the scenes milit.ry-

sindical pact with
General Nicolaides.
This severely
hurt the Persist
effort in the eyes of
labor rank and
file.
The two dominant labor
factions distanced
themselves from him and
were able to bridge their
differences to form a unified
CGT right before the
elections. A new generation
of labor leaders had come
of age.

The activities of labor
from 1979 to 1983 illustrate
the difficulty of maintaining

authoritarian order.

a

bureaucratic-

Once the use of repression had

been exhausted and the
"threat" which brought the
military to power had been dealt
with, the next order of
business was to maintain order.
Another essential part
of the military's goals was
to de-politicize the labor
movement.
This attempt at "exclusion"
became difficult
to accomplish as consensus
within the regime began to
break down giving labor an opportunity
to
repel the

assault
Schisms within the ruling elite were
exploited by
labor and other groups in their attempts
to regain some

political footing.

The discontent of labor became so

severe and problematic to the regime that it went
to war
to quell

the domestic situation.

when that failed,

the

military attempted to play divide and conquer by
conspiring with certain elements of the labor movement
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in

negating

a

military-sindical pact.

The majority
of the labor leadership
condemned such actions and
stood
firm in calling for a
return to democracy.
In the end,
labor turned a deaf ear
to the military and
civilian
rule triumphed.
The

experiment with exclusionary
bureaucratic-authoritarianism was over.
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CHAPTER VI

T^ E-J^MT_FOUR_A^_^^
C IVILIAN RULE 1983-1988

The election results of
October 30,

1983, were a

surprise to everyone, both
to those inside Argentina
and
to outside observers.
what was assumed to be an easy
Peronist victory turned out to
be the party's first
defeat in an open and free election.
Instead, a nearly
100-year-old party, the Radical Civic
Union (UCR) won
52% of the vote and achieved its first
fair victory
against the Peronist party since the
latter's founding
in the mid-1940s.

(Previous Radical presidents Frondizi

and Illia came into office under conditions
where the

Peronist party was outlawed, thereby tainting
the

legitimacy of these Radicals as governors.)
The man at the helm of the Radical victory was
Raul

Alfonsln,

a

member of the lef t-of-center wing of this
246

broad-based middle-class
party.

A son of immigrants

Spain, Alfonsln was
born and
chascQmus
(fam ° US f ° r US dulce
d * leche), a small
town seventy

^

*iles southwest of
Buenos Aires.

Mfonsin had always been

a

A lawyer by training,

politician, active in the

reformist wing of the
Radical party and in local
regional politics.
Building a reputation on his
gift
for fiery oratory,
Alfonsin was a party maverick,
continuously doing battle with
the Radical Party oldguard,
when elections were called
by the military junta
in Narch for October
30th, Alfonsln managed to recruit
thousands of newcomers to the
party, mainly from among
the young urban middle
classes.
In the party primary,
he successfully won the
right to run for president under
the party banner, thereby bringing
into dominance the
lef t-of-center wing of the party.

1

The party platform which brought
him to victory

consisted of several key issues which
touched the core
of Argentine life.
Of foremost concern was the

issue of

human rights violations committed by the
outgoing

military junta.

Alfonsln promised an investigation into

the thousands of disappeared,

murdered.

kidnapped, tortured, and

He also promised that there would be no

amne sty for those responsible for the atrocities of the
miilitary's

"dirty war."

miilitary in disarray,

Of course,

in 1983 with the

all political parties claimed that
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an investigation
into human rights
violations would be
ordered, but for
Mfonsin, the concern with
human rights
long preceded the
democratic opening.
He was a cofounder of the Permanent
Assembly for Human Rights
and
he attempted to
publicize the cases of families
of those
who had disappeared.
He spent some time in
jail for
such activities, but he
came away with a solid

reputation for honesty and
commitment to justice. 2
A second key issue was
to highlight the failure
of
both military and Peronist
rule.
Throughout his
campaign, he constantly played
on Argentines' memories
of the turbulent days of
Isabel PerOn and the terror of
the military regime.
He stressed the corruption,
ineptitude, and moral bankruptcy
of these past regimes
and he sought to link them
together. 3 when reports
surfaced at the end of March concerning
a militarysindical pact, Alfonsin was quick to
condemn this all
too familiar aspect of Argentine
political life.

Alfonsin used the specter of

a

military- sindical pact

to point to the corruptness of certain
sectors of labor,

but he did not condemn the labor movement as

Rather, he called on labor to reject such

a

a

whole.

pact,

in

repudiation of the military regime and to build anew

democratic labor movement.

a

4

Finally, not any less important in

a

nation where

personality has always dominated politics, was the fact
248

^at

of all the major
candidates,

and untried politician.

Mfonsin, was

a

new

xtalo Luder, the Persist

candidate, had been
closely associated with
the last
disastrous Peronist regime
so he fared badly trying
to
Prove that the Persists
represented change and
innovation. Mvaro
Alsogaray fche candidate
small but significant
Christian Democratic party,
had
been associated with
past military regimes and
was
therefore suspect for his
military sympathies and his
rabid anti-Peronism.
Mfonsin, although a Radical, was
not from the "old guard"
of the party but represented
the reformist, more
popular wing.
His ascendancy to the
national political scene
represented to most Argentines
a break from the past,
although not with tradition. 5
Upon taking office on December
10, 1983, Alfonsin
immediately called for the former
leaders of the

^^

,

military junta to be arrested.

Alfonsin asked the

military courts to investigate human
rights abuses but
they came up with nothing. Alfonsin
thereupon decided
to have the former leaders tried
in civilian courts.

The trials began in June 1985 and
lasted almost nine

months with the result that former presidents
Videla and
Viola, along with Admiral Massera of the navy,
were

convicted of human rights crimes during the "dirty war."
This was and remains the only case of

a

South American

nation where former military rulers were tried and
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r

convicted for their
excesses.

6

On another front,
Alfonsin attempted to reform
relations with the Pe
6ni st-dominated labor
movement
Unlike his Radical
predecessors, Alfonsin had
little
desire to destroy the
political power of the Persist
labor movement, but he
was intent on reforming
its most

authoritarian proclivities.

He sought neither tactical

accommodation nor all-out war,
but rather a middle way
fraught with periods of
tension and resolution.
Early
in 1984, Alfonsin
introduced a bill to congress
which

would mandate court-controlled
union elections and
guaranteed minority representation.
This ambitious bill
sought to enforce new elections
without the time-honored
practice of union oversight, but
it was soundly rejected
by the Per6nist-controlled
senate.
However, a milder
bill was passed which allowed
the standing union
leadership to organize elections based
on existing
7
constitutions.
this instance, each

m

side gave in

a

little: the Peronist union bosses realized
the need to
call elections to legitimize their
positions in the new

democracy, and Alfonsin mediated his initial
zeal for

massive reform of the labor movement.
It was in keeping with the tenor of the times
that

the labor movement, as

a

whole,

lent initial tacit

support to the Alfonsin government.

Although the labor

union bosses in the newly united CGT of 1983 had
250

suppose, the Persist
Italo Ludgr

^^^

fQr
at the polls due
to working-class
rank-and-file

defections forced the
movement leadership to
reassess
its role in Argentine
political life.
indeed,

the

factionalism which had
existed within the labor
movement
throughout the past military
regime resurfaced soon
after the elections were
over.
Without

a

doubt,

the biggest beneficiaries
of the

Radical victory were those
unionists who had
consistently agitated against
the military regime,
namely those allied with
the CGT-Brasil headed by
Saul
Ubaldini.
Ubaldini emerged into prominence
in the
winter of 1978 when, as press
secretary of the Brewery
union, he was called upon to
deliver a scathing speech
condemning military rule at an
end-of- the-yea r dinner
for the Commission of 25
faction of the labor movement.

Other more prestigious union leaders
declined to give
the speech for fear of persecution
by the authorities.
Ubaldini, however, was willing to read
the speech, even
though policemen were outside the entrance,
waiting to

arrest them all.

The incident catapulted Ubaldini to

union fame and enabled him to come to power
outside of
the more traditional channels of union mobility.
the head of the Brewery union,

was not

a

a

minor union, Ubaldini

CGT insider, nor was he as dogmatic

as many of his peers.

Being

a

Peronist

His strategy of confrontation
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i

.

with the „iutar
y authorities paid off when
democracy
returned.
After the end of
military rule, ubaldini
inherited
labor movement that
was once again f act
ional 2ed
internally and weakened
politically and economically

a

The military's concerted
campaign to de-industrialize
the economy and to
de-politicize the labor movement
had
caused drastic results
for labor socially,
economically,
and politically.
Alon g with a drastic reduction
in
wages, real income, and
working hours, the size of the
overall urban labor
population was reduced.

m

manufacturing, where there were
1,165,000 employed in
1975,

in 1982 the numbers had
decreased to 740,000.

Industrial output as percentage
of GNP declined from 29%
in 1975 to 25% in 1980.
This decline in the sheer size
of the industrial labor
sectors and in the power of
workers constituted a challenge
for Ubaldini in

recouping labor's political power in
the new democratic
9
regime

Complicating the process of labor consolidation
was
the resurfacing of old rivalries and
contending
interests within the labor elite.

in the

initial

aftermath of the October 1983 elections, the four
major
factions of the labor movement attempted to create

coalition to run the CGT.

Ubaldini, the only one to

have popular Per6nist support allied with the 62
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a

Organizations, the political

a,

of the labor movement.

He was clearly the
most vocal union critic
of the past
-litary regime. Jorge Triaca,
head of the Plastics

-ion,

is considered the

businessman's unionist.

He was
one of the leaders of
the "dialogue" wing of
the labor
movement during the military
junta.
Osvaldo Borda,

secretary-general of the rubber
industry, represents the
Commission of 25 group of
unions.
Ramon Baldassini,
secretary-general of the postal
clerks' federation
represents non-aligned unions. 10
Ubaldini claims to be seeking

a

new reformed meaning

to Peronism in which
people's voices are heard.

considers himself

a

He

worker's unionist and, by all

accounts, lives an austere life-style.

His goal of more

reform within the labor movement
has alienated him from
Lorenzo Miguel, who represents the old
guard of the
labor movement.

The Commission of 25 is considered the

"renovationist" wing of the labor movement.

They claim

to truly represent the workers and
dispute Ubaldini's

stance as the worker's unionist.

independent unions are

a

The non-aligned or

small but significant group of

unions which are non-Peronist and which seek to carve
out

a

role for themselves in the labor elite.

Jorge

Triaca's faction is considered the most accommodating to
the new government.

Espousing

a

familiar tune, Triaca's

faction has sought dialogue with the Alfonsin
253

.

s

.

government 11

^

Clearly, with such
contending interests>
for labor movement
consolidation has been fraught
with
conflict.
In October 1985,
ubaldini succeeded in being
naaed the sole leader
of the COT.
To many analysts,
this signalled that his
faction had attained
dominance
over all the other
interests within the CGT
ubaldini
election represented a
significant move away from the
older conservative Peronist
labor leaders,
while still
olearly identifying with
Peronism, ubaldini was of a new
generation of labor leaders,
less tied to dogmatism and
to the strong-arm tactics
used by his predecessors.
He
was not implicated in the
alleged military-sindical pact
negotiations and he had a clear
record of criticizing
the past military junta.
His ascendancy
.

-

to the

presidency of the CGT in 1985
represented change,
although still within the traditional

Persist

framework

Relations between Ubaldini and the Radical
government
have oscillated between cordial and
confrontational.
The imposition of a state of siege in
October 1985 in
the wake of several right-wing sponsored
bombings was

supported by Ubaldini.

in the November 1985

congressional elections, Ubaldini stayed apart from

partisan politics.

While he of course supported the

Peronist party candidates, he did little electioneering
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.

on the party's behalf.

The Radicals won

a

comfortable

ma jori ty

The year 1986 however,
proved to be less cordial
and
more confrontational.
February, ubaldini called
a

m

general strike to protest
the lack of progress in
the
economy under the Austral
Plan.
This general strike
which effectively shut down
the country (it was called
for a Friday in the middle
of a summer heat wave) served
two purposes.
One was to demonstrate to all
the seeming

control Ubaldini held over the
labor movement.
The
ability to rally massive public
support is critical to
the credibility of any labor
leader.
The second was to
serve notice to Alfonsin that the
economic situation
needed to get better. Not only did
labor feel that the

country had somehow stalled, but nearly
all sectors of
society felt the same way.
Every political party (with
the exception of the Radicals) and
every major business

and social group in Argentina voiced their
support for
this general strike.

it should be noted that this

strike in no way called for the removal of the
Radicals,
but rather, it called for Alfonsin to take greater

strides in improving the economic welfare of the

nation 12
At the end of May, Ubaldini decided to pull the CGT
out of "concertation" talks between the government and

business groups.

In 1985, Alfonsin had created the
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Economic and Social
Conference
to bring together
labor,

(

CES

)

which was designed

business, and the relevant

state agencies to discuss
economic and social problems.
The ostensible purpose
of the CES was to create
a

tripartite pact between
government, labor, and business
which would work toward
incorporating the latter two
sectors into policy-making
and -implementing matters,
issues which were immediately
put
on the table were

wages, collective bargaining,
and social welfare
programs. Alfonsln hoped the CES
would be a vehicle

whereby he could win labor support
for his policies.
holding these concertation talks,

By

he hoped to

demonstrate to labor his sincere
commitment to dealing
with their concerns while at the
same time attempting to
moderate their growing militancy.
After

a

stormy year of negotiations, the CGT pulled

out of the talks claiming bad faith on
the part of the

government in continuing

a

dialogue.

for the walkout are still unclear,

while the reasons

it happened after a

salary adjustment policy had already been hammered out
by the three sectors.

Without formal CGT acceptance,

the salary adjustment was decreed into law.

it appears

that the Alfonsln government calculated the divisiveness

within the labor movement would enable

it

to negotiate

directly with more accommodating unions apart from the
CGT.
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It. calculations
proved correct as many
unions opted
to negotiate with
the government directly,
the most
-portent of which was the
Metalworkers <U0M> headed by

Lorenzo Miguel,

unhappy with Obaldini's
increasingly
confrontational stance toward
the government, Miguel
had
followed his own strategy
of dealing directly with
the
government over wage increases
for his
union.

The

importance for the government
of garnering UOM support
cannot be underestimated
as this powerful union
maintains a leadership role
in affecting how other
unions determine their
strategies for dealing with the
government
Other fallout from Ubaldini's
growing militancy was
to reignite the factionalism
still endemic in the labor

movement.
deputy.

Jorge Triaca ran for congress
and is now

a

He retained leadership of the
Plastics Union

and argued for greater collaboration
with the Radical
government.
The Commission of 25 and the
independent
unions have continued their pressure
to reform the labor

movement and have argued that Ubaldini is
too
personalistic.

Indeed, by 1986

called the Ubaldini stas

,

a

new group emerged

once again testifying to the

importance of personality in Argentine politics.
The year 1987 began with
the CGT.

a

general strike called by

On January 26th the CGT struck over

a

series

of demands which they argued the Radical government
had
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not taken adequate
action to redress.

-crease

Th ese included an

in the minimum
monthly wage,

revision of
collective contract
agreements, a target date
for a
return to collective
wage bargaining, and a
return of
c

-trol

of

obra^ociales funds

to the unions.

The

strike appeared to be
85% successful in industrial
areas.
ubaldini stressed that the
strike was over
policy and not for the
overthrow of the government.
The strike had little
impact on government policy,
with the Radicals continuing
to deal with unions on an
individual basis.
Ubaldini's power appeared to be
weakened, and in March, a new
group formed to rival his
control of the labor movement.
The "Commission
15"
of

(although encompassing about 50
unions), led by Jorge
Triaca, among others, declared
it would seek an

alternative to Ubaldini's confrontational
strategies.
Claiming not to rival the CGT for
power, the Commission
of 15 began independent talks with
the government.
The

Radical government seized upon the
opportunity and

opened its doors to negotiation.
At about the same time (March 1987),
Miguel's UOM

successfully negotiated with the government for

a

wage

increase which was above the ceiling the government
had

previously set.

This wage increase set off

a

crisis for

the Minister of Labor Hugo Barrionuevo who had been

against the wage hike.

He lost,
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and therefore resigned.

The Radicals used
this opportunity to
appoint a
'eranist, Carlos Ald.r.t..
to the position.
Mderete
was allied with the
Mission of 15 and it seemed clear
that the Radicals had
opted to court the more

accommodationist Commission
o£ 15 over that of the
confrontational CGT.
Not long after news of
labor dominated the headlines,
there occurred a severe
crisis in the Argentine
experiment with democracy.
Ever since the trials of the
former rulers of the military
juntas had taken place,
the military had embarked
on a public relations campaign
to cleanse its image and
to
limit the prosecutions of
men currently on active duty,
especially those in the
lower and middle ranks.
The military claims that the
war against subversion waged
in the 1970s made democracy
possible today.
They also feel that those men who
were
only following orders should be
exempt from

prosecution. 13
At the end of 1986, Alfonsin decreed
what was called
a

"full stop" law in which after February
22,

1987,

no

more cases would be accepted against military
men

accused of human rights abuses.

After the conviction of

the principal leaders of the past regimes,

a

large

number of lawsuits against particular military personnel
had been lodged by civilians.

Alfonsin argued that this

process could go on for years and prevent the nation
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m ° Vin9

80 he

"hen cases could be
loaded.

*

date for

a

final end to

From the ti». o£ the
announcement to February
22nd, several hundred
complaints had been lod
9 ed, far more than had been
anticipated by all sides.
The military became a
little
14
restless.
On April 15,

a

major in the army stationed
in the

provincial city of Cordoba
refused to appear before a
federal court to be
questioned concerning his role
in
human rights abuses
committed between 1976 and
1983.
He
was automatically
dismissed from the army and took
refuge in the Air Transport
Infantry Regiment in Cordoba
where he found supporters.
The crisis came when
the

commander of the Cordoba troops
told Alfonsin that his
troops were unwilling to obey
a government order to
arrest the major. 15
This sparked

a

similar mutiny at the far more

important Campo de Mayo Infantry School
just on the
outskirts of Buenos Aires on April
17th.
Both groups
demanded full amnesty for their actions
during military
rule.

The Cordoba problem was resolved
when the major

decided to give himself up to the authorities,
but the
Campo de Mayo crisis gripped the nation for
several

days.

Reports flew about as to who was participating

and whether the army commanders were in control. 16

This crisis touched off

26 0

a

massive outpouring of

.

support for Alfonsin and
public condemnation of the
army.
Thousands of people took
to the Plaza de Mayo
to
voice support for democracy.
Hundreds flocked to the
military garrisons to voice
their repudiation of the
military actions. After
much negotiation with the
army
high command, Alfonsin
decided to personally
go to the

Campo de Mayo to ask the
rebel military men to
surrender.
it worked, with Alfonsin
promising to
appoint a new army commander
and to consider their
17
complaints

immediately following the crisis,

a

new army

commander was appointed and Alfonsin
introduced a bill,
called "due obedience," which would
exonerate lowerranking military men of all wrong-doing
if they had only
been following orders.
This law went into effect at the
end of May, effectively reducing
the number of military
men who would face prosecution. 18
However, this does
not necessarily translate into renewed
strength on the
part of the military.

Recalling Robert Potash's

observation, the army takes power when it has received

widespread popular support.

The events of May and June

1987 demonstrated the public's commitment to the

Alfonsin regime and public repudiation of the army.
Despite having won

a

victory in gaining passage of an

amnesty law, the army was still far from regaining its
past political power.
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The second half o£
1987 was dominated by
the byelections scheduled
£or September in which
half of the
national deputies and
twenty-two governorships
were up
for contestation
along with a host of
provincial and
municipal seats.
Perhaps concerned about
the Radicalsshowing in the elections,
Alfonsln-s

government drafted
several laws which dealt
with long-standing union
grievances.
Among the draft proposals
were included the
establishment of a certain
number of union delegates
per
factory, the creation of
special labor courts, the
legalization of work stoppages
and work to rule tactics,
and salary concessions. 19
The conservative Union
of Argentine Industrialists
(UIA) raised objections
to this legislation and were
successful in having the
legislation stalled
in the

senate.

Alfonsln was unable to capitalize
on gains for
labor by September.
Instead, his party lost
to the

Peronists, with the latter capturing
41.5% of the
deputies vote and sixteen of the
twenty-two

governorships.

The Radicals lost their majority
in the

Chamber of Deputies.

It was not

just the labor sector

which had caused Alfonsin's loss, but
also what seemed
to be his inability to refuel economic
growth and to
deal with the debt crisis. 20

The PeriSnist victory of September 1987 has
led to

a

seemingly more accommodationist tone by Alfonsln
toward
262

•"or,

the months since
September 1987,
90ve rnra ent has signed
a minimum wage
l-w>
t.

the Radical

certain union activities,
and signed a free
collective
bargaining l aw
Wage negotiations
»"d labor in the
latter part c£ 1987 were
successful at
getting the CGT to call
off threatened strikes,
as the
unions decided to adopt
a wait and see
attitude toward
government economic policy. 21
.

in February 1988,

the government set up a
minimum

wage council, which was
another attempt at a tripartite
pact between labor, business,
and government over
economic issues.
The four CGT members on the
council

represented the Ubaldinista and
Commission of 25
factions of the CGT. 22 The
Commission of 15, had of
sorts, re-entered the fold
by allying with
the 62

Organizations led by Lorenzo Miguel.

Their strategies

of collaborating with the
Radical government had failed
to win them power and influence. 23

Meanwhile, the nation was shaken by
another military
revolt at the beginning of 1988.
The leader of the
revolt was the same colonel who had led
the Easter

uprisings of the year before.

This time,

the army was

able to quell the revolt (there were an
estimated

hundred sympathizers) without
However,

a

great deal of effort.

this incident and the continuing contention by

some military sectors that their war on subversion
was
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f°"e

reminds us all that the
military remains &
to contend with
in Latin American
politics. 2 <

C^£clu^i£n
When Alfonsin was
elected in October 1983,
.any longtime observers of
Argentine politics took bets
on how
long he would last in
power, dubious of the
survivability of civilian
rule in a nation racked
by
fifty years of internal
conflict.
At present, after
four and a half years
in power, most analysts
see

Alfonsin serving out his term
through 1989.
nation is already gearing

indeed,

the

up for the 1989 election.

Alfonsin has named his successor
to the Radical party
and the Persists are
continuing their internal struggle
between the orthodox and renovation!
st wings.
The campaign for the 1989
presidency will undoubtedly

determine the nature of the political
game for the next
year and a half.
There are already signs that Alfonsin
is seeking greater accommodation
with certain groups,
such as labor.
On the heels of the September 1987
electoral defeats, Alfonsin delivered on
several longstanding labor demands.
In February 1988, he called for
a

minimum wage council as

a

way to once again create

a

tripartite social pact.

Along with Radical policy, the internal politics
of
the labor movement have shown change.
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Factionalism

continues to rack the
CGT, but in the past
several
years, the more
reform-oriented factions have
gained
increasing leverage.
The hard core Persists,
such as
Lorenzo Miguel, while
still very powerful, are
no longer
dominant.
The factions led by
Ubaldini, the Commission
of 25, and the
Independents have proven effective
at

winning support.
The trend toward reform
within the labor movement
will undoubtedly be slow
and turbulent.
However, that
it

is happening at all

speaks to the nature of change

within Argentine society.

Per6nism will continue to be

the major force in the labor
movement, but what PerOnism

will mean and look like to new
generations of labor will
be different.
change will occur, although there is
always the risk of reversals, but
it will be change
within certain set parameters.
Those parameters are at

present being negotiated under the democratic
regime.
One analyst of the current Argentine
political scene,
Paul Buchanan, has argued that much work
needs to be

done in analyzing labor-state relations within

democratic framework.

corporatism within

a

a

He argues for the need to look at

democratic context, i.e., how are

inclusionary corporatist strategies for mediating labor
demands different for regime types--author i tarian,
populist, and democratic.

J 5

This would be

a

fruitful

area for research on what exactly is democracy
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— Latin

American style.
Apart fro. the labor
scene

CmliM
«vil

CUle

""""""

*

unrest.

,

th . gceatest threat

^

the mili tary rather
than

The mflitary continues
to assert
displeasure over certain
Radical policies but its
campaign to rehabilitate
its image has not won
widespread adherence.
The political health of
the
nation remains critical
as Argentina attempts to
carry
on with the business
o£ democratic rebuilding.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The transition to civilian
rule in Argentina was the
result of a complex web of
actors, events, and policies

situated within the context
of the nation's own
particular culture and history.
There was no singular
cause, no chain of events,
no particular individuals

which definitively caused the
breakdown of authoritarian
rule.
Rather, the breakdown of authoritarian
rule

proceeded by fits and starts, and
involved
cast of characters and

a

a

diverse

series of bad political

judgments which culminated in the
political opening
toward democracy. what the preceding
pages have
attempted to do was to explore one facet
in that

transition from authoritarian to democratic
rule, namely
the role the labor union movement played
in this

process.

This thesis sought to argue that the labor

union movement did play
of the military,

a

significant role in the demise

despite the many rivalries and

divisions which plagued its ranks.
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And it has sought to

.

illustrate how

«ti«

a

supposedly entrenched
authoritarian
was ultimately
incapable of maintaining
civil

order
T». Point of
departure was the idea
that the military
:unta in Argentina
from 1976 to 1983 shared
.any of the
characteristics of o-Donnell',
bureaucratic-

authoritarian state.

There was

a

military committed to

its project of managing
the country.

It pursued an

economic program which
sought to weed out inefficient
national firms and to
contract a burgeoning state
bureaucracy.
To fuel economic growth,
it sought foreign
capital investment.
The military in power saw
as its
primary obstacle the highly
organized and politicized
labor unions.
Its strategy for dealing with
labor was
to "exclude" then, from
their economic project through
the use of repression.
under General Videla, the regime
had no intention of
leaving power once law and order
were restored.
It saw
its role as going beyond restoring
civil peace to the

institution of an economic program which
would develop
and modernize a beleaguered nation.
To revitalize a
stagnant economy, this regime sought to
encourage
foreign capital investment while at the
same time

cutting back on social welfare expenditures.

An attempt

was also made by the civilian Minister of the
Economy

Martinez de Hoz to pull the state out of vital
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industries, but this
met
the .ilitary,

inning

wUh

^

^^^

so that the military's
influence over the

of the economy
remained strong.

To carry out its
economic program,

resorted to repression
and terror.
repression could be attributed

the military junta

The ferocity of this

to the high level of

political mobilization on
the part of social groups
Prior to 1976, namely labor.
since the 1940s, labor had
shared a role in influencing
the politics of the nation.
Peron had incorporated this
group into the political
system and created a class
of labor leaders whose
power
sometimes rivaled those in
political office. Along with
the military, landed elites,
and urban bourgeoisie,
labor came to be

a

significant political force.

To the

military, labor's identification
with Peron and the need
to ensure a docile labor
force in order to attract
foreign investment, necessitated
that labor be singled
out for special treatment.
While no group of people was
immune from the military's repression,
labor was

particularly attacked in the junta's attempt
to
undermine the labor movement's very existence.
The attempt at "exclusionary bureaucratic-

authoritarianism" was
the opposition,

initially successful in silencing

although labor rank and file continued

to strike over bread-and-butter issues.

Combined with

economic policies which were not working as planned, the
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-litary junta

,

s

^

hegemonic

t

^

Problem of presidential
succession which came up
ln 1980
also complicated
things as lt
dissension
three branches of the
armed forces.
The alliance
"hich had brought the
military to power was
having a
difficult time maintaining
itself in power.

^^^^

From 1980 onward, the
authoritarian system began to
unravel.
The economy began once
again to spiral out of
control with high inflation.
The banking system
collapsed and unemployment
rose to unprecedented
levels.
The first major
demonstrations against regime
policy
were called by the labor
union elite despite continued
repression.
The ascension to power of
General Viola
inaugurated a series of moves
by other military factions
to unseat him.
At the same time, there was
the

mobili 2at ion of other groups
in society, such as the
political parties and human rights
associations, against
the regime.

When General Galtieri came to power
in
in December 1981,

a

coup d'etat

the stage was set for disaster.

Committed to staying in power at whatever
costs, he paid
off old debts by taking Argentina
to war.
Faced with
opposition both from within the junta and from
the

public, Galtieri decided the time was ripe
for an

invasion of the Malvinas.
aside, the war was

a

All strategic considerations

political ploy to gain time for
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a

.

.

*alte*i„ g regime.

when the ploy £ailed
as Argenuna
lost the war, the
regime ca»e tumbling
down and the
tracks
One of the keys to
understanding how and why
this
course of events took
place was to look at a
certain
aspect of military-civil
relations, the relationship
between the labor union
movement and the junta.
it is
the argument of this
thesis that the literature
on

bureacuratic authoritarianism
and authoritarianism in
general have ignored the
substantive role which civilian
groups can play in the breakdown
of authoritarian
regimes.

m

analyzing the political activities
of the
labor elite from 1976 to
1983, the thesis has attempted
to demonstrate that
authoritarian controls imposed by
the militay were in the long
run ineffective at creating
a docile labor force.
It is also argued
that the labor

elite constantly sought opportunities
to recast its
position within the political arena
and that eventually,
it aided in destabilizing the
authoritarian military
regime

Recent studies on the policies carried out
by the
junta have shown that one of the junta's
main goals was
to strip the labor movement of its political
power and

its economic control over worker-related
issues such as

collective bargaining and social welfare benefits.
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To

do this,

the junta applied
physical,

legal,

and

obstructive means in dealing
with labor.
Labor leaders
were jailed and many
were tortured and murdered.
Laws
were promulgated which
outlawed strikes, freedom of
assembly, and the existence
of the CGT
Policies were
put in place to remove
labor
leaders from their offices
(to be replaced by
military interveners), to put
.

the

control of labor union
funds into the hands of the
military, and to prevent
labor influence in matters
concerning wages and other
work-related issues.
This attack by the junta was
successful initially in
repressing labor activism and
opposition to regime
policy.
The immediate jailing of the
principal labor
leaders, the intervention of the
principal unions, and
the immediate implementation
of labor laws restricting
labor activity gave labor little
chance to formulate
strategies for dealing with the regime.
Instead, with
the major labor leaders in jail,

there emerged

a

new

group of men who came to fill the void left
by those in
jail.

Leaders of the non-intervened unions (which were

for the most part the smaller less politically

influential unions), also began to exercise muscle in
the now very confined parameters of political action.

This development had the effect of creating and

exacerbating divisions among labor leaders once the
detained labor leaders were let out of jail.
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Diff *tenCeS

° f ° Pini0n

C -tered around
the issue of how
best to deal with
the junta on labor-related
matters
One faction called
for a strategy of
negotiation and
dialogue with the junta
on strictly labor issues,
with
no mention of other
pressing political matters
such as
the extent of the
repression and the mounting
number of
disappearances. Another
faction, fresh from

jail and

seeing their union power
eclipsed by military
interveners, advocated a
strategy of greater demand
making and confrontation.
The preoccupation of the
contending factions in the
first three years of military
rule was of recouping the
power lost in the initial
repression, most especially to

prevent the new Law of Professional
Associations from
being passed.
Both sides recognized the inherently
debilitating effect this new legislation
would have on
the structure and power of the
labor union movement, and

claimed to be working against its
passage.

Both sides

also claimed to be seeking solutions
to labor's growing
economic crisis.

While the labor elite factions were busy
jockeying to
gain dominance over the labor movement, labor
rank and

file was busy voicing its demands through strikes.

The

existence of these strikes made it imperative for the
labor elite to demonstrate to rank and file that it was

taking steps to alleviate the dire economic situation.
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It initially did
this by using the forums
Qf

international labor
organizations to criticize
regime
Policies.
However, this was not
enough and the labor
elite had to become
more critical of the regime,
especially those labor
readers who were predisposed
to
dialogue and accommodation.
It bears

remembering at this point that
historically,
the Argentine labor
elite was a "conservative"
group of
leaders, disinclined to
call strikes except to prove
the
extent of their own power.
it is also a pragmatic
group, liberal in its economic
outlook, and highly
nationalistic.
Yet, it was caught in a bind
when
mediating the state's interests
with those of rank and
file demands.
Because the state had the power to
recognize a union and its leaders
as being

"representative" of

a

group's interests, any union

leader necessarily had to tow the
state's line to some
extent.
This was in keeping with the corporatist

paradigm whereby the leaders of special
interests were
beholden to the state and must "educate" their
constituency to accept state policies.
indicator of the control

a

An important

labor leader had over his

rank and file was the ability to control strikes--

without this power,
regime.

a

labor leader was useless to the

However, to be able to control strikes, the

labor leader had to necessarily satisfy or appear to be
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working for labor's
interests in some way. What
happened was that the
labor leaders were often
forced

"present rank and file demands
over

to

the interests of

the state.
in this particular
case,

the lack of improvement
over

the economic situation
forced the labor elite to
harden
its stance against the
regime, especially on the
part of

those who were initially
willing to cooperate with the
regime.
The bread-and-butter issues
of labor rank and
file made it easy to
organize strikes, so strikes
persisted throughout the regime's
tenure.
The existence
of a faction of the labor
elite calling for greater

confrontation also played

a

more critical of the regime.

role in pushing labor to be
it was therefore

in the

labor elite's self-interest to
demand greater

concessions for labor so as to appear to
be in control
of the situation.

What labor leaders always dreaded happening
was to
have strikes called without their support,
for this

would signal to the regime that they had lost
control
and influence over the rank and file.

In such a case,

the regime would have little reason to negotiate
with

them.

This was especially dangerous as within the labor

movement there were always others waiting for the

opportunity to come to power.
continues to be

a

This,

by the way,

dilemma for the labor elite.
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Labor leaders, in
effect,

Proverbial bind between

a

found themselves in that

rock and a hard place.

xf

it

is accepted that
Argentine labor leaders
sought to

safeguard their own
self-interest primarily, then
given
the economic situation,
they were forced to
agitate for
greater concessions for
labor and against the
wishes of
the regime.
This was especially so
because
the regime

remained impervious to labor
demands between 1976 and
1982.
Those labor leaders who
attempted to negotiate
with the regime saw their
efforts continually stymied
as
time went on, forcing them
to take more critical
stands.
Granted, several labor leaders
sought accommodation with
the regime to the very end,
but those who had

consistently opposed the regime
obtained dominance over
the direction of labor activism,
thereby marginalizing
the others' efforts.
No less important to the notion
of self-interest was
the concern with institutional
survival.

had embarked on

a

The military

program to dismantle the structural

and economic base of the labor
movement.

Its ultimate

goal was to force the labor movement
back to pre-Peron

days when labor was fairly inarticulate
of its demands
and not much of

a

political presence.

This attack on

the institutional existence of the labor
movement,

as

personified by the outlawing of the CGT, was another
reason for why an otherwise pragmatic labor elite took
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.

*

opposin, the regime

,

even at great

^^^^

risks

themselves

"

is apparent from
my argument that the
labor elite
U p. had little choice
» 9
hut to take

«

'

an opposing

stance against the
regime.

Because of the nature
of

labor's demands ana
and btpjuua
4-u
because of the
unstable influence
with which the labor
elite yielded its power,
they could
not be as easily
disenfranchised from political
power as
a 9roup.
Labor leaders were continually
called upon to
prove themselves and their
loyalty to labor.
Even
before schisms within the
armed forces became public,
factions of the labor elite
had taken the bold step
of
calling a political demonstration
against
the regime.

The attempt at excluding
labor from the bureaucratic-

authoritarian project never succeeded
in silencing this
group,
when the door was opened in
1980 to allow some
relaxation of the repression,
labor jumped right in and
became more vociferous in its
criticism of the regime.
The impact this labor agitation
had over the regime

was troubling at the very least
and destabilizing in the
end.
The demands of labor constantly
brought into
question the effectiveness of the regime
in maintaining
law and order and in managing the
economy.
The lack of

long-term success in muting labor's demands
caused rifts
within the junta and pressure to bear over
policy
decisions.

The fateful decision to go to war on April
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1982, was a direct response
to the bloody labor
demonstrations of narcn
March ioth.
301-h
«.u
As the
regime tottered,
labor got stronger.
2-

The fact that the labor
union movement helped to
destabilize the military regime
does not

necessarily

translate into helping to bring
about democratic rule.
The process of regime
breakdown does not inherently lead
to the instauration of
another regime type, although in
this particular case, a democratic
government
came to

power.

while still in its tentative stages,
the past
four and a half years of democratic
rule illustrate some

of the important consequences
of regime transition and

liberalization.
The labor union movement remains
divided and

contentious over who should lead and in what
way labor
interests should be pursued. what did occur
once the

military was finally out, was the emergence to
dominance
of the labor leaders who had fought against
the regime.

This meant, in most cases,

that younger,

less dogmatic

men came into the labor elite, men who espoused the need
for reform.

There continues to be however, those who

are committed to maintaining the closed vertical

structure of labor organization, but this generation of
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.

men have much iess
i^-pi
" Ipcc mfluence
than before.
What is especial ly
interesting is the £act
that many
°* the leaders who advocated
negotiating with the
military are now at
the forefront of
pushing for
negotiation with the Radical
governs. These men are
clearly pure opportunists
seeking to maximize their
individual self-interests
by currying favor with
whomever is in the Casa
Rosada.
It could therefore be
argued that these individuals
play a neutral role in
matters of regime change.
The fact that they
collaborated with the military
makes them no more
authoritarian than the fact
that they are collaborating
with a democratic regime
makes them inherently
democratic. What becomes
important therefore is to
gauge the extent of the changing
alliances within the
movement
To date,

those in control of the CGT have
followed

a

middle of the road course vis-a-vis
the Radical regime.
There has been give and take on
both sides, despite an

economic situation which is slow to
improve.

The labor

union elite, as with most every other
group in society,
is giving the Radicals the benefit
of a doubt.
While
conflict exists between government and labor,
it centers
around economic issues and not on the legitimacy
of the

Radicals to make policy.

Nor does the Radical regime

aspire to destroying the institutional existence
of the
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.

CCT.

while Mfonsin seeks
reform, he is astute
enough
to seek this reform
slowly and with caution.
Perhaps what Argentina
has finally realized is
the
need to seek accommodation
and compromise among
contending interests. As a
nation, it is still
recovering from the shock of
those dark days under
military rule.
it needs the time and
space to breathe
new life into its culture
and politics.
As such, when
the military uprisings
occurred last year, the

population rose up in
military.

a

wave of disgust against the

This was important in light of
how in the

past, military coups were always
supported by the
public.
That these particular actions by
the military
had the opposite effect is encouraging
for the future of

democracy in Argentina.
It is as yet premature to judge
whether Argentina's

experiment with democracy will survive into
the next
decade.
if the O'Donnell and Schmitter
elements for

a

successful transition are taken into consideration,
then
there are several encouraging signs that
Argentina may
be on the road to democratic instauration
In the first instance,

analysts of the Argentine

transition have agreed that the outgoing military regime
was an unmitigated disaster.

The clear-cut failures of

the Argentine junta stripped the military of credibility
as effective governors.

The military option,
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for the

ti-

being at least, was
no longer viable.
This enabled
the civilians to
take over the reigns of
power.
A second element,
related
to the first,

for

successful transition is
the idea of pacts.
The
outgoing military junta
was unable to negotiate a
pact
with civilian groups
before leaving power.
instead,
Argentina remains the only
South American nation which
has successfully tried
and convicted its former
military
leaders for their policies.
The absence of a militarysindical pact and the successful
trials further stripped
the military of any
substantive role in governing.

Contrast the Argentine case with
that of Brazil, where
Sarney's government has been much
more tied to military
interests.

Also,

has been mixed,
a

the record of the Brazilian
military

so that the military option has

remained

greater threat there than in Argentina.

O'Donnell and Schmitter also argue that
pacts
negotiated between civilian groups speak well
toward

democratic instauration

.

in Argentina,

there have been

several attempts at pact making between civilian
groups.
The first one, the Social and Economic Conference,
ended
in failure.

However,

the creation of

a

minimum wage

council in 1988 was another effort at pact making and

negotiations continue.

This is

a

healthy sign as it

appears that business, labor, and government are

committed to working together.
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A third element
for successful
transition is
elections.
The free elections
of 1983 broke the
time-onored tradition of a
much expected Peronist
victor,
The failure of the
Peronists to win (they'd
won every
election in which they'd
been allowed to participate,
^nailed to all that abiding by
the procedural aspects
of democracy did not
lead to foregone conclusions.
Not
only was this significant
for the transition, but
the
elections did not give the
Radicals a landslide victory.
The Peronists and several
smaller parties won enough
votes to be significant
players in the democratic game.
The by-elections of 1985
and 1987 spoke to this
as well.
The loss by the Radicals
of a congressional

majority in

1987 could be interpreted to mean
that party politics is
truly taking off.
The uncertain outcome of the
1989

presidential elections has galvanized
all key civilian
groups to play the game of open
political competition.
In short,

the elections of 1983,

given all civilian groups

a

1985,

and 1987 have

stake in continuing the

democratic game.
In light of the upcoming
presidential elections of

1989,

the next year and

Argentina.

a

half will be critical for

Along with the encouraging signs for

democracy, there continues to persist several
important

danger signs as well.

Alfonsin has been unable to solve

Argentina's economic problems, and it was this fact
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which cost him the
1987 elections
perhaps
this area that
external forces e
the 0 . s ., the
g
could play a role.
The military continues
to be

u ^ ^

.

,

.

.

,

a

Problem although less

so than in other Latin
American

nations.

For now, Alfonsln is in
control, but the
rumblings from the barracks
continue.

However the experiment with
democratization works
cut, Argentina will
have taken some bold strides
in
dealing with its legacy of
authoritarianism and civil
strife.
The democracy Argentina
so sorely desires is in
its infant stages, and it
is still far from clear
whether it will blossom into
full bloom.
The nation is
seeking to develop democracy in
its own way,
on its own

terms.

The challenge for Argentines
is to test whether

democracy can lead to social peace
and economic
prosperity.
The decision is theirs

and theirs alone.
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